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 Introduction
Reif ication and Spectacle: The Timeliness of Western 
Marxism1
Samir Gandesha and Johan F. Hartle
1. Yiwu: The Cryptogram of the Spectacle
We take our point of departure from the immense collection of commodi-
ties-become-spectacles of the trading stalls of Yiwu in the People’s Republic 
of China, which we visited together in spring 2014 (Figure 1). If China as a 
whole has become the ‘workshop of the world’, then the mid-sized city of 
Yiwu located four hours southwest of Shanghai by train is its showroom. If 
the factories arrayed around the Shenzhen region of China have become 
the central sites of production in the global economy, in which the Middle 
Kingdom has participated with particular energy and dynamism since the 
structural reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, then Yiwu, with its 
wholesale market, the so-called ‘China Commodity City’, constitutes the 
Figure 1. Trading stalls of Yiwu in the People’s Republic of China. Photo by Samir Gandesha and 
Johan F. Hartle.
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nodal point for commodity exchange and accelerated capital circulation. 
It is a living monument to Deng’s infamous ‘Capitalist road to socialism’, 
as if somehow, in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1949, that particular 
pathway could be thought and traversed independently of that specif ic 
destination.
Yiwu has only increased in importance since the aftermath of 9/11, 
we were told, with the tectonic shift of the Muslim world away from the 
United States towards China.2 The evidence of such a shift is provided 
by the myriad Turkish coffee houses and Pakistani restaurants that line 
its bustling streets. In the endless stalls and shop windows of its com-
mercial market one f inds rows and rows of kitsch objects, souvenirs, 
Christmas decorations, ersatz art depicting familiar Biblical scenes such 
as the Crucif ixion and the Last Supper, cute animals and cuddly teddy 
bears, children’s toys, knick-knacks, and doodads, objects that sell not 
in the hundreds but the hundreds of thousands and millions of units to 
the legions of merchants who descend daily upon Yiwu from all over the 
world to place orders for their shops back home. Last but not least it was, 
ironically, in Yiwu where the police tested its men to prepare for the 2016 
world economic summit to take place in Hangzhou as if to give visibility 
to the manifest and forceful ways in which global capital operates (see 
cover image).
What we f ind specif ically in this epicentre of the global economy is pre-
cisely what has been identif ied in the period leading up to 9/11: the process 
by which it unleashes a certain rhythm of colonization on the world as was 
f irst captured by Rosa Luxemburg in her seminal text The Accumulation of 
Capital (See Retort Collective, 2004). Expanding ever outwards, well beyond 
the limit of the nation-state, ‘capital accumulated to the point where it 
becomes images’, transcends its ‘diffuse’ (Fordist), ‘concentrated’ (socialist) 
and ‘integrated’ (post-Fordist) forms and now becomes truly planetary. The 
unprecedented levels of economic growth and development in the periphery 
now enable social subjects of those societies to putatively participate in 
such development.
However, rather than benefitting materially, through increased access 
to clean water, housing, primary and secondary education, citizens of 
China (and one could say BRIC societies as a whole) other than a rather 
modest, emerging middle class, participate in capitalist development only 
virtually and passively by consuming its spectral image, only in the form 
of the spectacularization of national economic and political power on the 
stage of global power politics.3 Inwardly, this leads to, indeed requires, a 
redoubled ‘colonization of everyday life’, not only through endogenous 
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f ilm and television, India’s Bollywood, for example, but also through the 
penetration of what we might term a kind of ‘micro-spectacle’ in the form 
of ever-shrinking and portable digital technology: the computers, iPads, 
iPhones, iWatches, wearable technologies, and the universally accessible 
social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Renren, Weibo, including a whole 
host of ‘hook-up’ sites, that they make immediately available and present, 
whose varied and precise algorithms reflect back to us our own desires. 
‘Micro-spectacle’ describes a condition whereby forms of immaterial labour 
are appropriated by a form of ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2009) 
with an apparently insatiable appetite for digitally mediated communica-
tion, information that can then be fed into various marketing, actuarial 
and security circuits. Citizen-subjects are therefore kept in a dizzyingly 
permanent state of distraction, which results in political paralysis, although 
not in a way that completely rules out the use of these technologies against 
separation itself, as we discuss below.
Signif icantly, however, the terrain of resistance lies, in a manner that 
could perhaps never have been imagined by the originator of the concept 
of détournement, in the way in which the ‘spectacle’ could be turned 
against itself. This was already intimated by the repetition compulsion 
that manifested in the seemingly endless loop of the sequence of the twin 
planes f lying into the Twin Towers, although with little or no apparent 
impact on a sanitized US popular culture (the event was not permitted to 
strain the upbeat ‘vibe’ of the Manhattan-set sitcom Friends, for example.) 
These attacks not only sought to land blows on the basic pillars of US power, 
the Pentagon and the Twin Towers, but as a response to the US’s growing 
involvement in the Arab world, they can be understood as an attempt to 
confront the very logic of modernization itself.
In the f irst Gulf War, with its so-called ‘smart bombs’ and hyper-voyeur-
ism, killing seemed to have become a pure matter of its representation. This 
constituted a prelude to our own drone age, represented after a decade or 
so of theoretical exuberance—perhaps itself an illusory symptom of Bill 
Clinton’s so-called ‘peace dividend’. The very limit of a kind of orgiastic 
postmodern excess reached its nadir in the claim made by one famous 
cultural critic that this war simply did not take place and was merely the 
simulacrum of a war (Baudrillard, 1995). (Try telling this story to a Kurdish 
family!) By the time of the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing counterattack on 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that provided safe harbour for al-Qaeda, 
a certain lesson was learned and the position, this time, from the same critic 
was that this new line of conflict represented nothing short of the ‘fourth 
world war’ (Baudrillard, 2004).
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A much more sober and productive discussion, in front of the backdrop 
of massive worldwide mobilization against the imminent and soon-to-be 
catastrophic invasion of Iraq by the US on 15 February 2003, could be 
discerned in a series of conversations undertaken by Giovanna Borradori, 
published as Philosophy in a Time of Terror, with erstwhile philosophical 
foes Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, who had just written an open 
letter on the possible emergence of a new ‘European public sphere’.4 Both 
Habermas and Derrida see the event as resulting from the uneven nature 
of globalization, which has explosively combined a widening of social and 
economic inequities between North and South with the destruction of the 
symbolic resources of various lifeworlds, particularly in Islamic and Arabic 
regions. In the course of modernization, claims to universality become 
more and more problematic while the counter-strategy of fundamental-
ism seems to offer a concrete alternative. The sheer ubiquity of global 
capitalism, so Habermas and Derrida realize, subjects the normative 
resources stored up in local traditions to an almost unbearable pressure. 
What Derrida calls the ‘auto-immune’ response of terrorism, then, is the 
response to the increasing colonization of lifeworlds by strategic forms of 
rationality. The false concreteness of fundamentalism seems to provide 
an alternative to the crumbling social relations and normative founda-
tions behind the glamorous and promising surface of commodif ication 
(Gandesha, 2006).
What neither philosopher properly grasps, however, is the way in which 
the commodifying logic of globalization unleashes profound and troubling 
anxieties within societies in which centuries-old traditions that are already 
under siege are challenged not just from the outside but from within as 
well. The best account of the transformation of the conditions of cultural 
life by an ever-globalizing capitalism remains, of course, Marx and Engels’s 
Shakespearean paean to the transformative, liberating dynamics of capital-
ism in the Communist Manifesto, in whose English translation one can hear 
clear echoes of the Tempest:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of 
all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish 
the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All f ixed, fast-frozen relations, 
with the train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept 
away, all new ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is 
solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned and man is at last compelled 
to face with sober senses [mit nüchternen Augen] his real conditions of 
life, and his relations with his kind. (Marx and Engels, 2008, pp. 38–39)
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The uprooting of traditional social relations and community-based forms 
of life produces a political vacuum, very often f illed with the spectacular 
imagery of concreteness, idols, and violence. These forms of concreteness 
are, in other words, part of the spell that capital itself produces. Nothing 
seems to escape the utter immanence of the system. This is made especially 
clear in the media strategy of the newly arisen geopolitical player in the 
Middle East: the Sunni organization ISIS or ISIL (Islamic State in Syria/
Levant) probably best known as Daesh (in Arabic, it is a mocking term 
meaning literally ‘one who crushes underfoot’). Since its emergence in the 
chaos that has unfolded in post-invasion Iraq, post-civil war Syria and in 
the aftermath of the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, this formation has 
orchestrated a particularly deft media strategy by releasing high-definition 
video clips of its atrocities5—most recently its attacks on the twin spec-
tacles of a heavy-metal rock show at Le Bataclan and a football match 
between Germany and France at Le Stade de France—via the internet to 
prospective recruits but also to a Western media which, in a state of crisis 
and intensive competition, compulsively and pathologically relies upon 
ever-more sensationalistic content to package, gloss, and market. In its very 
profit-maximizing logic, however, the Western media aids and abets Daesh 
in accomplishing its own strategic objectives: inducing nothing less than a 
condition of panic in ever-larger numbers of the population.6
In the absence of an organized Left in the Arab and Persian Worlds, either 
via co-optation or elimination, to enable popular forces to truly face the 
‘real conditions of life’, namely, social relations as such, what has come to 
occupy the space of resistance are conservative revolutionary movements. 
They, for example, took power in Iran in 1979 and momentarily Egypt in the 
aftermath of Tahrir Square. The ‘fundamentalist spectacle’ (Lütticken, 2008, 
p. 83), however, structurally repeats the nihilist vision of capitalist modernity 
in more than one respect: Where representation rules (both in the realm of the 
visual and in the realm of politics), alternatives will be rare if they appear at all.
The critique of reif ication and spectacle therefore also suggests an epis-
temic shift or a change of standpoint from the atomized reality of reif ied 
social relations and the glossy surface of hyper-capitalist idolatry, on the 
one hand, to the self-organization of those social forces that constitute and 
produce social reality, on the other. In other words, in the absence of an 
organized, self-confident workers’ movement prepared aggressively to take 
up Nietzsche’s dictum that ‘Whatever is falling deserves a push’, what we 
see is a quintessentially modern mobilization of the traditions organized 
around the idea of the ‘holy’, in opposition to an all-too ‘profane’ logic: what 
Marx elsewhere in the Manifesto deems the ‘callous cash payment’.
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However distorted the spectacle of terror might be, it may still contain 
an obscured image of social totality. The object of the attack on 9/11 was 
the multinational workforce housed at the World Trade Center as well 
as the military and security apparatus whose role it was to maintain the 
stability of the economic and geopolitical order established by Bretton 
Woods (in the Pentagon). On the other side of spectacle (see Lütticken, 
2008), an equally distorted but equally symptomatic image was given: While 
typically understanding very little, if anything, and, indeed, visibly shaken 
and seemingly paralyzed upon learning the news about the attacks on the 
morning of September 11, George W. Bush did, however, possess unique 
insight into the real objective of the attack—the nihilism of expanded 
capital accumulation for it own sake and without limit. He unwittingly 
made this clear the day after the attacks when he enjoined US citizens to 
do their duty and go shopping or, indeed, to visit Disney World in Florida. 
This makes perfect sense: In the minds of those in power the world is truly 
a Manichean one, not so much divided by ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, as such, but 
rather by opposing versions of spectacle (Disney World versus 9/11).
But the problem of the spectacle, which emerges anew on 11 September 
2001, has a more complex valence: the long-gestating Arab Revolutions.7 Ten 
years later, sparked by the tragic self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, 
the roadside fruiterer constantly harassed by the Tunis police, massive 
regional political convulsions were rapidly set in motion. In the region’s 
most important state, Egypt, these led to, amongst other things, the rise 
and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in elections following the toppling of 
the Mubarak junta, climaxing in—itself a farcical repetition that echoed 
that of Napoleon III so acerbically described by Marx—Mubarak being 
replaced by Mubarakhism in the person of General Sisi.
Egypt’s Tahrir Square, however, in September 2011, was the powerfully 
compelling inspiration behind the Occupy Movement that launched itself 
four years after the bottom fell out of the global economy, as many US-based, 
supposedly ‘too-big-to-fail’ f inancial institutions were brought to their 
knees by virtue of their ‘exposure’ to macro-economic shocks through mas-
sive investments in ‘sub-prime’ mortgages and other f inancial instruments 
of highly dubious worth. The Occupy Movement was itself sparked by the 
call of Kalle Lasn, editor of the modest yet influential Vancouver-based 
‘culture-jamming’ magazine Adbusters, to ‘Occupy Wall Street!’ against the 
image of a ballerina gingerly perched on Wall Street’s raging bull. ‘Bring 
folding chairs!’ it implored.
The call evinced the direct and abiding impact of Guy Debord’s influence, 
his analysis of the hegemony of the image, the spectacle, via advertising, 
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as well as his strategy of ‘détournement ’ as a refashioning and re-purposing 
of the spectacle in such a way that undermines its initial aims: namely, a 
disempowering of the people, a devitalization of life, in a word ‘separation’. 
It was testimony to the Situationist International slogan: ‘We express what’s 
on everyone’s minds’.
The ‘Occupy Movement’, such as it was called, manifested itself through-
out North America and Europe and was roundly criticized in the main-
stream media for its apparent inability to clearly articulate its demands. 
What the media seems to have missed is the fact that the movement was 
less about concrete-material demands that could be met, i.e. progressive 
income taxation, re-distribution of wealth, the provision of social housing, 
a guaranteed annual income, an increase in the minimum wage,8 than it 
was about meeting the spectacle on its own terms. After all, one can make 
demands of a social democratic sort strictly within the purview of the 
spectacle.9 This seems to be what Occupy was really about and in this can 
be seen as the attempt to reconstitute the very nature of political space 
along the lines suggested by the Situationist International in the form 
of the constitution of a geographically concrete ‘situation’ by means of 
‘psychogeography’, or pulses of attraction/repulsion as they spontaneously 
manifest themselves in the urban milieu, the ‘dérive’, or experiencing the 
city by way of an aestheticized ‘drifting’, or by what Lefebvre and later 
Harvey call the ‘right to the city’.
The nature of the spectacle has, however, been profoundly misunder-
stood by postmodern cultural and media theorists who themselves engage 
in a curious act of amnesia and therefore of separation by dissociating the 
concept of the spectacle from corresponding key concepts that belonged to 
the core vocabulary of Western Marxism. The critique of a reif ied social life, 
of social totality, in the language of Lukács-inspired Hegelian Marxism all 
the way through to Debord himself, allowed for a profound socio-economic 
analysis and critique but also, more significantly, made it possible to identify 
traces of the prospects for political resistance and indeed transformation 
that the concept of ‘spectacle’ (at least in its contemporary revenants) more 
often than not—and much against its inherent ambition—tends to de-
emphasize. It is as if the concept dropped from a f irst-year university-level 
media studies textbook fully formed without its own specif ic connection 
to historical praxis. Any discussion of the concept of ‘spectacle’ and the 
phenomenon it seeks to come to grips with, therefore, must come to terms 
with closely aff iliated concepts of ‘reif ication’ and ‘commodity’.
Indeed, as we suggest below, the constellation of commodity-reif ication-
spectacle can be understood as a model that presupposes a ‘political 
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ontology’ or the way in which politics is ontological and ontology is political: 
the crossing point, of course, being some account of the very nature of 
agency. This ontology, we claim, has largely been prepared by the Marxian 
conceptualization of commodity fetishism, by Marx’s analysis of the way 
in which capital simultaneously disenchants and re-enchants the modern 
world. And, put differently, this constellation can be read as one that enables 
us to come to grips with a structural or systemic account of ‘depoliticiza-
tion’.10 Other attempts to understand the politics of the spectacle that are not 
grounded in a postmodern appropriation have done so in equally superficial 
ways, for example arguing that a homogenizing global capitalism ‘McWorld’ 
f inds itself ever more aggressively confronted by the very ‘Jihad’ (Barber, 
1996) that it has generated, or that what we see from 9/11 onwards is a ‘clash 
of fundamentalisms’ (Ali, 2002) of the Christian-Zionist right with Islamic 
extremism, or that what we are witnessing now is the end of literacy and 
the ‘triumph of the spectacle’ (Hedges, 2010).11 What is missing in these 
perspectives is a convincing analysis of the development of a certain logic 
that runs through an account of the cultural dynamics of commodification 
that stretches back through Lukács’s attempt to understand, via the concept 
of ‘reif ication’, the failure of Central European revolutions, in which he, 
himself, played a not inconsiderable role, to Marx’s famous account of the 
fetishism of commodities in Capital, Volume I (1867). It is only by reading 
the concept of spectacle in light of the conceptual history that we can 
truly come to grips with the systematic and quite disastrous unleashing 
of processes of commodif ication in the present often referred to as ‘neo-
liberalism’.12 Much of contemporary capitalism unfolds from the conception 
of commodity, much like in Marx’s 1867, Lukács’s 1923, and Debord’s 1967. 
This is why we begin with Yiwu.
2. The Sequence (1867–1923–1967) and the Parcours
To our mind the axis Lukács-Debord, in the footsteps of Marx’s concep-
tualization of commodity fetishism, does not, however, only identify a 
theoretical lineage that deepened and broadened the understanding of 
commodif ication. The sequence 1967–1923–1867 also stands for three 
stages of reflection of the real history of modern capitalism: the advent 
of high capitalism, of Fordist capitalism, and of capitalist consumerism 
and the increasing forms of opaqueness that characterize the economic 
system itself. This marks one of the strictly timely aspects, understood 
as both contemporaneous and time-diagnostic, of the Western Marxist 
inTRoduC Tion 17
conceptualization of the cultural effects of commodif ication. It obviously 
also poses the question how to move on from within and in continuation of 
this framework: How to define the cultural logics of capitalism under condi-
tions of post-Fordist, neo-liberal, globalized capitalism? Or to paraphrase 
Croce: What is living and what is dead in the legacy of Western Marxism?
The idea of timeliness is important also insofar as the concept of reif ica-
tion is, above all, one that addresses temporality or what we could call the 
de-temporalization of time, its f lattening or hollowing out. Indeed, this is 
what Lukács, himself, in the key essay from History and Class Consciousness, 
‘Reif ication and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, calls the ‘spatializa-
tion of time’. This is at the centre of the phenomenon of reif ication as an 
element of political theory. Reif ication seems to close off other possible 
futures. Reif ication thus seems to obstruct what Hannah Arendt considers 
the essence of the political, namely: the possibility of a ‘new beginning’ 
as opposed to the endless repetition of the same that she came, rightly 
or wrongly, to associate with the ‘social’ or the realm inhabited by what 
she calls animal laborans. The timeliness of our book can therefore be 
seen in the manner in which it can contribute to an understanding of the 
closing off of certain possibilities via the hypostatization of a market-based 
socio-economic logic (neo-liberalism) and the fake alternative between the 
hypercapitalist and the ‘fundamentalist’ spectacles.
To pose the question of timeliness of this particular tradition of Western 
Marxism also means to read Lukács and Debord as untimely contemporar-
ies, as contemporaries of the ongoing commodif ication of culture (art, 
academia, etc.) in times of austerity politics. It therefore means to bring 
their accounts of reif ication and spectacle into dialogue with contemporary 
theories of the political, and of contemporary political ontologies that claim 
(legitimately or not) to inherit the legacy of Marxism.
The chapters of this volume approach these questions from a variety 
of different angles. The f irst section of this book is, however, dedicated 
to the philosophical foundations of the critique of reif ication. In Johan F. 
Hartle’s chapter the concept of reif ication is brought into dialogue with 
contemporary models of political ontology to emphasize the depoliticizing 
effects of reif ication also on the level of theory. Lukács and Debord address 
the factuality of social reality not only through systematic analysis but also 
(both programmatically and performatively) through aesthetic strategies. 
The socially necessary semblance of reif ied life, so the chapter argues, has 
to be aesthetically re-staged to be accessible to political struggles.
Samir Gandesha’s chapter discusses two conflicting lines of the concep-
tion of reif ication in light of their critique in the aesthetic considerations of 
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Theodor W. Adorno. What Adorno points out in critique both of an identity-
philosophical conception of transparent self-determination on the one 
hand and a somewhat ursprungsphilosophische conception of authenticity 
on the other, is the non-identity of a temporality that disrupts any sense of 
primordial or teleological identity and thereby opens up dynamics of dif-
ference, dissent, and contradiction that are foundational for any emphatic 
conception of the political.
That reif ication itself has to be thought of as a dialectical concept is the 
central claim of Thijs Lijster’s interpretation of Benjamin and Adorno’s 
critique. To emancipate the object from the spell of reif ication, so Lijster 
shows, Benjamin and Adorno regard the fetishistic insistence on the thing 
as central. The collector is the central f igure of such dialectical critique of 
reif ication, as is the autonomous (and thereby fetishized) artwork.
The second section of this book is dedicated to the cultural dynamics of 
the critique of spectacle. Tyrus Miller’s chapter specif ically discusses the 
artistic strategies and programs of two core members of the Situationist 
International: Asger Jorn and Constant Nieuwenhuys. Both of their urbanist 
visions aim, as Miller shows, clearly at a critique of the reif ication of urban 
life by reintroducing dynamics of play into the everyday.
The chapter by Sudeep Dasgupta is dedicated to the interpretation of the 
concept of spectacle in the art historical writings of T.J. Clark and Jonathan 
Crary. Dasgupta analyses three dimensions of historical corporeality: 
the staging of painted bodies, of the body of the spectator, and the social 
body. By discussing these ‘cryptograms of modernism’, Dasgupta not only 
articulates the critical emphasis on historical contingency that is inherent 
to the analysis of spectacle, but also underlines the immense analytical 
value of the concept of spectacle for historically grounded cultural analysis.
The chapter by Noortje de Leij reconstructs the influence of the concept 
of spectacle on contemporary art criticism—particularly its relevance 
for the art criticism around the journal October. The cultural diagnosis 
of spectacle is, as the chapter emphasizes, at the very core of the work of 
Krauss, Foster, and Buchloh, whose critical strategies also strongly rely on 
the specif ic interpretation of the term.
The third section of the book addresses the problems of ‘reif ication’ 
and ‘spectacle’ in light of contemporary questions. Kati Röttger’s chapter 
discusses the critique of spectacle literally in light of the metaphorics of 
theatre and stage. The critique of spectacle, Röttger argues, in dialogue with 
the political theories of Arendt, Nancy, and Rancière, sacrif ices key aspects 
of the political that are necessarily tied to the stage-like reality of public 
action. Contemporary political practice therefore has to navigate carefully 
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between the various dimensions of spectacle, rejecting its depoliticizing 
elements while appropriating its mobilizing dimensions.
Willow Verkerk’s chapter poses a critique of reif ication in light of con-
temporary feminist concerns. Late capitalism, which seeks to exploit the 
most marketable human characteristics, retains patriarchal interests in 
objectifying female sexuality and reproductive labour. Feminist activism 
requires, Verkerk argues, in conversation with Lukács, MacKinnon, Hara-
way, and Butler, an understanding of reif ication that includes its sexually 
objectifying trajectories as well as the unique opportunities for agency that 
women have under capitalism.
Joost de Bloois’s chapter emphasizes the neglected ecological dimension 
of Debord’s critique of spectacle against the background of the 1971 text of 
A Sick Planet. This does not only open up interesting correspondences with 
the early Frankfurt School (Adorno’s idea of natural history in particular) 
but also links Debord’s philosophy to vitalist conceptions of the political 
that characterize key strands of contemporary French political thought.
The concluding chapter of this volume, which stands out as a supple-
ment to the three main sections of the book, constitutes an extended 
discussion between the book’s two editors, Samir Gandesha and Johan 
F. Hartle, and the American artist Zachary Formwalt, whose video essays 
are amongst the most poignant discussions of both contemporary and 
historical correspondences between visual culture and the structure of 
capital. The interview ‘drifts’ through Formwalt’s work along the lines of 
the Marx-Lukács-Debord axis and thus concludes this book by addressing 
perspectives of contemporary cultural interventions that might in some 
ways inherit the aesthetic programs of Lukács and Debord.
The aim of the overall project of this book is to contribute to a critical 
theory and practice that addresses both the ‘metabolic rift’ (Marx) between 
humanity and the natural world on the one hand, and its corresponding 
subjective crisis on the other. The latter, so we believe, is a crisis of the 
very pre-conditions of political agency, that is itself formed by accelerated 
processes of commodif ication and reif ication that have certainly now, if 
not already in 1923 or 1967, become truly total.
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1. Reification as Structural 
Depoliticization : The Political 
Ontology of Lukács and Debord
Johan F. Hartle
The Lukácsian concept of reification has regained academic relevance. It has 
again been discussed in different contexts of contemporary Marxism—by 
representatives of the latest generations of the Frankfurt School and by 
informed circles of British academic Marxists.1 This allows one to read 
Lukács’s original concept—but also its further expansion and development 
in Debord’s theory of spectacle—in new light or to at least shed new light 
on interpretations that have gotten lost in the conjunctures of discourse.
One politically crucial aspect of the theory of reif ication is its critical 
analysis of depoliticization implicit to the specif ic ontology of the com-
modity (respectively the spectacle). What Lukács emphasizes with Marx, 
and what Debord discusses in even broader terms (including the visual 
culture of consumer capitalism), is a conceptualization of the implications 
of commodif ied practice that obscure emphatic political practice.2 It is 
particularly this aspect of reif ication that has radically been denied by 
contemporary, merely ethical reconstructions of the concept.3
By leaving the individuals in a position of isolation, in a passive, merely 
‘contemplative’ stance, so Lukács (and with him Debord)4 will claim, the 
capacity of a radical negotiation and potential restructuring of the fun-
damental principles of societal organization can no longer be addressed. 
The general societal condition of reif ication, the transformation of social 
life into a quantif iable and objectif ied reality leaves the social individu-
als in a contemplative stance and thus detaches them from the objective 
world (Lukács, 1971, p. 89). Political life is thereby, so the argument goes, 
objectif ied into social (or, in a different vocabulary: institutional) facts 
that tend to conceal their own preconditions in social practice. This is how 
depoliticization, the loss of emphatic political capacities, coincides with 
political apathy in the conception of reif ication.
This focus on depoliticization makes ‘reif ication’ a politically influential 
concept in the context of contemporary debates concerning ‘political ontol-
ogy’ and ‘the political’. In contemporary thought a variety of references 
to various ontologies (of Spinoza, Schiller, Cantor, Heidegger, Lacan, etc.; 
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see Hartle, 2009) have been introduced to emphasize and rethink the 
ontological sources of politics—the materiality of politics in tension with 
its political representation—and the political dimensions of ontology—the 
claim that the structure of philosophical thought is of (at least) indirect 
political relevance.5 Although clearly not in the centre of these develop-
ments, Lukács’s later work has addressed this question explicitly in terms 
of ontology (see Lukács, 1978a, 1978b, 1980). But already his considerations 
on the Gegenstandsform (form of objectivity) of developed capitalism in 
History and Class Consciousness poses these questions and can therefore 
be productively discussed as a political ontology in its own right.
The question of depoliticization not only addresses one of the standard 
laments in (and sometimes against) liberal democracies. It also marks the 
very situation of the original development of Western Marxism, classi-
cally described as, on the one hand, a ‘basic shift […] towards philosophy’ 
(Anderson, 1976, p. 49) and, on the other, as a materialist interest in the 
question of ideology (art, culture, social consciousness) as a central element 
of political struggle in times of defeat (Jacoby, 1981).
The historical moment of Western Marxism echoed the failure of socialist 
revolutions and the rise of authoritarian regimes in the inter-war period, 
as it tried to answer the question how and why capitalist rule persisted in 
times of manifest social contradictions. Georg Lukács’s History and Class 
Consciousness is often seen as the original text of Western Marxism (see 
e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1973, pp. 31–58). Lukács’s theory of ideology is, of course, 
far from being unproblematic. It remains committed to the Leninist idea 
of the vanguard party, which favours the political knowledge of (party) 
intellectuals, and its idea of an authentically proletarian (i.e. radical demo-
cratic) subjectivity (or: ‘standpoint’) is quite dismissive of any empirical 
consciousness in real working-class struggles (Larrain, 1988).
If Western Marxism, however, had in some cases been introduced as a 
critical theory of distorted political capacities (of rightist and authoritar-
ian kinds) or of misinterpreted or misplaced lines of conflict, the specif ic 
relevance of Lukács consists in his contribution to understanding precisely 
the absence of the political in structural terms without falling back into 
an attitude of individual ethical blame (see also Henning, 2012, p. 244, 
p. 257; Selk, 2015). This is, to my mind, one of the strengths of the original 
conception of reif ication.
In the following I will (1) briefly outline this ontological interpretation 
of reif ication in Lukács’s own terms and in terms of contemporary ap-
proaches to social (and institutional) facts. Thereafter, I will (2) outline 
some continuities of this philosophical project in Debord’s theory of 
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spectacle, whose own thought is (systematically) derivative with respect 
to the original project of Lukács. I will conclude by (3) emphasizing the way 
in which the theory of reif ication still contributes to a political ontology 
that reaches beyond the naivety of an idealist identity philosophy (classi-
cally ascribed to Lukács)—particularly by emphasizing the dynamics of 
aesthetic disruption and political construction. Here it is Lukács, I claim, 
who is (aesthetically) derivative (with respect to nineteenth-century real-
ism), whereas Debord contributes an original understanding of aesthetic 
intervention and thereby adds substantively to the concrete forms of a 
critique of reif ication.
1. Mistaking the Social: Fetishism and Social Facts
Lukács introduces reif ication (Verdinglichung), very much in line with 
Marx’s theory of fetishism, as a form of objectivity (Gegenstandsform) that 
necessarily emerges within the general structure of commodity exchange.6 
Marx had argued that the exchange value of commodities is not only practi-
cally taken for granted but also continuously reproduced and confirmed in 
the social-exchange process. With money, value becomes f inally objectif ied 
and appears to be of material, thing-like reality. Value seems to be inherent 
the commodity itself although it is by no means implied in the physical 
reality of the respective object. Like mass, colour, etc., value appears to be 
an objective quality of the commodity, whereas it merely is a congealed 
form of social labour (including the social relations that organize it), which 
functions as a form of social mediation (Postone, 1996, pp. 148–157). The 
existence of value, one could say, is, an ontological commitment implicit in 
the exchange practice, through which one practically accepts and confirms 
its ‘objective’ reality.
Commodities are therefore, as Marx explains, not only concrete objects 
of consumption with sensuous qualities, bearers of use value, but also social 
beings, as bearers of exchange value. Exchange value contains a relation 
of each commodity to all other commodities and to the current state of 
economic productivity.
Through value, ultimately determined by socially necessary labour time, 
commensurability and, thus, comparability are possible. Every single com-
modity in this way contains reference to the whole of society and thereby 
also to the forms of social organization that precede the existence of any 
single commodity. In this way, value implicitly contains the relationality 
of all commodities and the processes of their production (including even 
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the social struggles about the conditions of production and labour time). 
It is nothing less than this that gets fetishized with the ontological fallacy 
that Marx generally characterizes as commodity fetishism.
Marx’s fetishism argument can thus be reconstructed as follows: 
Through the apparent—but effective—reality of the exchange process a 
relation between things develops in which the social relations inherent 
in the process of production are indirectly present (in a crystallized or 
congealed form, as Marx would say), which conceals the relation between 
social producers by presenting them in a thing-like form (crystallized in 
commodities).
If I exchange commodities, so the argument goes, I implicitly accept 
the circumstances that are embodied in the structure of value (the whole 
relations of productions) implied in these commodities. This primordial and 
tacit acceptance is vital in all forms of commodity exchange, independently 
of the subjective ideology to which I might subscribe. ‘They do this without 
being aware of it’, as Marx famously formulates (Marx, 1990, pp. 166–167). 
This practical misunderstanding (a misunderstanding that is a structural 
effect of practical relations rather than of intellectual failure) of the true 
status of social objects—commodities in particular—is both socially 
necessary and semblance-like; its implicit understanding of reality is both 
apparent and effective: Social reality is constituted along these lines. Yet 
it is constructed as an unalterable objectivity and as if it had not been 
historically rooted in social practice.
The fact, however, that the reality of the exchange process mediates 
between the social producers, also implies that it installs a social reality 
of its own kind. The mediations (social practices related to each other 
as abstract labour) of capitalism are real, despite the fact that they are, 
fundamentally, abstractions, which in the f irst place also conceal the social 
relations of which they are a product. Marx famously writes: The ‘social 
relations between their [the producers’] private labour’ (more generally 
speaking: the social mediations resulting from abstract labour) ‘appear as 
what they really are’ (Marx, 1990, p. 166), as an effective social reality. The 
reality of the commodity is at the same time delusive and appears as what 
it really is.
Fetishism means that this thing-like form of social relations is taken 
as an absolute reality and thus is endowed with the capacity to structure 
social reality and to make the historically contingent structures of social 
life appear necessary, independent of human intervention, a kind of ‘second 
nature’, with its own lawfulness (Lukács, 1971, p. 128). In this sense fetishism 
is both the methodological denial and the unknowing acknowledgement 
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of these social relations implicit in social facts.7 These social relations are 
implicitly acknowledged because their constitutive role in the determina-
tion of the ‘second nature’ of social facts is denied. Commodity fetishism 
takes objects for granted and thereby turns social processes into relations 
between things. Indirectly it also endows these things with agency, as 
they seem to already have taken decisions that should actually be up to 
constitutive democratic practices. Human agents become passive while 
things appear to be imbued with a strange kind of agency.
Given the interpretation of commodity fetishism as an ontological 
principle of social practice that also implies a wide range of ideological com-
mitments, it is no wonder that Lukács puts so much political emphasis on the 
question of method, for he is concerned with the concept of totality, and, as 
we will also see later, questions of political organization. For good reasons, 
History and Class Consciousness is called Studies in Marxist Dialectics. And 
if there is any form of orthodox Marxism that deserves justif ication, Lukács 
claims, then it is the justif ication of Marxism as a method. ‘In the teeth of 
isolated and isolating facts and partial systems, dialectics insists on the 
concrete unity of the whole’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 6).
Lukács was one of the f irst theorists to take Marx’s fetishism argument 
systematically seriously and to give it a central position in his interpreta-
tion of Marxism (cf. Jappe, 1999, p. 4). But Marx and Lukács are not the 
only ones to theorize the dynamic and practical preconditions of social 
facts. To separate the argument from the specif ic theory of value that is 
presupposed by the Marxist fetishism argument and also to clarify the 
relationship between objects that operate in the realm of f irst nature and 
objects that operate in the realm of the second (objects that have a social 
reality and thereby become social facts), one can refer to other theoretical 
paradigms as well. Starting from a rather different set of philosophical 
assumptions, for instance, John Searle’s understanding of social reality (and 
social factuality in particular) appears to develop a very similar argument. 
This ontological generalization of a structure that also marks commodity 
fetishism (something Searle does not point out—although he describes his 
contribution as a contribution to economics) also introduces a language 
that helps to distinguish more easily between fetishistic factuality and its 
social preconditions.
Searle emphasizes the specif ic ontology of social facts that are not to 
be mistaken with pure facts (facts that are valid independently of direct 
human intervention). The particular ontological status of social facts is 
therefore, according to Searle, that they are institutional facts, facts that 
are instituted in social practices.
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According to Searle’s definition institutional facts have the general form 
of: a specif ic object X, which counts as Y under conditions of C (Searle, 2005, 
p. 7).8 The object gains a status that constitutes its second, social reality. The 
status function of exchange value, for instance, ascribed to a specific object, 
is dependent on institutional (or better: social) conditions, too. The status 
of a given object to which a status function (value) is ascribed, changes its 
social signif icance only under certain social conditions. In other words: A 
material object X appears as a commodity Y under the institutional condi-
tions C. Although the physical appearance of the object might not have 
changed (unless a price tag has been put on it), its social factuality has 
changed signif icantly.
The point, for Searle as much as for the Marxist tradition, is not to mistake 
these two layers of reality (in the terminology of Lukács one could say: the 
first nature of the object gains a second nature) for each other and not to 
deny the implied social circumstances of lived reality. For the ontological 
status of social facts is thus fully dependent on the institutional or social 
circumstances against the backdrop of which the attribution of that par-
ticular status only makes sense. It is, in other words, fully contingent on 
the social practice of commodity exchange in and through which products 
of human labour are turned into commodities. These kinds of facts are 
therefore not observer-independent (as physical facts like the size of the 
moon are: they are independent of human practice) but always part of the 
social reality of which human agents are a part—including the ones that 
describe this particular social reality.
Despite these parallels, the Marxist account of fetishism methodo-
logically complicates this approach in three respects. Firstly, the actor-
dependent view of the institutional status of facts implies a variety of 
complex (reciprocal, mutually conditioning) relations between theory 
and the object of its study. Much of Lukács’s reservations concerning the 
methodology of the natural sciences (and their relevance for the social 
sciences) have to do with this assumed interrelatedness of the subject 
and object of study in the f ield of culture and society, which lacks in the 
objectivistic orientation of the natural sciences modelled on physics.9
Secondly, from a Marxist point of view (or: from the point of view of a 
political ontology of constitution) it is furthermore important to emphasize 
that the social circumstances, which create a second layer of reality and, 
potentially, a ‘second nature’, are instituted as well. The spiral of institut-
ing processes in this sense winds itself deeper and deeper into history, an 
argument which seems to be at the core of any Marxist critique of political 
reif ication.10
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Thirdly, Searle’s argument also implies (though Searle does not point 
this out) an aspect that is at the very core of the critique of fetishism: that 
the relation between social facts and their social circumstances might be 
reciprocal. If, in other words, I accept social facts to be facts, as I practically 
do, I also accept the circumstances that are presupposed by and embodied 
in them. If I, for instance, in the case of a soccer game, accept the ball 
crossing a line to be a goal (if I cheer and move back to my half of the soccer 
pitch), then I also unknowingly acknowledge a whole bunch of rules and 
conditions that def ine the soccer game. In some spheres of social practice 
this might not be too much of a problem. The social relations that are being 
denied in the Marxian account of fetishism, however, are far from being 
innocent. They include, so Marxism claims, the reproduction of structures 
of exploitation and dominance.
2. Commodity Fetishism, Reification, Spectacle
According to Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism, the ideological 
implication of commodity exchange consists in an ontological fallacy (a form 
of ontological commitment implied in the practice of commodity exchange 
which mistakes historical ‘becoming’ for natural ‘being’), which is implicit to 
a specific form of practice: to take social facts, embedded in societal practice, 
as simple facts, thereby implicitly accepting their societal preconditions and 
leaving their structural and genetic preconditions unnoticed and therefore 
also beyond the reach of constitutive democratic practices.
In this sense the critique of reif ication is rooted in a political ontology, 
which is, ultimately, a process-based and relational ontology, ‘the knowledge 
that social facts are not objects but relations between men’ (Lukács, 1971, 
p. 180). As suggested before, this ontology can (also and with respect to con-
temporary discussion) be called political ontology in at least two respects: 
It emphasizes the political importance of ontological commitments (and, 
thus, the fact that ontologies are political) and it emphasizes the mate-
rial and practical (i.e. ontological) preconditions—Searle’s ‘institutional 
conditions’—of any structured political body. The political ontology of the 
critique of reif ication is an ontology of social relations and processes, which 
emphasizes the primacy of relations and processes over given objects. The 
specif ic suggestion of the political ontology of the Lukács-Debord axis is 
the transition from an ontology of isolated facts to an ontology of mediation 
and of constitutive processes, and also, in particular, the constitutive or 
‘instituting’ processes of social labour.11
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In the apparent but effective objectivity of social facts, social relations 
appear as second nature whereas there actually is nothing natural, essential, 
and eternal about them at all. Such ‘second nature’ makes the possibility of 
emphatic practice disappear in a thing-like objectivity, a social reality that 
seems to consist of things. This leads to a closure of the realm of politics 
as well: Surrounded by taken-for-granted social facts, human beings f ind 
themselves in a world that seems to lie beyond the reach of democratic 
intervention and processes of conscious political formation, in a situation 
of passivity and apathy, effected by the ontological fallacy implicit to the 
logics of commodif ication. Men are, thus, following Lukács’s terminology 
(later taken up by Debord), left in a passive, ‘contemplative’ stance.12 Apathy 
and contemplation relates the social agents to their social environment as 
if it were a pure form of objectivity beyond the reach of direct intervention, 
beyond the reach of constitutive practices, as if it were an independent 
reality unto itself.
In this sense and up to this point, Marx’s analysis of ‘commodity fetish-
ism’ contains the major argument and key structure of the problem of 
‘reif ication’ and of the theory of spectacle as well. Foundational for all of the 
specif ic arguments and the cumulative tradition of the critique of reif ica-
tion, however, is the assumption that a specif ic form of social practice (the 
exchange of commodities) produces a form of objectivity that conceals the 
instituting powers of the social producers, which appear to these producers 
therefore as alien powers.
Implicit to the historical development of the critique of reif ication from 
Marx to Debord is, furthermore, a historically diagnostic dimension. Lukács 
develops the more restricted account of fetishism into a general theory of 
institutional practices, which embraces the whole width of historically 
specif ic phenomena from Neo-Kantian thought, to Taylorization, and all 
the way through to the general structure of bureaucratic rationality as 
it deals with predictable and calculable objectif ied reality (see Lukács, 
1971, pp. 95–97). With Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness the original 
critique of commodity fetishism, rooted in the analysis of high capitalism, is 
being transformed into a general critique of fetishistic culture that identifies 
the logics of emerging Fordist regulation.
A large part of what Guy Debord develops into a theory of the visual 
and spatial regime of spectacle under conditions of mediatized (diffuse) 
consumer capitalism (the diffuse spectacle), command economies (concen-
trated), and late capitalism (integrated) is the unfolding and differentiation 
of the original reif ication argument of Luákcs into a critical theory of visual 
culture. The spectacle, Debord writes, ‘is the world of commodity ruling 
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over all lived experience’ (Debord, 1995, p. 26). Anselm Jappe has been the 
clearest in pointing out that: ‘Debord’s use of the term spectacle should be 
understood as an extension of Marx’s idea of the commodity form’ (Jappe, 
1999, p. 19). Guy Debord’s theory of spectacle is, in other words, quite directly 
a continuation of the Marxian and Lukácsian critique of fetishism and 
systematically not an original theory.
Its political anthropology of the contemplative Homo spectator (Debord, 
1995, p. 9) is anticipated by Marx’s fetishism argument and its Lukácsian 
interpretation. Fetishism is an act of depoliticization in and through 
habitualized practices that constitute the (socially necessary) illusion of 
objectivity where, in fact, f luid and dynamic social relations are at the core 
of things. The inner conception of ‘spectacle’ does not go much beyond this 
argument.
What makes Debord’s account of spectacle an original theory is the 
expansion of the reach of the classical argument and also an attempt to 
understand so-called ‘formerly existing socialism’ through this lens. Ac-
cording to Debord, visual practice, the world of imagery, is an objectif ied 
mediation of already objectif ied social relations. This encloses, in Debord’s 
account, just as much the glamorous realm of autonomous artistic practices, 
abstracted from the everyday through institutional boundaries, as it encom-
passes the shiny world of commodity imagery in fashion, advertising, and 
commercial culture, i.e. the sphere of the culture industry.
The structure of argument, however, remains rooted in the critique of 
reif ication: Spectacular visual representation is just another layer of the 
type of objectivity that has been produced by commodity exchange in the 
f irst place—by the ontological fallacy of abstracting objects from their 
constitutive processes, by hierarchizing naturalized ‘being’ over histori-
cal ‘becoming’. In other words: the spectacle is an image—a static visual 
reproduction and confirmation—of what the world of commodities has 
ontologically left us with. So much for the world of things.
Such a reification of the objective world into a static world of singular 
things has its corresponding effects on the practical self-understanding of 
social subjects, too. Very much in agreement with each other, Marx, Lukács, 
and Debord describe the separating effects of the logics of commodity 
exchange, of reif ication, and of spectacle on the side of political subjectivity 
as well.
The f irst part of Capital, Volume I, ‘Commodities and Money’, before 
entering the sphere of production, which leads, as Marx famously says, 
to a change of the ‘dramatis personae’ (which introduces the f igures of 
the worker and the capitalist; Marx, 1990, p. 280),13 knows only individual 
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commodity possessors, related to each other by contractual relations. 
Lukács describes this very same ‘atomization’ of the social producers into 
individual commodity possessors as a ‘necessary illusion’ that follows not so 
much from a scientif ically reductive account of the complexity of economic 
practices as such but as a direct effect of the logics of commodity exchange 
(Lukács, 1971, p. 92).
Such separation is at the very core of Debord’s theory of spectacle and 
here, too, Debord can contribute substantively to the original account of 
reif ication.14 ‘Generalized separation’ (Debord, 1995, p. 12) is the way in 
which the spectacle operates, leaving individual subjects in the state of 
pure contemplation, separated from the conditions of one’s own practice 
and relation to the collective: The spectacle introduces a self-perception 
based on objectif ied and individuated reality rather than collective self-
constitution. The specif ic spectacular type of capitalism that Debord has in 
mind thus includes the celebration of the consumerist self in this separated, 
atomistic form. This, obviously, includes the general commodified emphasis 
on lifestyle and the vocabulary of social distinction, just as much as the 
more specif ic self-enjoyment in self-promoting techniques.15
Separation is described as ‘part and parcel of the unity of the world’ 
(p. 13), the ‘alpha and omega of spectacle’ (p. 20), and at the same time part 
of an ideology, which enhances the process of the ‘proletarianization of the 
world’ (p. 21). The reason lies in the logics of commodities themselves, or, as 
one could conclude, in the logics of the social relations between commodity 
possessors: ‘Each individual commodity’, so Debord writes, ‘f ights for itself’ 
(p. 43), whereas ‘proletarian struggle’ is described ‘as the process to dissolve 
all separation’ (p. 48).
In all its different formulations, reification thus dissolves the constitutive 
processes into separated particles and smashes political potentials into 
isolated facts. If social life becomes reif ied into social facts, i.e. relations 
and processes are turned into forms of second nature, which is according 
to Marx an implication of commodity exchange, their social embedment, 
their social origins and structural preconditions, and thus, their social 
causality, become invisible. If social reality appears as a world of objects (and 
not of constitutive practices), then social agents are reduced to executors 
of a pre-given reality (of, for instance, commodity relations) within the 
framework of which social practice only appears possible. Reif ied con-
sciousness is, accordingly, the incapability of rooting social facts in social 
practice, and of relating to fellow human beings as to co-producers of social 
reality. Another name for this general phenomenon of reif ication is, as I 
have claimed, depoliticization.
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3. Aesthetico-Political Interventions, or, How to Overcome 
Reification?
The critique of reif ication, however, f inds itself in a negative spiral that 
can not easily be broken: It requires forms of practice that are, by the very 
logics of what is to be criticized, undermined, blocked, and concealed. 
Overcoming reif ication thus depends on an ontological break with the 
objectif ied structures that reif ication installs. Whereas reif ication blocks 
the understanding of structure and mediation (Lukács (in)famously calls it 
totality), of collective action and class solidarity, precisely this is required 
to break its spell. What, then, is to be done?
In terms of a purely political program, much could be said about Lukács’s 
and Debord’s specif ic interpretations of the proletariat, of class struggle 
and the possibility of revolutionary practice (Jappe, 1999, pp. 37–39). Their 
philosophies are strongly influenced by strategic considerations and keep 
commenting on the historical developments of the socialist movement.16 
Both pin their hopes on the workers’ councils, while they passionately 
disagree on the Leninist legacy and the role of the party.17 Workers’ councils 
are seen as organizational means that allow for direct self-rule and political 
transparency, spontaneously and disruptively so. Much of the hope pro-
jected onto the workers’ councils also reflects the key objectives that both 
Lukács and Debord have found themselves confronted with: the dream for 
a self-transparent collectivity prior to political alienation in institutional 
forms, the idealist conception of the identity of subject and object.18
Whatever the last word to be spoken on this problematic might be, one 
key aspect of the theoretico-political projects of Lukács and Debord that 
still deserves attention beyond these more concrete debates on strategy and 
political organization, however, is the question concerning the philosophi-
cally programmatic implications of their political ontology. Both suggest 
a transition from an ontology of facts, of objects and commodities, to an 
ontology of social labour and political constitution. As an ontological 
position the critique of reif ication therefore has consequences for the un-
derstanding of philosophy as such and for the implicit order of its respective 
sub-disciplines.
The fact that both Lukács and Debord strongly refer to aesthetic 
strategies—to strategies of narrative embedment in the case of Lukács 
and of détournement in that of Debord—could be read as a romanticist 
exaggeration of the potentials of art and thus as an implicit declaration of 
defeat.19 In a somewhat surprising complicity20 with a Rancièreian aesthet-
ics of politics, however, one could just as easily argue that the critique of 
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reif ication, like any form of politics proper, requires the reorganization of 
the aesthetic conditions under which social reality appears (or, in different 
words, reorganization of the appearance of things, which could also be 
seen as an interference in ontological misunderstandings). ‘For politics 
is’, as Rancière (1999, p. 74) writes, ‘a question of aesthetics, a matter of 
appearances’. Negotiating the conditions of perceptibility is, to recapitulate 
Rancière’s argument in a somewhat different language, always key to the 
emergence of radical political situations. The form of appearance that is at 
stake in the type of bourgeois and post-bourgeois politics that Lukács and 
Debord address, is the socially necessary appearance of a factuality that is 
in fact merely the result of a variety of social practices. Such a re-negotiation 
of the form of reality is a key condition of radical politics.21
The general revaluation of aesthetic interventions to break the spell 
of the fetishist objectivity goes hand in hand with a devaluation (an 
individualist understanding) of ethics.22 The emphasis on mediation, 
structural embedment, and on an already determined (and reif ied) hori-
zon of possible social agency dislodges the primacy of individualistic ethics 
as itself part of the logics of reif ication. And one of the key depoliticizing 
effects of reif ication had precisely been described as a situation in which 
the subject is left with an overwhelming mass of isolated phenomena 
that can no longer be structurally articulated and therefore confronted.23 
The critique of reif ication does therefore not primarily address dispersed 
ethical problems that the individual f inds him- or herself confronted with. 
It rather addresses the structural unity and general line of social conflicts 
and crises.
For Lukács re-politicization therefore means (and consistently so 
throughout his whole theoretical development) the re-narrativization of 
dispersed social facts. Literature (including philosophical literature, one 
could say, with Lukács’s own philosophical style in mind) narrativizes and 
contextualizes what appears to be immediate, atemporal, and dispersed. 
It embeds the historical individual, and, more generally, the historically 
particular, in its socio-historical context. Narrative essentially involves 
time (objective time, as Lukács will argue), change, and transition and thus 
opens a space for agency.
With reference to nineteenth-century realism, Lukács provides an 
account of processes rather than objects, which allows him to counter 
the ontology of commodif ication. Despite his systematic originality, 
his aesthetic program, however, as has often been criticized, remains 
derivative of classical forms of literature, which had their high tide in a 
previous century.24
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Debord emphasizes strategies that break the spell of pure factuality 
and pure spectatorship by re-appropriating these social facts through 
détournement. This, too, is true for his own style, re-appropriating the 
transformative critique of Feuerbach and the ideology critique of the young 
Marx.25 In both of their approaches we f ind a détournement, avant la lettre, 
which, also through the stylistic means of chiasmic sentences, revert the 
distorted relationships of (depotentiated) subjects and (fetishized) objects. 
Debord presents this stylistic means as a ‘rediscovered f luidity’ (Debord, 
1995, p.  144), ‘a f luid language of anti-ideology’ (p. 146). Détournement 
in this sense brings the hidden social meaning of things to the fore and 
reveals the structural connectivity of apparently isolated objects. It is, as 
Anselm Jappe (1999, p. 48) emphasizes, ‘a collage-like technique whereby 
pre-existing elements were reassembled into new creations’—a reconnec-
tion of single elements. The experimental creation of alternative moments 
of practice, literally the creation of situations (as it was programmatically 
inscribed to the name of the Situationist International), is nothing less 
than the attempt to allow for different perspectives on social mediation. 
Debord thus presents art as a practice of dialogue and as an intervention 
into the everyday (Jappe, 1999, p. 71) that allows for the creation of social 
relations that reach beyond the spectacular forms of self-preservation 
(through social distinction and lifestyle). Neo-avantgardist practices of 
that kind have, for good reasons, remained inf luential till the present, 
informing institutional critical and political interventive practices still 
today.26
Both of Lukács and Debord’s aesthetic programs, in all their differ-
ences, suggest the change of an ontological perspective, in line with the 
more explicitly political critique of reif ication through class struggle. 
The aesthetic transition accompanies and prepares the transition from 
an ontological commitment of commodity exchange to one of political 
practice, in light of which the structural connectivity of things becomes 
visible. The atomized ontology of singular facts is gradually replaced 
by the constitutive ontology of social embedment and mediation, of, as 
one might want to say with some caution, totality. Such a perspective of 
totality is, according to Lukács, merely a standpoint, and not an objective 
reality. It is a perspective, however, which only allows for emphatically 
transformative political practice: ‘From this standpoint alone’, so Lukács 
argues, ‘does history really become a history of mankind’ (Lukács, 1971, 
p. 186). The proof of the pudding of unity is, as always, in the eating, but, 
more precisely, also in the success of the respective theoretical strategies 
for political change.
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In the history of the reception and critique of Lukács, however, it has 
become successively clear that the creation of a viable understanding of 
the connectivity of apparently isolated social practices cannot count on 
an epistemological safety net. The structural horizon of integrated social 
facts cannot simply be read as a matter of pure ref lection—mirroring 
pre-given structures in consciousness, in scientif ic analysis, as Lukács 
indeed suggests (see Lukács, 1971, p. 8; pp. 50ff.).27 Totality is not so much 
given but rather aspired to (p. 174; p. 198). The ‘creation of the object’ (p. 175) 
to overcome the false semblance of immediacy and to develop the practical 
totality of the proletariat is, thus, a fundamental challenge for any effective 
critique of reif ication and its repoliticizing claims. ‘Challenge’, however, 
also means that it is not secured and that its outcomes are not guaranteed 
in advance.
Because the kind of connectivity and embedment that the critique of 
reif ication is aiming at is not pre-given by any kind of directly accessible 
empirical reality, the critique of reif ication can learn a great deal from the 
disruptive tactics of détournement and from the instantaneous creation of 
social situations in specif ic geographies or places.28 What the sometimes 
fusty emphasis on realist narrative can learn is also, and particularly, an 
alienating effect, an effect that opens up practical perspectives that do 
not simply emerge from the already existing world of facts and objects. 
For the creation of a revolutionary situation is not just reducible to the 
empirical; it is based on interruption, too.
In this sense totality is, as Fredric Jameson has not tired in emphasizing, 
not an aff irmative but rather a critical category. It is even experimental, 
in the concrete sense that it has to break with the already known reality 
of the habitualized knowledge of facts. The construction of an integrated 
horizon of political practice has to be based on the refusal of ‘habitual 
limits and boundaries and even a defamiliarization of our habitual sense 
of the recognition and the understanding of human acts and passions’, as 
Jameson (2009, p. 206) paraphrases.
In these ways the critique of reif ied ontology is not only ontologically 
disruptive (in terms of its intervention in the general, reif ied appearance of 
things) and constructive (in terms of the orientation towards a structurally 
and theoretically integrated horizon of practice). It is also creative in a 
genuinely aesthetic fashion. Political ontology therefore also means that 
the world is not merely out there: The world as a political horizon also 
needs to be created.
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2. ‘Reification’ between Autonomy and 
Authenticity : Adorno on Musical 
Experience1
Samir Gandesha
In an aphorism entitled ‘Le Prix de Progress’, appended to Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno write that ‘Alle Verdinglichung 
ist ein Vergessen’ (All reif ication is a forgetting) (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
2008, p. 229, translation altered).2 This comes as the very last sentence of a 
reading of a letter by Pierre Flourens, a French physiologist, who was elected 
to the Académie Française in preference to Victor Hugo. A ground-breaking 
anaesthesiologist, Flourens raised serious concerns about the use of chloro-
form in surgery because the substance didn’t simply inure the body to pain 
but, rather, consigned such pain to oblivion. In other words, chloroform led 
to a forgetting of suffering. This notion that ‘all reif ication is a forgetting’ 
is an appropriate point of departure for our discussion of what comprises 
‘reif ication’ or Verdinglichung (literally: ‘thingif ication’). The reason for this 
is that it enables us to bring into view two exemplary ‘models’ that frame 
the problem of reif ication specif ically as a form of forgetting: these are the 
models of dialectic, on the one hand, and difference, on the other.
The f irst stems from the Idealist tradition and, via a detour through 
Feuerbach’s ‘transformative critique’ of religion, Marx’s analysis of the 
commodity form in the famous fourth section of the f irst chapter of Capital 
Volume I. It is developed further in Georg Lukács’s epochal essay ‘Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ published as a chapter of his 
1923 book History and Class Consciousness. It could be said to culminate, 
mediated by the experiences of the mid-twentieth-century artistic avant-
garde, in Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle. If, for Marx, capitalist 
society in its liberal phase presents itself as an ‘immense accumulation of 
commodities’, then for Debord, in late capitalism, ‘the whole life of those 
societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself 
as an immense accumulation of spectacles’ (Debord, 1995, p. 12).
The second model of reif ication has its origins in the existential theology 
of Søren Kierkegaard and is given its fullest articulation in the phenom-
enological ontology of Martin Heidegger as outlined in his early magnum 
opus Being and Time, published just four years after History and Class 
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Consciousness, which introduces the idea of the ‘ontological difference’. 
This is the difference between the situated, f inite human being, Dasein, and 
the things that are disclosed in and through Dasein’s concernful activity 
in the context of the sedimented meanings constitutive of the world into 
which he or she is ‘thrown’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 91–148). The tradition of 
Western metaphysics is characterized by a constitutive ‘forgetting’ of the 
ontological difference or what Heidegger calls Seinsvergessenheit.
The two concepts are not unrelated, as Lucien Goldmann has sug-
gested, drawing attention to Heidegger’s reference in the f irst chapter of 
Part I to the failure of the attempt to ground an account of reif ication in 
terms of ‘consciousness’. Heidegger (1962, p. 487) states that ‘It has long 
been known that ancient ontology works with “Thing-concepts” and that 
there is a danger of “reifying consciousness”’. He then goes on to dismiss 
the formulation because it does not go deeply enough in the direction of 
ontological questioning, asking whether ‘we [can] even seek that answer 
as long as the question of the meaning of Being remains unformulated 
and unclarif ied’ (p. 487). While Lukács isn’t named directly, he is clearly 
implied. So, in Goldmann’s view (2009), Heidegger seeks in Being and Time 
to articulate nothing less than an ontological response to History and Class 
Consciousness.3 In particular, Heidegger’s account of ‘care’ (Sorge), according 
to Goldmann, insofar as it unif ies past, present, and future, constitutes a 
response to Lukács’s conception of totality as the historically mediated 
identity of subject and object.
The dispute between these two models and respective normative 
orientations has been at the heart of the key debates within late-twentieth-
century social and political thought.4 It is my contention that the enduring 
importance of Adorno’s critique of reif ication is, inter alia, the way in which 
he brings both models into a ‘f ield of force’ throughout his writings, and 
particularly through his understanding of the philosophical signif icance 
of the autonomous artwork. It is by virtue of its autonomy that the artwork 
is able to maintain the possibility of an experience of the dynamic, tem-
poral nature of the non-identical. In other words, in aesthetic experience 
Adorno locates an immanent path beyond reif ication, whereby reif ication 
is surpassed by a certain form of ‘totalization’ that avoids both the col-
lective action instigated by the revolutionary party and the resoluteness 
of individual decision oriented towards a project that would unify past, 
present, and future. Far from being an impotent retreat from politics, as 
the Habermasian reading holds, Adorno’s understanding of the aesthetic 
can be understood as a profound contribution to thinking about some of 
the key preconditions of political praxis (Gandesha, 2012).
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On the one hand, Adorno shows, with Horkheimer, the way in which the 
ego’s struggle for self-preservation, paradoxically, seals the conditions of its 
own demise. Self-preservation reif ies, and therefore destroys, the very life it 
putatively seeks to preserve. This is a thesis that obviously takes on urgent 
new meaning in the context of discussions of the ‘Anthropocene’.5 On the 
other hand, the orientation towards an ‘authentic’ life in the work of Buber, 
Jaspers, and especially the early Heidegger, amounts to what Adorno calls 
a ‘reif ied critique of reif ication’ (Adorno, 1973a).6 For Adorno, it is in the 
autonomous work of art that the logic of reif ication is pushed to extremes 
and in such a way that opens up a relation to the non-identical or transitory 
phenomena. Music, in particular, plays this role insofar as time itself is its 
very medium. Like Penelope, who undoes by night the weaving she performs 
by day, the artwork both actively alienates itself from life and, by virtue of 
that very separation, is a spur to reflection on the conditions of precisely 
such separation. Hence, Adorno suggests, alluding to Wagner artworks “heal 
the wound with the spear that inflicted it” (Adorno, 2002, p. 134). In what 
follows, I go on to sketch out the two models in Lukács and Heidegger in 
more detail (1), draw out the implicit normative dimensions of these models 
(2), and then look at the way the respective normative dimensions of each 
conception could be said to f ind an echo in Adorno’s understanding of 
musical experience (3).
1. Two Models of Reification
Returning to our two models—dialectic and difference—both could be 
said to take their point of departure from the understanding of reif ication 
as a form of forgetting that explicitly or implicitly also relates to attendant 
processes of ‘fetishism’ and ‘alienation’.7 For the dialectical model, reif ica-
tion is to be understood as Spirit’s objectifying activity that is forgotten as 
such, that is, as activity, but which is then subsequently re-appropriated 
on its return via the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness. 
Remembering, here, is to be understood as not the simple the opposite 
of forgetting, but rather as a process of a totalizing re-internalization 
(Erinnerung) of that which had been externalized, forgotten as such, and 
mistaken for an ‘otherness’ or form of alterity standing over and against 
its creator or author like an ‘alien power’. In this, the concept of experience 
(Erfahrung), plays a key role and experience implies a journey or pathway 
through which the shapes of consciousness are traversed. As Hegel puts it 
in the ‘Preface’ to the Phenomenology of Spirit:
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The Science of this pathway is the Science of the experience which con-
sciousness goes through; the substance and its movement are viewed 
as the object of consciousness. Consciousness knows and comprehends 
only what falls within its experience; for what is contained in this is noth-
ing but spiritual substance, and this, too, as object of the self. But Spirit 
becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming an other to 
itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself and of suspending this otherness. 
And experience is the name we give to just this movement, in which the 
immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, whether it be of sensuous 
[but still unsensed] being, or only thought of as simple, becomes alienated 
from itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is only then 
revealed for the f irst time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has 
become a property of consciousness also. (Hegel, 1977, §36)
Experience, then, is a re-membering or putting back in relation or mediation 
a broken totality, whose individual parts had been severed or dis-membered. 
Hegel’s famous example is ‘sense certainty’ which inaugurates the passage 
through the appearance of the various ‘shapes of consciousness’ in the 
Phenomenology (Hegel, 1977, §90-110). For Marx, the analogue is the com-
modity form8 which, insofar as it is a fetish, that is, necessarily abstracted 
from the conditions under which it is produced, it acquires what Lukács 
calls a ‘phantom-like objectivity’ (Lukács, 1971a, p. 83). It is, in other words, 
an object that occludes the very social relations that it embodies which, 
therefore, gives it its ‘phantom-like’ appearance. Such a ghostly objectivity 
constitutes a world in which relations between human beings take on the 
character of relations between things, and relations between things appear 
as relations between human beings. In describing the commodity in a 
manner that evokes his early critique of religion—the very f irst premise 
of criticism per se—Marx describes the commodity form as abounding in 
‘metaphysical subtleties’ (metaphysische Spitzfindigkeit) and ‘theological 
niceties’ (theologische Mucken) (Marx 1996, p. 81). Marx is already intimating 
something that Lukács will subsequently elaborate into startling meta-
philosophical claims (see Feenberg, 2014), namely: that the commodity 
poses not just a socio-economic problem but also fundamentally a cognitive 
one. Reif ication, then, in this tradition stems from the socially necessary 
illusion of the commodity as a ‘real abstraction’, which then, itself, occludes 
the grasp of the structural totality of the social whole as the object not just 
of theory but praxis. Forgetting here is to be understood specif ically as the 
structural incapacity to grasp the historical formation of the social world 
through practical activity.9
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Lukács shows the manner in which the process of fetishism, qua a total-
izing process of rationalization or the elaboration of a system of formal 
procedures, extends from production relations and comes to penetrate even 
the most minute sphere of society, including the realm of intimacy.10 One 
could say that the logic of commodity fetishism, in Lukács’s account, leads 
to the fetishism of formal logic insofar as it gives rise to apparently insoluble 
antinomies in philosophical thinking as in Kantian critical philosophy and 
the German Idealism that constitutes a response to Kantian philosophy. 
It is only in Hegel’s notion of the Absolute, according to Lukács, that we 
f ind the best attempt to cancel while simultaneously preserving these 
supposedly intractable oppositions. In other words, the basic problem of 
reif ication—that human relations take on the appearance of relations 
between things—deeply penetrates even the most otiose realm of specula-
tive philosophy. Hegel’s notion of the ‘Homecoming of Spirit’, culminating 
in the rationality of the ethical life of the modern state—the grasping 
of the rational content of historically produced customs or Sitten—is a 
false, merely one-sided solution to the problem of ‘transcendental home-
lessness’ (Lukács, 1971b p. 41) because its perpetuates a merely passive or 
‘contemplative’ relation to the world. In Lukács’s view, it was only in the 
world-constituting activity of the identical subject-object of history, that 
the intractable antinomies of bourgeois thinking would be decisively tran-
scended. Such an ‘identical subject-object of history’ (Lukács, 1971a, p. 197) is 
able to grasp the totality of historical objectif ications as the once-forgotten 
products of its own practical activity.
It is precisely the criticism of such a conception of philosophy that the 
philosophy of difference takes as its point of departure. Heidegger argues at 
the end of Division I of Being and Time that, while Hegel is one of the f irst 
(Kant being the other) to recognize the distinctive nature of temporality, 
in the f inal instance, he conceives of Spirit through ‘Kenosis’. Kenosis is the 
theological term that denotes the process by which God empties Himself into 
and ultimately out of time, thus the dialectic as, according to Hegel himself, 
‘theodicy’. So, in Heidegger’s view, while Hegel arrives at the brink of a break 
with the philosophical tradition’s ‘onto-theological’11 conception of being 
as the antithesis of time, he ultimately pulls back from it and re-inscribes 
the understanding of being as enduring presence, as the unconscious 
hypostatization of a particular modality of time: namely, that of the present.
Therefore, in Heidegger’s view, Hegel fails to go far enough insofar as he 
fails to grasp the temporality of Being (Sein) itself. And the reason why Hegel 
was incapable of grasping Being in this way had to do with the fact that, like 
the tradition of Western metaphysics originating with Plato’s account of 
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eidos, he failed to take as is starting point the ‘ontological difference’ or the 
difference between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes). In other words, the 
dialectical model of remembering, or making whole through the unfolding 
of Spirit’s speculative drive towards freedom, cannot avoid a certain kind of 
forgetting (Seinsvergessenheit)—the forgetting of the finite, situated, indeed, 
thrown (geworfen) being, Dasein. Indeed, it is precisely because he or she is 
so thrown, that ‘Being’ becomes, itself, a question for the situated human 
being. Hegel suggests, for example, that Spirit is able to remain self-identical 
through the most extreme experiences including death: ‘[T]he life of Spirit is 
not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devasta-
tion, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its 
truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it f inds itself’ (Hegel, 1977, §32).
Spirit, on its speculative journey ‘home’ to itself, entailing the achieved 
‘identity of identity and non-identity’, the unity of ‘subject and substance’, both 
cancels and preserves finitude itself. As a result, it fails to fully acknowledge 
the difference between Being or Dasein and beings, things that are disclosed 
within the so-called ‘worldhood’ of Dasein’s world. In contrast to the Hegelian 
Heimkehr or ‘Homecoming’, Heidegger understands Dasein as literally Unhe-
imlich (literally ‘un-homely’ but translated as ‘uncanny’).12 It is in this idea 
of Seinsvergessenheit or the ‘forgetting of being’ that we find an alternative, 
ontological conception of reification—a phenomenon that Heidegger locates 
at the heart of the philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato’s theory of 
the forms. Here Being is understood as enduring presence and therefore as the 
antithesis of lived time as it unfolds between, to use Arendt’s terms, ‘natality’ 
and ‘mortality’ (Arendt, 1958). As Heidegger suggests in direct opposition to 
Hegel’s attempt to grasp ‘substance as subject’: ‘man’s “substance” is not spirit 
as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 153).
For Heidegger, the problem of ‘reif ication’ cannot be understood in terms 
of the concept of consciousness precisely because of its Cartesian starting 
point, that is, the split between subject and object which, as previously 
suggested, can itself be traced back to the Greeks. The dualism of subject 
and object was part and parcel of the Seinsvergessenheit that elided the 
ontological difference and reduced the distinctive understanding of time for 
human being-in-the-world to a mere Vorhandenes, an ‘enduring presence’ 
that somehow withstood time. In contrast, Heidegger argues that Dasein 
has to be understood in terms of what he calls Sorge or care in which the 
various modalities of time, namely past, present, and future, were unif ied 
in a concernful engagement within the world.
Such an account of temporality Heidegger famously explicates via the 
example of the tool: That in the typical engagement within the totality 
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of meaningful structures constitutive of the world, the artisan does not 
thematize the tool; it is merely an extension of his own body in undertaking 
a particular future-directed project. It is, in other words, to be understood as 
a Zuhandenes, or a thing ‘ready-to-hand’. It is only when the tool breaks down 
that it becomes, in a sense, a ‘fetish’, though Heidegger does not of course 
use the term, insofar as it is transformed from the ready-to-hand, an integral 
part of Dasein’s world, to something that is ‘de-worlded’, torn, violently we 
could say, from the web of meaningful relations constitutive of the world 
and rendered as a Vorhandenes, a thing ‘present-at-hand’. The object can be 
considered, in this sense, as ‘alienated’ from Dasein’s own activity. What are 
the specif ically normative dimensions of these two models of reif ication?
2. Reification and Normativity
To gain a perspective on the normative dimensions of these two models, it is 
useful to compare Lukács and Heidegger’s conceptions with Axel Honneth’s 
recent attempt, via a post-metaphysical13 reconstruction of the concept of 
recognition, to revive and resuscitate the concept of reif ication. To the idea 
with which I began the chapter, that ‘all reif ication is a forgetting’, Honneth 
adds Stanley Cavell’s notion that knowledge is grounded in a prior moment 
of acknowledgement. The reif ication or thingification of the person results 
from a failure or a breakdown in the empathetic acknowledgment of the other 
and opens the possibility of subsuming the person beneath the category of 
‘thing’.14 Honneth states that ‘[t]o the extent to which in our acts of cognition 
we lose sight of the fact that these acts owe their existence to our having taken 
up an antecedent recognitional stance, we develop a tendency to perceive 
other persons as mere sensate objects’ (Honneth, 2008, p. 57). Unlike in his 
other writings where recognition is understood roughly according to the 
Hegelian differentiation of ‘Objective Spirit’ into spheres of intimacy, civil 
society, and community, here Honneth seems to suggest that the phenom-
enon of reification can be understood simply at the level of the individual and 
therefore as a matter of subjective disposition that can be simply corrected 
by a rather voluntaristic change of perspective. In other words, reification, in 
Honneth’s ethical account the phenomenon,15 appears then to be something 
like a mistake in categorization and can be rectif ied as such.
In contrast, as we have seen, Lukács and Heidegger understand reif ica-
tion as a form of forgetting that results from a determinate structural crisis 
that has profound implications for the conditions of human action. For 
Lukács, reif ication constitutes the ongoing crisis of generalized commodity 
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production through which the rationalization of even the most minute 
aspect of the social whole comes about. Reif ication consists of the reduc-
tion of time to space; of diachrony to ostensibly immutable synchronic 
laws of social motion. This amounts, as I have already suggested, to a kind 
of cognitive crisis that cannot, however, be solved by purely cognitive or 
contemplative means but must ultimately be addressed through praxis. 
Lukács could be said to be in agreement with the later Wittgenstein that the 
problem of ‘reif ication’ (like that of scepticism) is not so much a philosophi-
cal problem that could be met with a philosophical solution but rather a 
meta-philosophical problem to be dissolved by way of self-conscious action 
or praxis.
For Heidegger, in contrast, reif ication arises as result of the crisis or 
breakdown of our future-oriented, purposive action against the meaningful 
horizon of worldly commitments and engagements. In other words, reif ica-
tion results from the manner in which action is arrested or halted as a result 
of a tear in the background horizon of the meaningful world provoked by 
a breakdown in the zuhanden (‘ready-to-hand’) character of things, that 
is, the tool, itself, which is now disclosed as vorhanden (‘present-at-hand’); 
Dasein’s thrownness into the world of pre-given meanings now is resolved 
into a bifurcated scene consisting of a deracinated subject passively survey-
ing an object as it appears directly before it on the horizon of an eternal 
present shorn of any kind of relation to past or future. Like Wittgenstein, the 
sceptical problem of the certainty of our knowledge claims and, relatedly, 
the problem of the existence of other minds, is a function of a crisis or 
breakdown of worldly relations as previously described.
However wanting Honneth’s account of the origins of the phenomenon 
may be, insofar as it provides no compelling structural account of reif ica-
tion, it does provide a clear account of its normative orientation to the 
mutuality of recognition between persons.16 If structural accounts are on 
offer in an account of post-liberal capitalism in Lukács or for Heidegger 
in the account of the Seinsvergessenheit at the heart of the tradition of 
Western metaphysics, their respective normative starting points are more 
or less implicit rather than explicitly stated. For Honneth, reif ication stems, 
as we have seen, from a misrecognition of the person; from a denial of the 
recognition of the other’s aspiration to self-realization. In the case of Lukács 
and Heidegger it is possible discern the way in which normative commit-
ments are embedded in, on the one hand, the former’s account of history, 
and, on the other hand, in the latter’s history of Western metaphysics as 
a narrative of decline culminating, in his later writings, in the essence of 
technological thinking.
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The f irst account of reif ication, the dialectical account, one could argue, 
is oriented at recovering a form of lost autonomy understood not just in 
terms of Kantian primacy of moral self-legislation but in political terms as 
the democratic self-determination of a community.17 In taking up a merely 
contemplative attitude to its own objectif ications, the collective subject 
subordinates itself to a condition of heteronomy or of being determined by 
an ‘alien power’.18 The overcoming of such an attitude, the transformation 
of the petrif ied and barely recognizable forms of social existence is an act 
of freedom or, at least, inaugurates the passage from the realm of necessity 
to that freedom.19
The second account of reif ication, what I’m calling the difference ac-
count, in contrast, understands the phenomenon as the reduction of the 
human being to a condition indistinguishable from a world of things on 
the temporal horizon of an eternalized present. This amounts not so much 
to the loss of rational, which is to say self-legislating, freedom as it does a 
loss of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit).20 Such a loss amounts to a falling into 
the idle chatter (die Rede) of the anonymous world of ‘publicness’ by which 
‘everything gets obscured, and what has been covered up gets passed off 
as something familiar and accessible to everyone’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 165). 
The light of the open public sphere darkens everything because it induces 
Dasein to lose sight of, or indeed actively avoid, the fundamental questions 
of human existence.
These two models of reif ication—dialectic and difference—can be 
seen, as alluded to above, to f ind their way into the key philosophical 
positions of the late twentieth century. Each of these models, moreover, 
is oriented by a specif ic account of normativity. The f irst is geared to a 
notion of autonomy or a life that is a rationally self-legislating one. The 
second is oriented towards realization of a life characterized by irreduc-
ible difference or singularity. Autonomy entails action oriented towards 
the collective subject’s self-appropriation of the objective forms of its own 
activity. Authenticity, in contrast, is grounded in the irreducibly temporal 
nature of Dasein, its f initude and ultimate orientation towards its ownmost 
possibility, namely death. Being-towards-death is radically individuating 
insofar as only I can face my own death. Such singularity ultimately trumps 
the universality of moral law.
Insofar as the origins of the idea of autonomy in Kant entail the public use 
of reason, the problem of reification does not entail, therefore, in Heidegger’s 
view, the transgression of the injunction to treat fellow rational beings 
always as ends and never as means. Rather, in a manner that recalls Kierkeg-
aard’s idea of a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’, authenticity consists 
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in the irreducible singularity of the individual. Kierkegaard presents, in 
Fear and Trembling, an inversion of Hegel’s account of the mediations of 
individuality, particularity, and universality within the unfolding of Abso-
lute Spirit: ‘faith’s paradox is this, that the single individual is higher than 
the universal, that the single individual […] determines his relation to the 
universal through his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute 
through the relation to the universal’ (Kierkegaard, 1985, pp. 97–98). It 
entails what Derrida (2005, p. 36), referring explicitly to Kierkegaard, calls 
the ultimately ungroundable ‘madness of decision’. Hence, for Heidegger, 
the falling of Dasein into das Man (‘the They’), which is, as he suggests, 
always already one of its possibilities, is an avoidance of or f light from its 
‘ownmost possibility’: Being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode). In other words, 
for Dasein, Being-towards-death has a radically individuating function 
and grounds its irreducible singularity in a manner that runs parallel to 
Kierkegaard’s notion of faith.
The claim that I wish to make here is that, in his conceptualization of the 
phenomenon of reif ication, Adorno draws upon both of these normative 
insights. On the one hand, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, his lectures on 
moral philosophy (2002) and the section entitled ‘Models of Freedom in 
Negative Dialectics’ (2007, pp. 211–299), Adorno is at considerable pains to 
show the manner in which an account of radical autonomy, under which 
he subsumes Lukács’s Fichtean critique of reif ication, is self-undermining. 
That is to say, it entails, in its account of rational self-legislation, a repres-
sive relation to the subject’s own sensuous impulses for fulf ilment and 
happiness. Hence, it becomes the locus of the dialectic of enlightenment: 
that the drive to self-preservation undermines the very (sensuous) life it is 
meant to preserve in the f irst place. If detached from the ‘object’ (somatic 
drives, external nature and the social order), autonomy, Adorno argues, 
must reverse into its opposite: heteronomy.21
On the other hand, as I have shown elsewhere (Gandesha, 2004), 
Adorno criticizes Heidegger’s account of reif ication as, itself, ‘reif ied’. That 
is, Heidegger relies upon a form of what Günther Anders calls ‘pseudo con-
creteness’ (1948) that substantializes historically generated and therefore 
contingent conditions, for example the emotional states (Befindlichkeiten) 
of Dasein. It is precisely because of Heidegger’s ontico-ontological difference 
that he is unable to root an account of reif ication in natural-historical 
processes (Gandesha, 2004).22 At the same time, the notion of authenticity 
can be understood as a placeholder for the non-identical or the ‘transitory’ 
that always already lies beyond the grasp of the concept. In late capitalist 
society in which the logic of reif ication had penetrated deeply into the 
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most intimate spheres, the transitory becomes a key site for resistance. The 
relation to the transitory is also a new form of normativity grounded in non-
identity, which suggests a non-subsumptive and therefore non-dominating 
relation between the individual and the collective. For Adorno, such a form 
of normativity was embodied in exemplary fashion in musical experience, 
which from the beginning of the Western tradition of political philosophy 
in Plato’s middle period dialogues, the Republic in particular, is inextricable 
from the question of justice.23 While this interpretation cannot be fully 
elaborated in this context, I would like to try to sketch out in the following 
and concluding section the way in which auditory experience provides the 
basis for a non-repressive form of totalization that both borrows from the 
two models previously discussed and, in the process, goes beyond them.
3. Musical Experience beyond Autonomy and Authenticity
As I have previously suggested the two most signif icant models of reif ica-
tion in the twentieth century, those of Lukács and Heidegger, are oriented 
by two distinct forms of normativity grounded in autonomy and authentic-
ity respectively. What I want to suggest in this section is the way in which 
Adorno’s approach places autonomy and authenticity in a Kraftfeld, or 
f ield of force. Central to the development of Adorno’s position, of course, 
is his relation to Walter Benjamin. Benjamin’s early conception of allegory 
in his work on das Trauerspiel, or the German mourning play, is key, along 
with Lukács’s conception of ‘second nature’, to Adorno’s elaboration of 
the idea of ‘natural-history’ which then forms the basis not only for the 
argument of Dialectic of Enlightenment, which lays bare the inextricable 
relation of enlightenment and myth, but also for the arguments of Negative 
Dialectics, many of which are centrally concerned to show the propensity 
of an account of pure practical reason geared to self-legislating autonomy 
to collapse under its own (rigoristic) weight. While, in Adorno’s view, 
the concept of autonomy must be defended (see, for example, Adorno 
and Becker, 1983), this can only be done by way of a seemingly aporetic 
receptivity to the other or the non-identical (and hence heteronomy). The 
aporia is only apparent, however, insofar as the supplement of aesthetic 
experience is the key mediation between ‘autonomy’ and ‘authenticity,’ 
universal concepts of reason and sensuous particularity. Specif ically in 
relation to musical experience, understood temporally, the non-identical 
as a form of transitoriness ruptures the immanence of identity-thinking 
and identifying processes from within.
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But Benjamin’s later, Brecht-inspired work, also serves as a critical foil for 
Adorno’s attempt to articulate a critique of what he along with Horkheimer 
call the ‘culture industry’. As they argue in Dialectic of Enlightenment, en-
lightenment culminates in ‘mass deception’ in which the anthropomorphism 
of its categories reaches new heights. An earlier version of this critique of 
the culture industry appears in an essay published in the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung entitled ‘Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of 
Listening’ (Adorno, 1982). Here, Adorno offers an almost explicit refutation of 
Benjamin’s widely influential essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechani-
cal Reproducibility’. As the central claims of this essay have already been 
discussed ad nauseam, I will not rehearse them again here. Suffice it to say, 
however, that the thrust of Benjamin’s argument is that the destruction of the 
‘aura’ or authenticity of the artwork via technologies of mass reproducibility, 
photography, and film in particular afford new opportunities for the objective 
presentation of socio-historical truths that had hitherto not been available 
to art—an ‘optical unconscious’ in which hitherto concealed structures of 
power are brought to light—and new subjective conditions for the experience 
of art. For example, the collective experience of film supplants the individual-
ized bourgeois forms of apprehension of art works in the museum.
Of a piece with his scepticism of much of his older friend and mentor’s 
later work, Adorno seeks to make an immanent critique of Benjamin’s 
cultural criticism. For example, in his exchange over the essay on Baude-
laire, Adorno suggests that Benjamin doesn’t properly understand Marx’s 
concept of ‘commodity fetishism’, and that he therefore ought to return 
to Capital, Volume I (Adorno, 1973b, p. 61). Similarly, in ‘Fetish Character’, 
Adorno grounds his response to what he views as Benjamin’s excessively 
optimistic account of mass culture not only in Marx’s account of commodity 
fetishism, which he quotes directly and at some length, but also in Lukács’s 
account of reif ication which, as is well-known, was also extremely highly 
regarded by Benjamin.24 Indeed, in suggesting that reif ication culminates 
in the culture industry, Adorno anticipates Debord’s account of the ‘spec-
tacle’. Two points of intersection are worth indicating: the utter passivity 
(pseudo-activity) of the spectator/listener before the spectacle and the 
overwhelming reproduction of the ‘Always-the-same’ (das Immergleiche). 
According to Adorno, ‘A sensory pleasure turns into disgust as soon as it 
is seen how it only serves to betray the consumer. The betrayal consists in 
always offering the same thing’ (Adorno, 1982, p. 290).
However much it may seem that Adorno’s and Benjamin’s positions are 
strictly opposed on the question of the emancipatory character of mass 
culture, it is important to recognize that Adorno is clear that mass culture 
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and autonomous art, ‘serious’ and ‘light’ music, are, as he puts it ‘Both torn 
halves of an integral freedom to which however they do not add up’ (Adorno, 
1973b, 66; see also Leppert, 2005, pp. 92–133). Both high and low culture, in 
other words, cannot escape the totalizing logic of commodity fetishism and 
reif ication that suffuses capitalist society in its late phase. In articulating 
his critique, Adorno’s concern is to challenge directly what he considers 
Benjamin’s all-too sanguine assessment of the political possibilities that 
attend modes of ‘distracted’ apperception exemplif ied by the cinema and 
that crystallize the signif icance not just of Brecht’s epic theatre but also 
the Russian avant-garde. In particular, Adorno’s concern is the connection 
between the objective processes by which music, ‘serious’ and ‘light’ alike, is 
subjected to the law of value, hence its ‘fetish character’, and the subjective 
process by which the capacity to ‘listen’ to (and therefore properly experi-
ence, erfahren rather than simply erleben) music is undermined. The fetish 
character of music, in other words, generates an inherently reif ied form of 
listening. If ‘all reification is a forgetting’, then reification in this specific case 
entails an incapacity to hold the parts in an articulated relation with the 
whole in the dynamic, temporal unfolding or movement (Goehr, 2008) of a 
musical work. Genuine musical experience (musikalische Erfahrung) entails a 
capacity for Erinnernung, which means the ability to reintegrate parts within 
the whole—literally, as we saw in connection with Hegel, to ‘re-member’ 
what had been dirempted or dis-membered. Regressive listening, in contrast, 
requires a certain kind of prompt via the leitmotif as in certain late Romantic 
works of Wagner, for example, that enable the work, in its discontinuous 
parts, to be instantly recognizable. In this, they anticipate the advertising 
jingles that illuminate the raison d’etre of the culture industry: ‘to truck 
and barter’.Such leitmotifs, themselves, as forms of disconnected forms of 
climactic experiences (Erlebnisse) entail a forgetting or break in the structural 
relation to the whole. In this sense, if Benjamin’s theses concerning f ilm are 
correct at all, they certainly cannot be extended to music: ‘But if the f ilm as 
a whole seems to be apprehended in a distracted manner, deconcentrated 
listening makes the perception of the whole impossible’ (Adorno, 1982, p. 288). 
Musical structure, therefore, helps to illuminate ontological questions.
Here it is possible to see the important links to both Lukács and Hei-
degger. For both, as we have seen, reif ication is closely tied to forgetting. 
For Lukács, what is forgotten is the constitutive link to practical activity, 
the objectif ications of which then confront the collective agent as an alien 
power from without; a condition of utter alienation or heteronomy. For Hei-
degger, reif ication is understood as the forgetting of the ontico-ontological 
difference grounded in the qualitative temporality of the human being 
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situated or thrown into an always already meaningful world. As I have 
suggested above, in the f irst account what is at stake is autonomy, in the 
second, authenticity. In Adorno’s account of musical experience, it is pos-
sible to discern the attempt to defend autonomy, which is to say, aesthetic 
autonomy, whereby the work embodies its own self-directed lawfulness, in 
such a way as to rescue a notion of aura or authenticity understood as the 
trace of otherness that does not enter into concepts without remainder. 
Yet this is a kind of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) distanced from property 
(Eigentum), as the temporal evanescence of music cannot be possessed as 
such (see Leppert, 2005). In the autonomous, and therefore reified, artwork 
it is possible to discern a dialectical model for a non-reif ied fluid relation of 
sensuous particularity and universality that negates the logic of subsump-
tion of the former beneath the latter. As Adorno (1982, p. 298) suggests, 
‘Even discipline can take over the expression of free solidarity if freedom 
becomes its content. As little as regressive listening is a symptom of progress 
in consciousness of freedom, it could suddenly turn around if art, in unity 
with society, should ever leave the road of the always-identical’.
Specif ically with reference to the musical experience of what Adorno 
calls ‘structural listening’,25 that rather than entailing a forgetting or elision 
of the work as a whole punctuated by the shock-like, discrete, and discon-
nected experiences (Erlebnisse) of individual moments, the autonomous 
work calls forth a kind of concentrated listening as a type of experience 
(Erfahrung), as a type of unfolding that works simultaneously backwards 
and forwards; that what in a phenomenological register would be referred 
to as ‘internal time consciousness’ (Husserl, 1991) and therefore involves a 
unifying process entailing both retention and protention. However, and 
this is a key aberration in Adorno from both Lukács and Heidegger, it would 
totalize in such a way as to generate or regenerate a (mimetic) capacity for 
passive receptivity (rather than active, constituting spontaneity) in rela-
tion to the genuinely other. It is a form of totalization, in other words, that 
paradoxically sets free the transitory rather than subsuming it beneath 
subject-object identity (Lukács) or Dasein’s care structure unifying past and 
present in the futurity of one’s own most authentic (eigentlich) possibility 
(Heidegger). What Adorno calls ‘thinking conceptually beyond the concept’ 
is in a sense then a form of remembering of the necessity of forgetting—that 
sensuous particularity can never be subsumed beneath concepts without 
leaving a trace or a remainder that is simply unrecuperable because of its 
inherent temporality; that, like musical notes, the non-identical simply 
sounds and then passes away. As Adorno suggests in reference to the free 
atonal works of Schönberg and Webern: ‘They are called individualists, and 
‘ReiFiCaTion’ beT ween auTonomY and auTHenTiCiT Y 51
yet their work is nothing but a single dialogue with the powers that destroy 
individuality—powers whose “formless shadows” fall gigantically on their 
music. In music, too, collective powers are liquidating an individuality past 
saving, but against them only individuals are capable of representing the 
aims of collectivity’ (1982, p. 299).
To return to that with which I started, Pierre Flourens’s rejection of the 
use of chloroform: his reason for doing so had to do with the fact that, in 
contrast to received opinion, chloroform not only fails to diminish suffering 
in patients who are sedated with the drug, but actually enhances it. The 
way chloroform acts, however, is to enable the nervous system to forget 
what it has undergone. Moreover, given its effectiveness in promoting such 
forgetfulness and therefore in widening the scope for increasing the inva-
siveness of medical procedures, it risks turning human beings into guinea 
pigs; in transforming every operation into an act of vivisection. Indeed, the 
unprecedented levels of pain that might be caused by the invasive nature of 
the procedures themselves may cause permanent mental damage or even 
death under narcosis, the exact nature of which would be concealed from 
both the relatives of the patient as well as the world at large. In a sense, this 
kind of reif ication as a forgetting would be a double forgetting: a forgetting 
of forgetting. A forgetting of a nature of the administering of chloroform 
and its effects, i.e. not the reduction in the body’s sensitivity to stimuli but 
rather enhancing its capacity to forget the pain that it has suffered.
My argument has been that for Adorno, Lukács, and Heidegger’s concep-
tions of reif ication ultimately fail to understand this problem of the forget-
ting of the necessity of forgetting addressed by Flourens. In this example, 
we see medicine as a rational system that treats the individual as a thing 
(as a guinea pig to be experimented on) or a mere presence-at-hand that 
forgets the authorship and/or irreducible singularity of the human being. 
However, what is not brought to memory, and what to some extent def ies 
its powers of recall, is an irreconcilable moment of somatic suffering that 
pervades natural history. In contrast to Lukács and Heidegger, Adorno seeks 
to differentiate a notion of enlightenment as Mündigkeit from the self-
destructive notion of enlightenment as Aufklärung. While Kant uses the two 
concepts more or less interchangeably in his famous essay ‘Beantwortung 
der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’, Adorno (with Horkheimer) differentiates 
the two. While Aufklärung, emphasizes the role of vision in establishing 
a totalizing picture of the whole, Adorno takes Mündigkeit to mean the 
capacity of the subject to speak up for him- or herself in a non-conformist 
way and this entails a certain kind of danger and riskiness that comes 
with a refusal of ‘identif ication with the aggressor’, a refusal that in his 
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youth Adorno (1991, p. 186) came to associate with the use of Fremdwörter, 
which he understood as the ‘Jews of language’. Far from simply emphasizing 
the autonomy of the subject and perpetuating the self-destructive logic of 
the dialectic of enlightenment, however, Adorno stresses the importance, 
indeed the irreducibility, of aspiring to ‘express the inexpressible’ (Adorno, 
2007, pp. 108-110). Indeed such irreducibility comes into its own precisely 
by virtue of the specialized (and therefore reif ied) dialectic of aesthetic 
autonomy that releases the transitory, the ‘unexpressable’, from the hold 
of identity or the ‘expressable’. It is the resistance of the former that makes 
possible what Hannah Arendt regards as the very signature of the political: 
namely, the possibility of a ‘new beginning’.
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3. ‘All Reification Is a Forgetting’ : 
Benjamin, Adorno, and the Dialectic 
of Reification
Thijs Lijster
In his contribution to the book The Idea of Communism, Slavoj Žižek argues 
that ‘we can no longer talk about “reif ication” in the classic Lukácsian sense. 
Far from being invisible, social relationality in its very fluidity is directly the 
object of marketing and exchange’ (Žižek, 2010, p. 221).1 While reif ication 
in the traditional sense referred to the apprehension of social relations as 
things—for instance, to consider the price of an object as a mysterious and 
autonomous force, instead of something that has its origin in human labour 
mediated by relations of commodity exchange—today these social relations 
themselves have become the model of the commodity form, as industrial 
capitalism has turned into ‘cultural’ capitalism, intellectual and immate-
rial labour are becoming increasingly predominant, and information and 
experience the primary consumer goods. Indeed, in a world in which, more 
than ever, ‘all that is solid melts into air’ (Marx, 1978, p. 517), the critique 
of reif ication might run the risk of identifying with the aggressor. Hence, 
it is worthwhile to take a look at earlier critiques of Lukács’s critique of 
reif ication, of which those of Adorno and Benjamin are the most original.
Adorno’s indebtedness to Lukács theory of reif ication is quite well 
known, as is his later critique of Lukács in Negative Dialectics.2 There, 
Adorno argues that Lukács fails to distinguish between reif ication and 
what he calls objectivation.3 While the critique of reif ication rightfully 
exposes the thing-like object as part of the total social process, this cri-
tique thereby also tends to reduce the entire meaning of the object to the 
meaning-giving social subject, not allowing anything alien above and 
beyond the subject’s reach. Lukács, in short, ignores what one might call 
the surplus of meaning of the object itself, and hence relapses into idealism. 
As Adorno writes:
If a man looks upon thingness as radical evil, if he would like to dynamize 
all entity into pure actuality, he tends to be hostile to otherness, to the 
alien thing that has lent its name to alienation, and not in vain. (Adorno, 
1963, p. 191)
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Against this, Adorno argues:
The reconciled condition would not be the philosophical imperialism of 
annexing the alien. Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the alien, 
in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different beyond 
the heterogeneous and beyond that which is one’s own. (Adorno, 1963, p. 191)
In other words, the ‘thingness’ of the object should not be completely trans-
lated into the product of social relations, as the theory of reif ication seems 
to imply. The ‘alienness’ of the object, for Adorno, is also the recognition 
that there is something beyond the subject’s reach, i.e. beyond what can 
be reduced to subjectivity.
Less well known, however, is the critique of the concept of reif ication 
developed by Adorno’s mentor and friend, Walter Benjamin. Robert Hullot-
Kentor, for instance, writes that Adorno ‘in opposition to both Benjamin and 
the early Lukács […] did not reify the critique of reif ication’ (Hullot-Kentor, 
2006, p. 249; emphasis added). As true as this may be with regard to Lukács, 
I do not agree with Hullot-Kentor where it concerns Benjamin. Or to put it 
more strongly, I believe that Adorno’s critique of the critique of reif ication 
is largely derived from Benjamin’s work, and developed in dialogue with 
Benjamin, as I will try to show in what follows. To do this, I will f irst take 
a look at a discussion on the concept of reif ication in the correspondence 
between Adorno and Benjamin. Next, I will discuss how Benjamin’s concept 
of reif ication is closely connected to the theory of allegory developed in his 
Trauerspiel book, which later returns, albeit in a different form, in the f igure 
of the collector from the Arcades Project. This f igure, I will argue, can be 
considered as an ‘emblem’ of Benjamin’s theory of reif ication. Finally, I will 
come back to Adorno and to the way the Benjaminian dialectic of reification 
functions in his aesthetics, more specif ically in the relation between art 
and natural beauty.
1. ‘All Reification Is a Forgetting’
In their Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno famously stated 
that ‘all reif ication is forgetting’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p. 191). 
But the f irst time this line appears is in a letter from Adorno to Walter 
Benjamin, dated 29 February 1940. In it, Adorno expresses his enthusiasm 
for Benjamin’s rewritten version of the essay on Baudelaire, ‘On Some Motifs 
in Baudelaire’. In this essay, Benjamin introduces the distinction between 
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Erfahrung and Erlebnis—Erfahrung as the kind of experience connected 
to and embedded in tradition, as a collective memory, and Erlebnis as an 
isolated shock-experience that cannot f ind its way into memory, or only to 
a distorted voluntary memory.
In his letter, Adorno expresses his appreciation for Benjamin’s theory 
of experience, but proposes to develop it further by connecting it to the 
concept of reif ication. He writes:
Is it not the case that the real task here is to bring the entire opposition 
between Erlebnis and Erfahrung into relation with a dialectical theory of 
forgetting? Or one could equally say, into relation with a theory of reif ica-
tion. For all reif ication is a forgetting: objects become purely thing-like 
the moment they are retained for us without the continued presence of 
their other aspects: when something of them has been forgotten. (Adorno 
and Benjamin, 1999, p. 321)
He continues saying that:
there is absolutely no question for us of merely repeating Hegel’s [and here 
one could probably also fill in Lukács’s name, TL] verdict upon reif ication 
here, but rather of formulating a proper critique of reif ication, i.e. of 
unfolding the contradictory moments that are involved in such forgetting; 
or one could also say, of formulating a distinction between good and bad 
reif ication. (Adorno and Benjamin, 1999, p. 321)
Finally, Adorno also proposes to involve Benjamin’s concept of aura in this 
theory of forgetting, for, in his view, Benjamin’s aura is nothing but the 
forgetting of human labour invested in things. I will return to the concept 
of aura in the last section.
In his response of 7 May 1940, Benjamin reacts somewhat reluctantly to 
Adorno’s proposals. Although there might be all sorts of personal reasons 
for this reluctance, there are at least two possible theoretical ones, too. 
First, Benjamin had already developed the dialectical theory of reif ication 
Adorno suggests quite some time earlier, namely in the theory of allegory 
that was part of his analysis of the German Baroque mourning play. Second, 
Adorno’s formulation of ‘a distinction between good and bad reif ication’ 
might have struck Benjamin as strangely undialectical, as if the two could be 
neatly categorized and separated. It does not f it into Benjamin’s ideas about 
reif ication, according to which reif ication might be redeemed precisely by 
taking it to its extreme.
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2. Reification and Allegory
As Benjamin argues in his study of the Trauerspiel, baroque melancholy 
maintains a double relation to the world of things, once characterized 
by Winfried Menninghaus as a dialectic of devaluation (Entwertung) and 
sanctif ication (Erhebung) (Menninghaus, 1980). For the Baroque poets, who 
were Lutherans, the ‘natural’ order of the cosmos is lost, and the world of 
things devalued; grace awaits us only in the afterlife. On the other side, 
however, the melancholic attitude, as described by Benjamin, is character-
ized by a perpetual attribution of new meanings to dead objects, thereby 
‘sanctifying’ them as the potential key to eternal knowledge. Thus, the 
melancholic grants devalued objects an opportunity to possess a new life.
Allegory, as Benjamin argues, is the expression of this melancholic world-
view. As he so brilliantly puts it: ‘The allegory of the seventeenth century 
is not convention of expression, but expression of convention’ (Benjamin, 
1977, p. 175). In allegorical language, everything can become the sign for 
anything else, sometimes turning a thing into its exact opposite—a crown 
becomes a funeral wreath and an angel’s harp turns into an executioner’s 
axe (p. 231). However, in order to receive its allegorical meaning, the object 
must be torn out of its original context. This is why, according to Benjamin, 
the most prominent Baroque emblems are the ruin, the corpse, and the 
skull: objects that are already dead, whose life has literally withered away, 
and are therefore available for the allegorist to f ill with new meaning. One 
might also say that these objects are allegories of allegory.
Although the Trauerspiel study precedes Benjamin’s ‘turn’ to Marxism, it 
is not hard to see that his critique of Baroque conventionalism f its well into 
a Marxist critique of the commodity form. This is precisely why Benjamin 
recognized so much of his own thoughts when he was f irst introduced to 
Lukács’s critique of reif ication and commodif ication in History and Class 
Conscience, which, in a later newspaper review, he praises as one of the 
books that ‘remain alive’ (Benjamin, 1972, p. 171).
Indeed, the commodity form has a central place in Benjamin’s analysis 
of modernity in the Arcades Project.4 Like Lukács, Benjamin conceives of 
the commodity not merely as an economic form, but as something that 
permeates the lives and minds of people. As we come to express everything 
in terms of exchange value, the way we perceive our world and each other 
changes. The commodity, as Marx already argues, is exchangeable for any 
other commodity through the medium of money, and therefore the com-
modif ied object is deprived of its specif ic meaning. Herein lies the aff inity 
between commodity and allegory, which similarly sucks the life out of 
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any object: ‘The devaluation of the world of things in allegory is surpassed 
within the world of things itself by the commodity’ (Benjamin, 2003, p. 164).
Although Benjamin himself never states it explicitly, one could translate 
the dialectical poles of allegory, devaluation, and sanctification into a dialectic 
of reification. As objects enter the market and become commodities, their 
original meaning is stripped from them and replaced by their price. Or, to 
put it in Marx’s terms, their use value is eclipsed by their exchange value. 
The commodity is a product of human labour, but no longer recognized as 
such, and taken for a nature-like thing: natural history (Naturgeschichte), as 
Benjamin calls it. Life is drained from the object and what remains is an empty 
shell, similar to the Baroque emblems of the ruin, the skull, and the corpse.
However, the other pole of the allegory—sanctif ication—is equally 
present in commodification. New meanings are granted to commodities, as 
Benjamin points out by quoting Marx: ‘Value […] converts every product into 
a social hieroglyphic’.5 The exchange value of the commodity is considered 
as a force of its own, a force beyond man. Hence the reference to the fetish; 
Marx famously speaks of the ‘theological niceties and metaphysical subtle-
ties’ of the commodity (Marx, 1990, p. 163). Benjamin appropriates Marx’s 
notion of commodity fetishism quite creatively yet also quite literally: in his 
Arcades Project he describes how in nineteenth-century Paris the commod-
ity is worshipped in a very specif ic location, namely the shopping windows 
in the arcades. There, commodities became fetishes in the most literal sense: 
they were put on pedestals, edif ices, and in alcoves, worshipped as holy 
relics by a crowd passing by them as in a religious procession.
Although the worshipping of commodities in consumer capitalism that 
has the Paris arcades as its temple is clearly ideological, Benjamin refuses 
to reject it as mere false consciousness. He was fascinated by these new 
meanings, the collective dreams and fears that were projected onto dead 
objects. This epoch, he argues, witnessed the dawn of a new mythology. 
Myth means the transformation of history into nature: social processes 
are presented as necessary and inevitable. However, taken to its extreme, 
commodity fetishism makes the opposite movement. This movement f inds 
its expression in the souvenir: ‘The key f igure in early allegory is the corpse. 
In late allegory, it is the “souvenir”. The “souvenir” is the schema of the 
commodity’s transformation into an object for the collector’ (Benjamin, 
2003, p. 190). For Benjamin, the nineteenth-century collector, who roams 
the curiosity shops of the arcades in search for the missing piece of his 
collection, is a utopian f igure, who functions as an emblem for a different 
relationship to the world of things. To find out what this relationship entails, 
we will have a closer look at him.
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3. The Collector
In the Arcades Project we read that ‘the true collector detaches the object 
from its functional relations’ (Benjamin, 1999a, p. 207). This indeed recalls 
one important aspect of Lukács’s notion of reif ication, namely the reif ica-
tion of objects (as distinguished from the reification of human labour power, 
or the reif ication of social relations). To turn a commodity into something 
collectable means, in the f irst place, to strip it of its use value: a toy collector 
does not play with his collection just as a philatelist does not use his stamps 
to send letters. But the collector also charges the object with new meaning: 
a meaning the object gains by entering in a different relationship with the 
other collectables. This relationship between different objects within a 
collection, which is no longer functional but aesthetic, is what Benjamin 
calls a ‘constellation’. In constructing constellations, the collector seems 
quite similar to the allegorist: he strips the object of its original context 
(devaluation), but also grants it a new meaning (sanctif ication) by turning 
the object into a ‘souvenir’.
However, Benjamin argues that the collector differs from the allegorist 
in some crucial ways. First, the collector approaches the objects with love 
instead of spleen (Pensky, 1993, p. 243). In the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin 
shows that the Baroque allegorist f inally considers the entire earthly realm 
as an allegory for the afterlife, thus betraying the world of things. The col-
lector, by contrast, has a love for things. The objects ‘strike him’, Benjamin 
writes, which implies that the collector is attentive to their meaning, instead 
of the meaning he projects on them (Benjamin, 1999a, p. 205).
Second, as Benjamin writes: ‘[F]or the collector, the world is present, and 
indeed ordered, in each of his objects. Ordered, however, according to a 
surprising and, for the profane understanding, incomprehensible connec-
tion’ (p. 207). The collector pays attention not merely to the object at hand, 
but also to its previous owners, where the object has been, in short for the 
path the object has travelled before it was put in his hands and became 
part of his collection. As such, each object indeed presents an alternative 
order of history. The collector considers his own relation to the object as 
an intervention in its afterlife.
The collector, f inally, does not consider the order of things as merely 
conventional, as the allegorist does. Benjamin writes:
[The allegorist] has given up the attempt to elucidate things through 
research into their  properties and relations. He dislodges things from their 
context and, from the outset,  relies on his profundity to illuminate their 
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meaning. The collector, by contrast, brings  together what belongs together; 
by keeping in mind their aff inities and their  succession in time, he can 
eventually furnish information about his objects. (Benjamin, 1999a, p. 211)
The problem of course is that there is no rule or law to determine ‘what 
belongs together’. Therefore, the opposition between allegorist and collector 
is itself a dialectical one, as Benjamin writes: ‘In every collector hides an 
allegorist, and in every allegorist a collector’ (p. 211). Both collector and 
allegorist consider the world as ruinous and fragmentary, but although the 
collector remains hopeful of f inding the ‘true’ order of the fragments, the 
allegorist has given up on the world.
To come back to our main concern: I believe we might consider the 
f igure of the collector as the ‘emblem’, so to speak, of Benjamin’s dialectic of 
reification. The collector takes commodification to its extreme: he strips the 
obsolete and old-fashioned commodities from their f inal social remnants. 
But in doing so, Benjamin argues, he also liberates them from servitude. 
He writes:
[The collector] makes his concern the transf iguration of things. To him 
falls the Sisyphean task of divesting things of their commodity character 
by taking possession of them. But he bestows on them only connoisseur 
value, rather than use value. The collector dreams his way not only into 
a distant or bygone world but also into a better one—one in which, to 
be sure, human beings are no better provided with what they need than 
in the everyday world, but in which things are freed from the drudgery of 
being useful. (P. 9)
Here it is important to keep in mind the specif ic kind of collector Benjamin 
has in mind, namely the nineteenth-century-type collector of curiosities, 
who collects obsolete objects that others consider to be junk, and not the 
kind of art collector we see today, for whom a collection functions as a 
display of wealth, or a way to either speculate with or store money capital.6
While the Benjaminian kind of collecting is today a marginal phenom-
enon at best, one might argue that the last remnants of it have moved 
to the world of art—that is, not to art collections, but rather to artistic 
practices that involve collections or collectables. These practices of course 
have their origin in the objet trouvé of Dadaism and Surrealism, movements 
that were important sources of inspiration for Benjamin himself,7 and later 
also for movements such as the Situationist International and artists such 
as Marcel Broodthaers, Robert Rauschenberg, and Claes Oldenburg. These 
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movements and artists have considered the artwork itself as a collection 
of worn-out or discarded objects, which they revive by placing them into a 
constellation, i.e. an aesthetic relationship with other objects (cf. Owens, 
1980; Crimp, 1993; Krauss, 1999).
For Adorno, however, the dialectic of reif ication that the collector stands 
for is the model for the aesthetic experience per se. It was precisely for this 
reason that he famously accused Benjamin of thinking undialectically when 
the latter discarded autonomous art as ‘counterrevolutionary’ in his essay 
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility’ (Adorno 
and Benjamin, 1999, p. 128). Still, in Aesthetic Theory Adorno is in dialogue 
with his friend, as he deploys the Benjaminian dialectic of reif ication to 
rescue the idea of autonomous art and the aesthetic experience.8
4. Adorno’s Dialectic of Reification
That the dialectic of reif ication discussed above is one of the cardinal 
principles of Adorno’s aesthetics is most clearly expressed in his provocative 
statement in Aesthetic Theory that ‘the absolute artwork converges with the 
absolute commodity’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 28). Although Adorno considers art 
as perhaps the last harbour of refuge against reif ication and commodity 
fetishism, it can only function as such through a process of reif ication and 
fetishization. Referring back to his statement, Adorno writes:
If artworks are in fact absolute commodities in that they are a social 
product that has rejected every semblance of existing for society, a sem-
blance to which commodities otherwise urgently cling, the determining 
relation of production, the commodity form, enters the artwork equally 
with the social force of production and the antagonism between the 
two. The absolute commodity would be free of the ideology inherent 
in the commodity form, which pretends to exist for-another, whereas 
ironically it is something merely for-itself: it exists for those who hold 
power. (P. 308)
In other words, the absolute artwork converges with the absolute commod-
ity because f irst, it detaches itself fully from the productive process of which 
it is the product, and second, because it has no use value whatsoever.9 The 
artwork is functionless, it does not communicate, we do not know what it is, 
and not even why it exists: it is indeed, as Adorno notes, an enigma (Rätsel), 
therefore recalling Marx’s idea of the commodity as a ‘social hieroglyph’.
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It is precisely the enigmatic character that is part of every genuine 
aesthetic experience, which makes such an experience into a model, one 
might say, for a non-dominative relationship to the world of things that 
resists identity thinking. Adorno writes: ‘Art stands as plenipotentiary for 
the in-itself that does not yet exist’ (p. 327). In other words, the aesthetic 
experience is exemplary for what a full experience might be in a society 
that is not dominated by functional relationships. Such a mode of relating 
to objects has an eye for the meaning inherent in the object itself, beyond 
the meaning the subject projects on it.
Adorno’s bête noire here is, as so often, the tradition of Idealism, which 
has dominated western thought since Descartes and Kant and, in his view, 
still comprises the work of Heidegger and Lukács, who pretend to have 
overcome it. The subject, as conceived by the Idealist system, is a ‘belly 
turned mind’, since it devours what comes in its path and leaves nothing 
of the integrity of what it is confronted with (Adorno, 1973, p. 23). As Kant 
tells us, intuitions are ‘blind’ unless they are subsumed under the categories 
of cognition. Sensuousness, in other words, has meaning only when this 
is granted to it by transcendental subjectivity, while the object is known 
only insofar as it can be manipulated: it is reduced to spiritual content. This 
reif ication of experience, Adorno argues, disf igures both the object and the 
subject. The object is conceived of as a f ixed entity when it is being reduced 
to its conceptualization by a representing mind; the object’s particularity is 
destroyed through its subsumption under a priori schemas of knowledge. 
Consequently, however, the object also loses its ability to act as a source of 
human creativity and spontaneity. The subject, by consequence, loses its 
chance of encountering something new and different, something alien to 
itself, something that could alter the structures of its thought.10 The world 
becomes but a mirror of the subject itself. Hence, Adorno argues, philosophi-
cal idealism not only has a poor conception of experience, but eventually 
also cannot live up to its own claim of objectivity, since everywhere it looks 
it only sees itself (Adorno, 1973, p. 120).
In Negative Dialectics Adorno gives a hint of what a full experience would 
look like: ‘If the thought really yielded to the object, if its attention were on 
the object, not on its category, the very objects would start talking under the 
lingering eye’ (Adorno, 1973, pp. 27–28). Indeed, the experience of a work 
of art, which cannot be subsumed under a certain category, and has an 
enigmatic and non-reducible meaning of its own, is the model for such a way 
of relating to the world. However, Adorno argues in Aesthetic Theory that 
the work of art in turn is modelled after natural beauty. Again, Benjamin is 
not far away, and in the above quoted passage from Negative Dialectics one 
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can hear the echo of Benjamin’s def inition of aura, as granting the object 
with the ability to return one’s gaze.11
In the introduction I already mentioned how Adorno suggested in his 
letter to Benjamin that the concept of aura in fact refers to forgetfulness of 
human labour in the object (and hence to a kind of reif ication). In his reply 
Benjamin comes back to this, and writes the following:
But even if the question of the aura does in fact involve a ‘forgotten hu-
man moment’, this is still not necessarily the moment of human labour. 
The tree and the shrub which offer themselves to us are not made by 
human hands. There must therefore be something human in the things 
themselves, something that is not originated by labour. (Adorno and 
Benjamin, 1999, p. 327)
Benjamin, in other words, resists the hurried subsumption of his concept 
of aura under the theory of reif ication by Adorno, precisely because of its 
idealistic moment. Indeed, the imperative to consider everything within the 
‘total social process’ stands in great tension with the demand of the object 
to be taken on its own, to consider it as a ‘sensuous particular’ (Bernstein, 
2006, p. 152), to borrow a phrase of Jay Bernstein.
It is this tension that Adorno wants to keep intact in his later theory of 
experience, which is why he tries to redeem reif ication. Like Benjamin’s col-
lector, Adorno takes the idea of reif ication to its extreme in order to redeem 
it: ‘Radicalized, what is called reification probes for the language of things. It 
narrows the distance to the idea of that nature that extirpates the primacy 
of human meaning’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 78). And indeed, in its very reif ication 
art paradoxically approaches the beauty of nature, not through imitation, 
but by being entirely in-itself, by bearing a enigmatic meaning that exceeds 
the meaning projected unto it by the subject: ‘Aesthetic objectivity, the 
reflection of the being-in-itself of nature, realizes the subjective teleological 
element of unity; exclusively thereby do artworks become comparable to 
nature’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 100).
True reconciliation, in other words, does not mean bringing to light 
the ‘forgotten human element’ in nature, as Adorno suggests in his letter 
to Benjamin, but rather to acknowledge and emphasize the very alien 
and ‘inhuman’ character of nature, an inhuman moment that is also 
part of humanity itself. In Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and 
Adorno referred to this moment with their famous def inition of mimesis 
as ‘remembrance of nature within the subject’, in which ‘enlightenment 
is opposed in principle to power’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p. 32).12 
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Only once the subject remembers that it is itself also part of nature, that 
it has been constituted in a dialectical relationship with nature instead 
of reducing nature entirely to itself, will it cease its destructive attempts 
to control nature in order to take away its fear from it. The dialectical 
‘answer’ to the dialectic of enlightenment, then, is that only the subject’s 
acceptance of the impossibility of emancipating oneself from nature will 
allow it to interrupt the blind course of nature. This is what the dialectic 
of reif ication comprises.
5. Conclusion
Let us finally return to the problem raised in the introduction with the quote 
by Žižek, namely that Lukács’s critique of reif ication no longer suff ices in a 
world where not rigidity but fluidity, f lexibility, and change seem to be the 
main sources of alienation and discontent; i.e. the ideology that we are all 
happy nomads moving through the global network. Obviously, this is an 
all-too-easy critique of Lukács, if only for the fact that this is indeed mere 
ideology.13 It does show, however, how capitalism absorbs and encapsulates 
the very forms of critique that were traditionally directed against it.14
Though Benjamin and Adorno’s dialectic of reif ication could perhaps 
not be a solution to this problem—for that, the problem is too complex—I 
believe that at least it might shield us against all too easy paeans to fluid-
ity, dynamics, or nomadism. Indeed, I think that contemporary trans- or 
post-humanists who preach the gospel of the network and speak of the 
blurring of boundaries between humans and non-humans might run the 
same risk as Lukács of relapsing into idealism.15 For these thinkers fail to 
acknowledge that while the distinction between subject and object may 
be ontologically f lawed, it still is a historical reality, which one does not do 
away with as with a touch of a magic wand.
For Benjamin and Adorno the dialectic of reif ication means recognizing 
what Adorno calls the ‘primacy of the object’: yes, the object might be 
socially and historically constituted, but its meaning cannot and should 
not be reduced entirely to social relations. This very inscrutability of the 
object, its surplus of meaning beyond the subject’s reach, has a utopian 
moment, which makes it essential not only for aesthetic experience but 
also for a changed relation to the world. As Adorno formulates it in Negative 
Dialectics: ‘For there could no more be truth without a subject freeing itself 
from delusions than there could be truth without that which is not the 
subject, that in which truth has its archetype’ (Adorno, 1973, p. 375).
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4. Utopian Interiors : The Art of 
Situationist Urbanism from Reification 
to Play
Tyrus Miller
In this essay I discuss the urbanistic thinking and practice of two artists 
closely associated with the founding of the Situationist International (SI): 
the Danish painter Asger Jorn and the Dutch painter, sculptor, and architect 
Constant Nieuwenhuys. Both helped establish the SI, and subsequently, 
long after their off icial separation from the group, Jorn remained a friend 
and f inancial backer of the group, while Constant was politically aff iliated 
with, and an inspiration for, the radical Provos anarchist movement in 
Amsterdam. In particular, I will pay close attention to the special graphic 
practices of these two artists—various practices of modelling, drawing, 
collaging, and so on—which they used to explore the possibility of a new, 
utopian relation between creatively designed spaces and new forms of self-
hood beyond the individualist self characteristically reproduced by modern 
capitalism and its built environments. These practices were intended to 
‘mobilize’—render more f luid and f lexible—the built environment of 
the cities, helping to disclose the social encounters and social action that 
ultimately, in their view, structured it, whether in the form of dynamically 
perceptible, playful human activity or in the static forms of accumulated, 
reif ied, alienated labour. They also suggestively ‘modelled’ (in both the 
conceptual and architectural sense) a new collective mode of production of 
space intended to overcome the reif ied abstractions of capitalist, modernist 
urbanism. Participating in the broad twentieth-century and avant-garde 
questioning of the status of artistic work (as specialized activity) and works 
(as specialized objects), Jorn and Constant offered artistic analogons of 
social spaces that would no longer be structured by capitalist work, under-
stood as a modality of alienated labour, but rather by an autonomous free 
play of encounters and situations.
I concentrate here especially on Situationist views on the construction of 
designed spaces and décor, and the relationship of interiors to psychic and 
emotional states of subjective experience—an area of Situationist thought 
and practice to which artistic participants such as Jorn and Constant made 
especially important contributions. This focus is somewhat unusual for a 
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couple of reasons. First, the discussion of the Situationists has, until recently, 
strongly centred on the f igure of Guy Debord and the political critique of 
his Society of the Spectacle, with the practices of appropriated images and 
the politics of occupation taking centre stage. To the extent that Debord in-
creasingly steered the Situationist International towards a highly factional, 
sectarian political grouplet, this has tended to marginalize the seminal 
role of artists in the original Situationist movement, who resigned from the 
group or were systematically purged. However, it is becoming increasingly 
clear in hindsight that the associated artists made crucial contributions 
to the founding matrix of Situationist ideas. But second, even when these 
artists are brought back into the conversation, Situationist urbanism has 
nevertheless tended to be strongly associated with exterior spaces—with 
streets, maps, city networks, and buildings—rather than the design and 
experience of interiors.
If, however, we consider more carefully key motifs of Situationist urban 
thought, we f ind not a favouring of exterior space over interiors, but rather 
a critique of the abstract opposition between exterior and interior space, as 
reif ied manifestations of a capitalist production of space. The Situationists 
may be understood to have taken to a new degree of consistency, an aim 
first set out in André Breton’s writings in the 1920s and 1930s: the projection 
of an artistically-modelled practice of everyday life that would overcome 
the capitalist division of labour and radically displace the category of work 
(as labour process) and works (as products of labour) in favour of play, 
friendship, eroticism, intoxication, investigation, and eventually, political 
action. ‘The leading surrealists’, Henri Lefebvre would note in his 1974 book 
The Production of Space,
sought to decode inner space and illuminate the nature of the transition 
from this subjective space to the material realm of the body and the 
outside world and thence to social life. Consequently surrealism has a 
theoretical import which was not originally recognized. (Lefebvre, 1991, 
p. 18)
Developing this theoretical motif in Surrealism but going back deeper into 
the history of Paris, Walter Benjamin also emphasized a reversibility and 
communicability between interior and exterior spaces, and between ‘sub-
jective’ and ‘objective’ qualities of those spaces, which he saw exemplif ied 
by the ambiguous street-house constellations of the iron and glass arcades 
that emerged in the early decades of the nineteenth century.
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In Communicating Vessels, a work that anticipates later ‘critiques of 
everyday life’ such as those of Henri Lefebvre, who claimed to have directly 
influenced the founding of the COBRA artist group that included Jorn and 
Constant (Lefebvre, 2002, p. 269), Breton would write that ‘Surrealism […] 
should not be consider extant except in the a priori non-specialization of its 
effort’ (Breton, 1990, p. 86). Underpinning Breton’s notion of ‘a priori non-
specialization’ is both a psychic and a social theory of which his conception 
of Surrealism was said to partake. Psychically, he was seeking to recast 
the structure of subjective perceptual experience and cognition in terms 
of Freudian conceptions of the unconscious, particularly the dream. The 
underlying idea of ‘communicating vessels’ is that the basic schemata of 
experience, which Kant conceived in f ixed, rational terms, are in fact thor-
oughly permeated by mobile desires, irrational drives, and overdetermined 
fantasies. It is the pre-differentiated ‘poetic’ matrix of the dream that for 
Breton constitutes the ‘a priori’ of psychic experience, not the rational 
structuring forms of categories. Socially, the psychic indifferentiation of 
the unconscious provides a pivot for a social critique. If it is not the rational 
mind that ultimately supports the lines and borders that divide our integral 
experience as both individuals and collectives, but rather the rhetorical 
performances of unconscious psychic faculties, then these ‘productions’ 
must be socially constrained and f iltered, especially through the repressive 
organization of labour and the state-sanctioned class violence that allows it 
to persist. In turn, the structures of experience—the apparently aprioristic 
boundaries that channel it in socially authorized ways—may be contested 
through individual and, especially, collective revolt.
As with later ‘Great Refusals’ such as that proposed by Herbert Marcuse 
in the 1960s, Surrealism’s f irst gesture was to refuse to work, permanently 
‘going on strike’ in favour of an all-sided, non-specialized group activity 
that adumbrated new forms of life beyond the capitalist division of labour. 
Tellingly, one of the iconic images of Situationism, often reiterated and 
discussed in their publications and f ilms, was a 1953 photograph of a graf-
f itied slogan, reportedly inscribed by Debord himself on the wall of the Rue 
de Seine in Saint-Germain-des-Prés, which read Ne Travaillez Jamais! (Never 
Work!). Accordingly too—the Situationists intuited—our received notions 
of exterior and interior space and their continuous reproduction in everyday 
lived experience derive from complementary modalities of abstract labour 
time we call ‘work’ and ‘leisure’, and the cyclical movements of things and 
bodies that connect them. Shattering the opposition between exterior and 
interior and dismantling the system of alienated labour that structure urban 
time and space around the work/divide through the planning ideologies 
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and architectural forms of modernist urbanism appeared to them corollary 
tasks requiring revolutionary social change.
A theoretical legacy shared by Walter Benjamin, Henri Lefebvre, and 
the Situationists is their indebtedness to the activist Marxism of the early 
Georg Lukács, in particular his analysis of reif ication in History and Class 
Consciousness, which suggested how Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism 
might offer a rigorous way to formulate the dialectical reversibility of 
subjectivity and objectivity. Lukács’s concept of reif ication may be seen as 
the initiator of a lineage of innovations in the Marxist notion of ideology 
that also includes Walter Benjamin’s investigations of cities as collective 
dream-structures; the notion in Theodor Adorno that the culture industry 
translates commodity-structure into cognitive and affective schemata that 
preform contemporary experience; Guy Debord’s idea of the society of the 
spectacle in which social relations have been transformed into images; and 
even Louis Althusser’s formulation of ideology as the normal unthematized 
background of lived relations to the social order, the ‘imaginary relation of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence’.
Lukács, Benjamin, Lefebvre, and Debord each derived the theoretically 
fruitful inspiration of seeing that the commodity-object already held within 
it a kind of immanent false consciousness ‘out there’ in space, ready to be 
activated by its experiential intercourse with human agents. Correlatively, 
the apparent spontaneity of human consciousness, the very movements of 
thought, were seen to be already constrained, not by a Kantian transcen-
dental a priori, but by the historically contingent yet powerfully determin-
ing structures of capitalism, such that reif ied thought-forms necessarily 
ref lected the epistemically false appearances of objects as they moved 
through their systemic circuits of production, exchange, and consumption. 
Where they innovate beyond Lukács is in applying this reversible subject-
object of reif ication not just to commodities as such, nor to the critique of 
philosophical and literary texts that reflect the constraints of reif ication, 
but to the holistic framework of lived experience in cities, where spaces, 
consumable objects, fashions, and social types can all be seen as aspects of 
an integral ‘cosmos’ organized by capitalist reif ication. Metropolitan spaces 
themselves, Benjamin and subsequently the Situationists suggest, can be 
understood as materialized nodes of ideology. Benjamin came to call these, 
within his neo-Bergsonian conceptual universe, ‘images’, while Debord’s 
notion of ‘spectacle’ includes the terminology of ‘images’, though he clarif ies 
that the spectacle is a social relation of lived abstraction and separation 
mediated by images. Debord suggests that the spectacle concentrates in ex-
periential nodes the activity of consciousness, imposing a spurious, reif ied 
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unity on the world’s appearance; this unity, in turn, though apparently 
spontaneous, has a language-like constellation of imposed meanings, acting 
as ‘the off icial language of generalized separation’. As a corollary to this 
critical orientation, both Benjamin and Debord were theoretically sensitive 
to artistic and architectural attempts—from Paul Klee, Picasso, and the 
Surrealists early in the twentieth century to the New Babylon of Constant 
during the 1960s and 1970s—to imagine the transformation of these spaces, 
making visible the spatialized structure of ideology and revealing cracks in 
it that might be widened by a revolutionary spatial practice.
The procedure of the dérive—a kind of playful drifting around the streets 
or programmatic wandering—was intended as such a spatial practice, ex-
tending artistic logics that originated in the twentieth-century avant-gardes 
to extra-artistic domains of experience. The practice of dérive was central 
to early Situationist concerns with urbanism and urban experience, but in 
Constant’s work it also becomes a practice related to the interior spaces of his 
labyrinthine city, the New Babylon. Its programmatic status was signalled 
by Guy Debord’s dedication of a text to its ‘theory’ (Theorie de la dérive). 
Already anticipated in key respects by the Surrealists’ collective wandering 
through the nighttime landscape of the Parc des Buttes Chaumont in Louis 
Aragon’s Paris Peasant and, via Benjamin’s historical telescoping of Surreal-
ist concerns, by the flâneur of Baudelaire’s Paris, the Situationists’ dérive 
involved a kind of free exploration of certain areas of or itineraries through 
urban space, with both intentional planning to facilitate the emergence of 
new observations and experiences and subsequent recounting to record 
and detail the experiences undergone during the dérive. The dérive was 
intended not only to elicit new physical and social details of urban sites, but 
also to ‘map’ their psychological and affective dimensions, which Debord 
took to be an ‘objective’ aspect of the interactions of urban dwellers with 
the specif ic atmospheres, shadows, spaces, pathways, and buildings that 
constitute the physical city. He thus wrote of an ‘objective terrain of the 
passions’ (terrain passionnel objectif ) and ‘a psychogeographical relief of the 
city’ that have their own determinism according to the social and physical 
morphology of urban space (Debord, 1956, p. 6).
A second crucial aspect of the dérive, as a quasi-artistic practice span-
ning writing and performance, was its ephemerality, anti-monumentality, 
and intransitivity—in short, its ‘situational’ character. As Henri Lefebvre 
explained in a 1983 interview, the Situationists took the increasing frag-
mentation of the city as an occasion to reassemble it anew, bringing about 
novel ‘situations’, occasions for fresh experiences, as a performative result 
of their activity:
72 THe SPell oF CaPiTal 
[W]e thought that the practice of the dérive revealed the idea of the 
fragmented city. But it was mostly done in Amsterdam. […] The experi-
ment consisted of rendering different aspects or fragments of the city 
simultaneous, fragments that can only be seen successively, in the same 
way that there exist people who have never seen certain parts of the city. 
(Lefebvre, 2002, p. 280)
An unattributed article in the December 1959 issue of Internationale Situ-
ationniste, ‘Unitary Urbanism at the End of the 1950s’, formulated this facet 
of the dérive explicitly, the temporary, ‘situational’ nature of the constella-
tions it elicits from an urban space undergoing rapid change:
In fact, beyond its essential lessons, the dérive furnishes only knowledge 
that is very precisely dated. In a few years, the construction or demolition 
of houses, the relocation of micro-societies and of fashions, will suff ice 
to change a city’s network of superficial attractions—a very encouraging 
phenomenon for the moment when we will come to establish an active 
link between the dérive and Situationist urban construction. Until 
then, the urban milieu will certainly change on its own, anarchically, 
ultimately rendering obsolete the dérives whose conclusions could not 
be translated into conscious transformations of this milieu. But the f irst 
lesson of the dérive is its own status in play. (Internationale Situation-
niste, 1997, p. 83)
In Paris Peasant, Aragon had emphasized the intimate relation between 
his own urban ‘psychogeography’ and the destructive forces of urban 
planning and capitalist speculation in urban property. The Passage de 
l’Opera, where the f irst part of the book takes place, was destined for 
destruction according to a very belated, very decadent, and corrupt stage 
of the Hausmannization of Paris that began in the 1850s. By the time 
Aragon’s book appeared, it was already a kind of an epitaph inscribed 
for a space that no longer existed: an architectural remnant of an earlier 
moment of urban modernity now being swept away by a successive wave 
of capitalist modernization. So too, in his Arcades Project, Benjamin saw 
in Baudelaire an allegorical practice of poetry related to the experience of 
ever-accelerated change in the urban fabric, which, as Baudelaire’s poem 
‘The Swan’ points out, ‘changes, alas, more quickly than the human heart’. 
If Baudelaire (via Benjamin) and Aragon stand in a context set out by the 
opening and closing of the historical project of Haussmannization, urban-
ism in the age of ‘high capitalism’, Debord and Constant attempt to come 
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to terms with a new, more totalized urbanism in the epoch of post-war 
planned neo-capitalism. In connecting the ephemeral, game-like activity 
of the dérive to Situationist construction, the ‘Unitary Urbanism’ essay 
signals an attempt to link up two domains of Situationist urban activity, 
each with a leading f igure temporarily aligned: Debord’s elegiacally-tinged 
exploration of the dérive and the psychogeographical landscape of the city 
of earlier modernity, disappearing at the hand of modernist urbanism; and 
Constant, already by the late 1950s at work on plotting out and modelling 
a new utopian counter-modernist city of situations that came to be know 
as ‘New Babylon’.
Yet as the ‘Unitary Urbanism’ text goes on to suggest, there is a third 
aspect to the dérive that is autobiographical and subjective-existential, 
as much an ethical question of ‘a life’ and its destinies as an issue directly 
pertaining to architecture or urban design. ‘All the stories that we live’, 
the text reads, ‘the dérive of our life, are characterized by the search 
for—or the lack of—an overarching construction. The transformation 
of the environment calls forth new emotional states that are f irst expe-
rienced passively and then, with heightened consciousness, give way to 
constructive reactions’ (Internationale Situationniste, 1997, p. 83). In an 
essay entitled ‘Architecture and Play’, published in the 30 May 1955 issue 
of Potlatch, Debord had similarly argued that ‘games’ such as the dérive 
were important explorations of experiences that could, systematically 
pursued and instituted, open up new modes of individual and collective 
comportment, indeed, a new morality: ‘It is a matter now of making the 
transition from arbitrary rules of play to a moral foundation’ (Debord, 
1996, p. 158). So, too, Constant would emphasize the socially and morally 
transformational aspect of play, the anthropological transmutation of 
situational game-playing into a general redef inition of humanity as Homo 
ludens (man the player). Constant emphasizes in painting more of the 
child-like and intimate side of the life of Homo ludens, however, even while 
elsewhere he would take up its political, even revolutionary dimension. 
In each case, however, we can understand them as an attempt to counter 
the homogenizing of experience that was the lived correlate of abstract 
space—that modality of space in which, as Lefebvre argues, an integral 
system of violence, control, expropriation, and hierarchy is instituted by 
capitalism in ambient form (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 285–291).
Similarly, the Situationist notion of détournement has been considered 
largely from the point of view of media critique: turning to parodic or 
critical purposes of the commercial and media products of the specta-
cle. The term détournement itself refers to the Situationists’ method of 
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appropriating—‘detourning’—existing texts, images, or f ilm sequences, 
modif ied through recaptioning or other means and placed in new con-
texts, which alter their meaning and function while continuing to index 
their original sources. Yet détournement became an important tool in the 
repertoire of the Situationists not only for negative purposes, for critical 
parody and exposure of hidden ideological aspects of cultural and com-
mercial goods, but also for positive constructions of new meanings and 
experiences—including quite personal and subjective ones. As recent 
editions of Debord’s work have revealed, his application of the technique 
of détournement was pervasive and enduring, including both ‘artistic’ works 
such as his collaborations with Asger Jorn Fin de Copenhague (1957) and 
Mémoires (1959: an autobiography including only appropriated sentences) 
as well as ‘theoretical’ works such as The Society of the Spectacle (1967) and 
f ilms such as The Society of the Spectacle (1973) and In Girum Imus Nocte 
et Consumimur Igni (1978). For my purposes, I would like to dwell briefly 
on the collaborations with Jorn, because they suggest that détournement 
establishes a kind of ambiguous intermediate space between externality 
and inner experience, between the spaces of the city and the spaces of 
Figure 4.1. Still from Guy debord’s film The Passage of a Few People in a Rather Brief Moment in Time 
(1959) showing asger Jorn (second from left, facing viewer), Guy debord (on far right, holding 
cigarette), and others seated at a table.
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the self, as a way of creating a passage through reif ied commodity-images, 
from advertisement and print journalism, discourses directly under the 
sway of the capitalist market, back towards an intensive, often passionate 
experience of lived time as qualitative duration (Figure 4.1).
In their collaborative work Fin de Copenhague (1957), for example, Jorn 
and Debord assembled a haphazard collage of images and newsprint, 
followed by Jorn’s dropping ink from a ladder onto zinc plates that were 
etched and used for printing. They evoke the boozy mood of their brief 
interval of time together between causal spatters of ink and scattered im-
ages of beer, cigarettes, and idealized faces and bodies of human f igures 
from advertisements. More artistically consequential, from both sides, 
is their next collaboration two years later, Mémoires (1959). This text is, 
ostensibly, an autobiographical text by Debord, constructed completely out 
of quotations from other texts, held together by Jorn’s so-called ‘structures 
portantes’—frame-like coloured ink lines, which carry, bear the weight of, 
or suspend the montaged images or quotations. Debord and Jorn create a 
poignant metaphor, both verbal and visual, of a nexus between a wandering 
body, a web of city-spaces, and the places of memory, both external and in-
ner. On one page, for instance, Jorn creates a body-like ideogram from these 
lines; while in another he suggests the radial paths that Debord, pictured 
toppled upside-down on the left side of the page, has taken through the 
streets of Paris in his inebriated dérives. Jorn’s ‘structures portantes’ are the 
lines of movement that define the labyrinth of memory—which in turn are 
traces of the body’s activity as it interacts with interior and external spaces 
of a rapidly changing city, and which may presently exist nowhere except 
in memory and in the graphic spaces of the collaborative book Mémoires.
Both Jorn and Constant were founding members of the COBRA group in 
the late 1940s—COBRA being an acronym for Copenhagen, represented by 
Asger Jorn; Brussels, represented by Corneille and Christian Dotremont; and 
Amsterdam, represented by Constant and Karel Appel. COBRA was typified 
by a sort of neo-primitivist amalgamation of Surrealism, Paul Klee-like 
elemental forms, and children’s art, coupled with a strong socialist-leaning 
politics.
In Jorn’s case, his production for COBRA already carried a precedent 
engagement with the relation of art and architecture. In 1937, he had assisted 
with Le Corbusier’s Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux at the world exhibition 
in Paris, where he transferred children’s drawings into wall decorations 
amidst slogans from the Popular Front. Throughout the 1940s and early 
1950s, as Ruth Baumeister’s research has recently demonstrated, Jorn wrote 
consistently on architecture, developing a critique of functionalism and 
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arguing for an imaginative synthesis of the arts towards a transformation 
of lived space. Thus, for example, in an essay from 1944 entitled ‘Face to 
Face’, Jorn expressed his preference for what he called ‘a surrealist vision of 
space and our surroundings’ over what Henri Lefebvre called the ‘technicist, 
scientif ic and intellectualized representation of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 43) 
by Le Corbusier, with whom Jorn had collaborated:
In the same period as Le Pavillon des Temps Nouveaux, the Surreal-
ists in Paris were creating interiors that offered a completely different 
perspective with regard to spatial development. Where architects were 
calling for light, they pronounced murk and gloom; where open space was 
proclaimed, they answered with labyrinths, impenetrability, hollows. 
Where planning was proposed they answered with the hazardous. If 
utilization was praised, they defended the useless. (Jorn, 2011, p. 77)
We can also see Jorn’s humanistic concern with the wartime destruction 
of cities, treated in an expressionistic vein in his early work, in his graphic 
work such as The Burning City, from 1950. In recent articles, both Hal Foster 
and Karen Kurczynski have also discussed Jorn’s massive painting Stalin-
grad, which Jorn worked on between 1957 and 1972, and about which he 
recounted: ‘In the mid-f ifties I was haunted by the stories told to me about 
the Battle of Stalingrad. […] I always wanted to make a painting that would 
be an action rather than portraying an action, [in] contrast with Guernica. 
[…] Guernica still exists whereas Stalingrad was completely wiped off the 
map. It became a “non-lieu”, a “non-place”. […] [M]y picture is an inner record 
of a historical event’ (quoted in Kurczynski, 2012, p. 29; emphasis added). 
Even, then, in the case of an external event, the destruction of the city of 
Stalingrad during World War II, Jorn insists on a double interiority of his 
artistic treatment of it: it is something based on narration, on something 
heard; and in turn, it is a ‘inner record’ of the event in its unspeakability. We 
might say, following Walter Benjamin’s ‘Storyteller’ essay (Benjamin, 1968, 
pp. 83–110), that Jorn’s painting is less the representation of an experience 
of wartime destruction as a registration of the impoverishment of com-
municable experience that a human catastrophe like Stalingrad entailed, 
a kind of descent into nameless inner suffering. Jorn indicated as much 
when he noted, ‘The name “Stalingrad” is, in a way, immaterial. It stands 
for an anonymous battlefield with snow’ (quoted in Kurczynski, 2012, p. 29).
Following the period of artistic activity with COBRA (by the early 1950s), 
Constant left behind avant-garde painting in favour of architectural practice 
as a protégé of the Dutch modernist Aldo Van Eyck. In his own architectural 
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practice and theoretical writing, Van Eyck sought to open up a new dialogue 
between interior and exterior spaces, in both a psychological-existential 
and a physical, designed sense. In a 1956 article, Van Eyck wrote:
We are not only breathing in, nor are we exclusively breathing out. This 
is why it would be so be so beneficial if the relation of interior space and 
exterior space, between individual and common space inside and outside 
[…] could be the built mirror of human nature. […] The dwelling and its 
extension into the exterior, the city and its extension into the interior, 
that’s what we have to achieve! (Quoted in Jaschke, 2001, p. 176)
In short, as Karin Jaschke has put it, ‘There is a suggestion here that urban 
space should be conceived in terms of domestic space, or even that the 
urban should be thought of as externalized domesticity and the domestic 
as internalized urbanity’ (p. 181).
Concretely, this involved careful thinking about passages, networks of tran-
sitional spaces, courtyards, stairways, and—with children’s play explicitly in 
mind—playgrounds and other play spaces (Van Eyck would design over 700 
Amsterdam playgrounds between 1947 and 1978). These transitional elements 
and play spaces will be, as we will see, also the basic components that Constant 
would weave together to construct the infinitely changeable inner labyrinths 
of his networked global city, the New Babylon (Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
Figure 4.2. Constant nieuwenhuys, New Babylon. Still from dVd [capture from maarten Schmidt 
and Thomas doebele, Constant, Avant le Départ, 2006].
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Around 1955, Constant began to explore Van Eyck-inf luenced ideas 
about ‘art and habitat’ that would crystallize into the New Babylon project 
and take further impetus, through his association with Guy Debord, from 
proto-Situationist themes of psychogeography, urban dérive, constructed 
situations, the détournement of architecture, and unitary urbanism. In 1957, 
in Alba, he would be inspired by a Roma encampment on the property of 
the painter Giuseppe Pinot-Gallizio to design one of the f irst installations 
of what would proliferate into New Babylon, his ‘Design for a Gypsy Camp’, 
which would provide a flexible structure for mobile décor and movement of 
people within the structure, a key concept that would be expanded to the 
scale of an entire city and eventually to a total global network. We can see 
also already Constant’s deconstruction of the difference between indoor 
and outdoor spaces, with the open webbed structure inspired by the mobile 
camps of the nomadic Roma people he encountered on Pinot-Gallizio’s 
property. There is at once covering and opening, and an internal complexity 
that allows an indef inite, open-ended set of appropriations and uses: as 
it were, an image of architectural reif ication in the midst of a process of 
dissolving back into mobile social space.
From 1957 to the early 1970s, when he ceased any further elaboration of 
the project, Constant tirelessly designed, modelled, theoretically articu-
lated, and publicized his idea of New Babylon, an elevated, networked city 
where nomadic city-dwellers would move through a climate-controlled 
inner labyrinth of changeable décor, experiencing a myriad of unrepeatable 
Figure 4.3. Constant nieuwenhuys, New Babylon. Still from dVd [capture from maarten Schmidt 
and Thomas doebele, Constant, Avant le Départ, 2006].
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encounters and realizing an anarchic society based no longer on labour but 
on play. New Babylon was intended to overcome modernist (rationalist) 
urbanism à la Corbusier, which was organized around places of labour and 
spaces of dwelling and the problems of circulating people and material 
between them; but also it sought to overturn the very anthropological foun-
dation of modernist urbanism in Homo faber, in a labouring humankind, 
in favour of a new anthropological horizon of free time and play realizing 
Homo ludens on a universal scale. Analogously, Jorn argued dialectically 
for automation in his essay, ‘The Situationists and Automation’, published 
in the f irst number of Internationale Situationniste in 1958: ‘Automation 
can develop rapidly only once it has established as a goal a perspective 
contrary to its own establishment, and only if it is known how to realize 
such a general perspective in the process of the development of automation’ 
(Jorn, 2011, p. 302). In other words, only if automation is used to realize the 
goals of heightened creativity, playfulness, and subjective experience, rather 
than the perfection of production and labour, will modern technology be 
able to realize its full human potential. Like other thinkers of the 1960s 
such as Herbert Marcuse, Jorn and Constant saw a potential in the social 
surplus made possible by technology—but also sought to safeguard against 
the perversion of that potential for destructive, rather than creative ends.
In his essay ‘A Different City for a Different Life’, published in Inter-
nationale Situationniste in December 1959, Constant laid out his basic 
architectonic vision of New Babylon:
The city of the future must be conceived as a continuous construction 
on pillars. […] The different levels will be divided into neighbouring and 
communicating spaces, climate- controlled, which will make it possible to 
create an inf inite variety of environments, facilitating the casual move-
ments of the inhabitants and their frequent encounters. (Constant, in 
McDonough, 2002, pp. 99, 101)
Beneath the elevated city where living and mobile dwelling take place, fully 
automated production takes place underground, while traff ic and agri-
culture can take place on the surface. ‘The plan of New Babylon’, Constant 
writes in a 1960 lecture in Amsterdam on unitary urbanism,
reveals a decentralized, reticular structure consisting of an irregular 
stringing together of numerous sectors, each covering an area of 5 to 10 
hectares, which stretches for hundred of kilometres in every direction 
and in which a population of on average 10 million people reside. […] In 
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view of their huge size, the levels are largely inaccessible to sunlight, so 
the interior of the city is artif icially lit, ventilated, and airconditioned. 
(Constant, in Wigley, 1998, p. 134)
In an essay based on his 1964 lecture at the ICA in London, entitled ‘New 
Babylon: An Urbanism of the Future’, Constant had further radicalized the 
creative indeterminacy that New Babylon was intended to house. He writes:
New Babylon could not be structured to a determined plan. On the con-
trary, every element would be left undetermined, mobile, and flexible. 
For the people circulating in this enormous social space are expected to 
give it its ever-changing shape, to divide it, to vary it, to create its different 
atmospheres and to play out their lives in a variety of surroundings. 
(constant, in borden and mccreery, p. 14)
He concludes by evoking the architectonic and sensory elements of New 
Babylon’s interior as a sort of futuristic, post-lettristic alphabet that can be 
syntactically articulated and rearranged at will by the collective encounters 
transpiring within it:
The unfunctional character of this playground-like construction makes 
any logical division of the inner spaces senseless. We should rather 
think of a quite chaotic arrangement of small and bigger spaces that 
are constantly assembled and disassembled by means of standardized 
mobile construction elements like walls, floors, and staircases. (Constant, 
in Borden and McCreery, p. 14)
And, from the 1960 Amsterdam lecture:
The movable walls are an active element of the psychogeographical game. 
[…] They are used to construct veritable labyrinths of the most hetero-
geneous forms in which one f inds special halls for radiophonic games, 
cinematographic games, psychoanalytical games, erotic games, games 
based on chance and on coincidence. (Constant in Wigley, 1998, p. 135)
Constant’s work, and more generally the activity of various Situationist 
artists and intellectuals, has received attention especially from the point of 
view of spatial practices: their affective remapping of cities, their fascination 
with marginal and fantastic built structures, and their opposition to the 
homogenizing and reifying tendencies of modernist urbanism in favour of 
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a utopian ‘unitary urbanism’ in which the construction of situations would 
be mobilized on a grand scale. Hence, with respect specif ically to Constant, 
some of the best critical discussions have been by architectural historians 
such as Mark Wigley or Hilde Heynen and urban geographers such as David 
Pinder. While indebted to their work, however, I seek to unfold a interpreta-
tion of Constant, which, in turn, will suggest that this is a pervasive element 
of Situationist thinking more generally: a complex, differentiated conception 
of time, liberated from the homogenous clock time of a reif ied environment 
of labour, that inflects the meaning of the work or activity at several different 
levels. To put it in somewhat philosophical terms, if in the post-war city, 
poised in the midst of its capitalist-urbanist transformation, Debord and his 
Situationist friends discovered the external, objective form of Situationist ex-
perience, then the temporalities nested within that city would be its internal, 
subjective correlate, waiting to be disclosed and existentially reappropriated. 
Situationist activity, be it the serious play of Debord’s psychogeographical 
dérives or Constant’s modelling and drawing of the ever-changing network 
of New Babylonian space, should be understood as an ensemble of singular 
operators for connecting the external to the internal in new space-time folds 
and passages, or translating the intensities of subversive spatial experience 
into temporal intensities of presence, memory, and desire that had no way 
to f ind expression under the weight of abstract labour.
Moreover, this quasi-Kantian association of urban space with temporal 
experience, mediated through modernistic activity and artefacts, has a pre-
Situationist genealogy in the writings of Georg Simmel and later, under the 
influence of Simmel, the early Georg Lukács and Walter Benjamin. The most 
explicit development of this reading of Simmel can be found in Massimo 
Cacciari’s consideration of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
German social thought, in his book Metropolis, where he discusses Simmel’s 
essayistic deployment of the city itself as the real solution to long-standing 
Kantian and neo-Kantian antinomies of thought. Cacciari writes: ‘In Sim-
mel, the city is called upon to concretize Kantian teleological judgment. 
Here, the themes and key problems of neo-Kantian philosophy all reappear’ 
(1995, p. 88). He goes on to argue:
As long as the value of the city is simply the synthesis of form and function 
in the original apperception of its totality, the temporal dimension will 
remain absent. […] Time, as well, [however], must be reconciled. And for 
time, there must be a form. Not for Kantian time […]. But for the time 
of Erleben [lived inner experience], the time of the actual products of 
history. And the form of this time must be the city. (Cacciari, 1995, p. 89)
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Putting this in somewhat more vernacular terms, the city comes to stand as 
a set of experiential forms—shapes of time, dynamized spaces—that give 
literally concrete dimension to the articulations of the inner-subjective 
and outer-objective realms. This is true for the actually-existing capitalist 
city, in which reif ication (Lukács) or ‘objective culture’ (Simmel) predomi-
nate in both outer and inner experience. Thus, for example, the locational 
economies of work and leisure zones and the circulation of traff ic between 
them are contingent, but seemingly rigid containers for both individual 
and collective experiences of space and time; interior-intensive space 
and exterior-extensive space, as categories of spatial experience, are 
disconnected phenomenological corollaries of architectural ‘objects’ such 
as private apartments or off ices on the one hand and streets and open 
zones such as parks on the other; and the potential dissonance between 
intimate subjective life and regimented or precarious objective life seems 
impenetrable to the understanding, which founders amidst individual 
eccentricities and, simultaneously, the arcana of complex, alien, superin-
dividual systems. Yet for the utopian-future city, new experiential forms, 
new schemata of experience, may reside latently ‘out there’ in its bricks, 
streets, hoardings, and walls. Lefebvre, indeed, translates this virtuality 
into a methodological precept to grasp the ‘possible’ dialectical develop-
ment of ‘the urban’ in the present-day, contradictory, and incomplete 
dynamics of ‘complete urbanization’ under contemporary capitalism: ‘The 
urban (an abbreviated form of urban society) can therefore be def ined 
not as an accomplished reality, situated behind the actual in time, but, 
on the contrary, as a horizon, an illuminating virtuality’ (Lefebvre, 2003, 
pp. 16–17).
In this sense, too, we can understand the continuity of the products of 
artistic modernism with the broader domain of urban modernity, insofar 
as both involve the invention and/or reappropriation of cultural forms to 
project new modes of experience, new ways of configuring the spatial and 
temporal schema of modern experiential ‘worlds’. As Jon Goodbun has 
written:
For Simmel […] the metropolis provided the particular conditions in 
which the ‘space’ of concrete experience (super-individual ‘society’) and 
the ‘space’ of inner experience (individual subject) are translated (almost 
in the mathematical sense, that is to say, ‘mapped’) onto each other. And 
this is one of the senses in which we can begin to understand the object 
of this other modernist genealogy: as a store of transformation matrices 
between inner and concrete experience. (Goodbun, 2001, pp. 158–159)
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Goodbun’s term ‘transformation matrices’ is a felicitous one in connection 
to Constant, since we might almost think of the New Babylon as a great, 
boundless, f luctuating set of montage collisions between experience-
constituting elements. As Tom McDonough has argued,
the New Babylon project […] [w]as less a moment within the history of 
(the practice or theory of) urban planning than a crucial intervention in a 
way of thinking and imagining the world of objects and one’s interaction 
with that world (McDonough, 2007, p. 85).
In fact, as the name suggests, Constant’s Babylon is associated with the 
old Babel, with language, with the ancient confusion of tongues. Yet it 
also projects a futuristic zaum-like or lettristic superlanguage as well, that 
aff irms the language-making capacity of human motility, affectivity, and 
play: basically any way that materiality can be motivated to take up an ar-
ticulatory relation in and of time, constitutes another urban idiolect among 
the cacophony of tongues. New Babylon thus subsumes the old Babylon’s 
derangement of languages into a modern inf inity of vibratory translations 
between inner and outer experience, between global extensiveness and 
ecstatic intensivity, all projected through Constant’s artistic models and 
graphs onto a superlinguistic and ultrametropolitan scale.
Constant’s New Babylon thus represents not only a utopian reorganiza-
tion of space, but also, and more fundamentally, the institution of a New 
Babylonian order of time intimately linked to a restructured subjectiv-
ity and existential identity. New Babylonians would experience an open 
temporal horizon in which all f ixed points, and hence the experience of 
repetition, rhythm, and memory, would be undermined by the perpetual 
f lux of the urban environment. Constant carries to the basic impulse of 
de-reif ication, the social-practical dissolution of objectif ied activity back 
into the activity itself, to such an extreme as to approach denying any 
objectifying role for human activity, a role he consigned completely to 
machines in his vision of fully automated production. By def inition, play is 
for him not only non-objectifying; it is actively de-objectifying, engaged with 
dismantling the existing manifestation of reif ied, accumulated labour in 
the urban environment. Through the postulated anthropological revolution 
that full automation would allow—the transition from Homo faber to Homo 
ludens—Constant breaks the link between labouring consciousness and 
collective self-reappropriation that remained integral to Lukács’s idea in 
History and Class Consciousness of the proletariat as the identical subject-
object of history, realized in socialist revolution. There is no collective return 
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in Constant, because there is no labour, no labouring consciousness, and no 
proletarian class to have class consciousness of its historical role ascribed 
to it. Spatially, this anthropological abolition of the proletariat expresses 
itself in a generalized nomadism facilitated by the structural liquidity of the 
inf initely alterable urban landscape. As Constant noted in his ICA lecture:
There would be no question of any f ixed life-pattern, for life itself would 
be a creative material. The unfunctional and fantastic way of living would 
demand rapid passage from place to another, from sector to sector, and 
life in New Babylon would be essentially nomadic, people would be 
constantly traveling. There would be no need for them to return to their 
point of departure and this would in any case be transformed. (Constant, 
in Borden and McCreery, p. 14)
The 1960 unitary urbanism lecture, however, had spelled out the subjective 
and psychic implications even more provocatively:
New Babylon would surely have the effect of brainwashing, erasing all 
routine and custom. There are no customs in New Babylon; it is obvious 
that a culture based on a dynamic game with life, that takes this life itself 
as its theme, that uses the activities of life as raw material for creativity, 
precludes all routine, all custom, all convention. The New Babylonian 
culture is based on the ephemeral, on the transience of an experience, 
and the contrast between this and new experiences. (Constant, in Wigley, 
1998, p. 135)
Despite Constant’s evocation of New Babylon as a world of pure playful ex-
perience, beyond art and even urban design, it remains that his exploration 
of the idea took place exclusively in a variety of representational media, as 
the flyer for a lithograph portfolio from the project evokes: ‘een groot aantal 
maquettes, constructies, plattgronden, afbeeldingen, foto’s, bescrijvingen en 
teksten’ (a large number of maquettes, constructions, plans, copies, photos, 
and description in texts). These, as Constant insisted, could only offer a 
snapshot suggestion of New Babylon, for two reasons. First, the static, 
structural elements of New Babylon that could be represented by means 
of drawings, models, photomontages, and textual descriptions were only 
themselves the thing-like, sedimented shell of a set of activities, enormously 
complex and anarchically f luctuating, that were to take place within New 
Babylon’s labyrinthine spaces. Like a hyperbolic version of Adolf Loos’s 
blank surfaces and hidden, complex interior Raumplan, the mobile decors 
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and ambiances of encounters within New Babylon could in no way be read 
off its hardened face (Figure 4.4). Secondly, New Babylon was constantly 
fluctuating in time, mutating, growing, and hence any given representation 
could only capture a thin chronological slice of that process. Undoubtedly, 
this unsurpassable problem of representation, shading into the very reif ica-
tion that Constant sought to overcome, explains his obsessively iterative 
elaboration of the project, up to his retrospective exhibition in the Hague 
in 1974, when he arbitrarily declared the project closed.
Nothing in New Babylon would allow one to talk of ‘type’ or ‘function’, 
which in more conventional architectural discourse and practice would ful-
f il this representational demand, since these depend on a continuity in time 
that New Babylon is, above all else, a technology intended to disaggregate 
and deny. In a sense, Constant’s New Babylon is a practical objectif ica-
tion of Nietzsche’s eternal return, which in Pierre Klossowski’s view can 
be understood as an intensive passage through all possible identities an 
inf inite number of times, but with the paradoxical implication that this 
def ies any position of f ixed identity from which a previous state of being, 
a ‘repetition’ could be recognized or experienced as such. Massimo Cac-
ciari, again, relates the experience of the eternal return in Nietzsche to the 
tragic undoing of the syntheses of the city in the radical non-synthesizable 
inf inities of the metropolis: a perception of the antinomy of the desire to 
understand the built environment of the city as pure de-reif ied becom-
ing and the desire to comprehend the city as a totality. ‘It is essential to 
understand’, Cacciari (1995) writes, ‘that the idea of the eternal return is 
the opposite of a synthesizing renewal. It is an absolute aff irmation of the 
breakdown of the pessimistic equilibrium, an aff irmation of the meaning 
of ‘casting beyond’ of contradiction’ (p. 25). Constant, indeed, carries to a 
new antinomic extreme this overcoming of contradiction in the eternal 
return that New Babylon implies. Oppositions of movement and stasis, 
freedom and constraint, anarchy and totalitarian order, construction 
and deconstruction, mass and individual, play and survival, dialogue and 
violence, utopia and dystopia are indiscernibly unravelled and reknit in the 
ever-changing labyrinths of this post-city supermetropolis.
Constant acknowledges this antinomy on the mass scale of the global 
city when he suggests that total nomadic mobility, no longer f ixed by the 
needs of labour and dwelling, along with the erasure of points of return 
that organize time in habit and memory, leads to a slowing of urban cir-
culation to a directionless flux. The New Babylon is itself an exasperation 
of modernity, a hyper-modernist dialectic at a standstill: total mobility 
inf initely enfolded into itself, thus becoming, at the moment of its global 
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Figure 4.4. Constant nieuwenhuys, New Babylon. Cover of Opus International 27 (September 1971).
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realization, a vibratory, but essentially immobile flux. Towards the end of 
the project, Constant even began to explore the possibility that the spaces 
of New Babylon might not only give rise to playful encounters, but also to 
violence. He noted that the continuation of the Vietnam War and other 
instances of violence led him to question his original utopian faith in a 
peaceful Homo ludens wandering through the interior playground of the 
New Babylon, and when he returned to painting, from the mid-1970s to his 
death in 2005, his work reflected this more soberly pessimistic state of mind.
However, in conclusion, I return for a moment to the problem of the 
intensive, de-reif ied interior and suggest that despite this apparent impasse 
Constant preserves an original relation to the utopian poetics and politics 
of the pre-World War II avant-garde, in particular in his development of 
an idea of montage allowed not just the juxtaposition of two separate 
images or objects, but rather the perception of explosive, transformative 
tensions within single designed objects, spaces, images, or utterances. 
Thus, for example, Sergei Eisenstein spoke of the single shot as a ‘montage 
cell’ in his theory of dialectical montage (Eisenstein, 1949); the Bakhtin 
circle conceived of the single word as the site of an internal dissension 
of voices where social struggles were played out in discourse (Volosinov, 
1986); and Walter Benjamin conceived of dialectics as a matter of interrup-
tion, ambiguity, and the concentration of tensions in images and objects 
(Benjamin, 1999, p. 10). In a late essay entitled ‘Piranesi, or the Flux of 
Forms’, written in 1946–1947, and hence almost contemporaneous with the 
early activity of Jorn and Constant in COBRA, Sergei Eisenstein compared 
an early version of Piranesi’s Carceri with one of his mature etchings. 
Utilizing a graphic depiction of the early print, Eisenstein proceeds to 
suggest how one can ‘explode’ the picture, liberating the forces bound up 
in static forms and leading to an ‘ecstasy’ (Eisenstein’s term) of spatial 
forms. Eisenstein is not simply arguing that one can treat architectural 
forms analytically, by decomposing them and projecting their components 
outwards along the liberated lines of force. He is also suggesting that there 
are creative, existential, and even spiritual implications in doing so, which 
for him related to still unrealized possibilities for cinematically-mediated 
‘ecstasies’ of time and affectivity.
As even a cursory glance through the works of the New Babylon corpus 
suggest, Piranesi is also fundamental to Constant’s labyrinthine design of 
the utopian city’s interior and hence to the lived experiences it provokes 
in the anarchistic subjects wandering through it. And so, in the end, it is 
not far-fetched to see in the New Babylon not the critical debunking and 
self-exasperation of modernist urbanism’s utopia, which took reif ication 
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to the end of the night, but rather an ‘explosion’ beyond it from within, in 
the very sense that Eisenstein intended: the mobilization of active forces, 
trapped in built structures, resources for a new human pathos and ecstasy 
in play.
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5. ‘The Brilliance of Invisibility’ : 
Tracking the Body in the Society of 
the Spectacle
Sudeep Dasgupta
[W]e need, as counterweight to the theory of the commodity as a form of 
alienated social relations, a parallel one of its evocation of endless desire.
—Timothy J. Clark, Should Benjamin Have Read Marx?
Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle extends Marx’s analysis of the 
commodity form to comprehend a consumer society marked by a surfeit 
of images. Rather than fall into the now familiar postmodern argument of 
the disappearance of the real and its replacement by the image, Debord 
centralizes the continuing importance of thinking the mediation between 
reality and appearance. The Society of the Spectacle characterizes the shift 
from the possession of the commodity to the appearance of images in 
the transition from ‘having’ to ‘appearing’ (Debord, 1995, p. 16). Debord 
defines the effect of this transition thus: ‘The spectacle is not a collection 
of images; rather it is a social relation between people mediated by images’ 
(p. 12). The commodity-form’s mediation of alienated social relations, which 
Marx deciphers, and the manifest visibility of proliferating images must 
be thought together. The commodity-form and images function in similar 
fashion, by f irstly mediating alienated social relations, and secondly, by 
making invisible this process of mediation. Debord’s expansion of Marx’s 
concept of mediation, however, stresses the paradoxical importance of 
appearance, whose ubiquitous power coincides with its power to hide 
alienation and separation from appearance. In other words, a dialectical 
relationship is set up between appearance and invisibility. The power of a 
society of overwhelming appearances resides in its ability to dissimulate 
its power of making social relations invisible.
However, the capacity for this dissimulation must necessarily pass 
through the f ield of visuality implied in the term ‘appearance’. How do 
f igurations of the social get stabilized through vision? What historically-
specif ic capacities of visualization are required to both produce and 
encounter the image-world of appearances? In this essay, I track how the 
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body is produced as the object of f iguration, the site for the production of 
vision, and a social body. The painted body, the spectatorial body, and the 
social body are historically-specif ic productions in capitalist modernity. 
The painted body is the artistically-rendered realization on canvas of the 
human body in its historical specif icity. The spectatorial body is not an 
ontological given but the site for a multiplication of disciplinary techniques, 
which produce its specific capacities to sense and see in encounters with the 
phenomenal world. The social body is the class-differentiated composition 
of a social totality. The endless desire manifested in the commodity world 
and the alienated social relations hidden from sight through images, I argue, 
can be tracked in the unstable relations between these three bodies. The 
contingency within the visual regime of the spectacle is the effect of the in-
stability of scopic desire manifested in the unstable relations between these 
three bodies. The invocations of scopic desire produced through visuality 
between these three bodies are intrinsic, and not only a counterweight, 
to the commodity-form’s transformation into images in the society of the 
spectacle. It is the instability in the relations between these three bodies 
within the f ield of vision, which enables a critical political potential to be 
thought within ‘the endless invocation of desire’ in the society of spectacle. 
In ‘The Misadventures of Critical Thought’, Jacques Rancière (2009) sug-
gests that contemporary artistic practices do not just repeat the critique 
of the spectacle, but neutralize Debord’s critique of capitalist exploitation 
and domination. My argument exploits the critical potential of visuality 
manifested in the unstable relation between the painted, spectatorial, and 
social body to suggest the contemporary relevance of Debord’s critique of 
appearance.
I begin by briefly indicating the vast, complex, and coordinated processes 
on whose success both the power of the spectacle and the logic of reif ica-
tion depends. This complex coordination triggered by different periods 
of capitalism, I argue, is fraught by risk precisely because of the intensity 
and the magnitude of coordination and integration implied in terms like 
the ‘spectacle’ and ‘reif ication’. A close comparison (and juxtaposition) 
of Jonathan Crary’s and the British Situationist T.J. Clark’s analyses of 
late-nineteenth-century painting develop an understanding of the work of 
stabilizing the relation between these three bodies in the f ield of visual-
ity. The ‘brilliance of invisibility’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 71), a term Foucault 
deployed in his reading of Manet, captures precisely how the evocation of 
endless desire, including scopic desire, is accompanied by the impossibil-
ity of f ixing, aligning, and coordinating the spectator’s, society’s, and the 
painting’s body. This productive failure in f ixing a relation between the 
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three bodies is not a negation of Debord’s argument, as we shall see in the 
next section. It is the effect, rather, of the complexities and contingencies 
that mark the incomplete transition from ‘being’ to ‘having’ to ‘appearing’ 
that Debord developed in his theses in The Society of the Spectacle.
Contingency and its management, risk and its avoidance, coordination 
and integration on the one hand and disruption and separation on the 
other—the tension between these elements is registered already in Georg 
Lukács and Debord, and this very same tension is registered in the f ield 
of visuality. Visuality is the domain in which I want to stage an encounter 
between contingency and permanency, f ixity and flux. Logics of identifica-
tion, I argue, seek to stabilize these three bodies by emphasizing only one 
sort of scopic regime and desire which would contemplatively guarantee 
what Debord described as ‘separation perfected’ (Debord, 1995, p. 11). Yet, 
as the following section will show, if the ‘society of spectacle’ spans such 
a vast domain of life, the coordination of its various elements undermine 
stabilization, including the stabilization of visuality. Instead there is always 
the threat of a dynamic of dissolution, which threatens both visuality, and 
other dimensions of the lifeworld. However, rather than privilege the logic 
of identif ication as the secured victory of complete spectacularization 
(the pessimistic, and I argue mistaken, reading of Debord), or declare the 
dynamic of dissolution as the goal of artistic and political practice must aim 
at, I will argue that a paradoxical dynamic of identification best describes 
both the increasing mediation of social life by images and the artistic and 
political critique made possible by the instabilities between the three bodies 
these images seek to stabilize. I shall stage an encounter between two 
readings of modernism in the late nineteenth century (Clark and Crary) 
to explore this relation between identif ication and dissolution. Both in 
T.J. Clark’s explicitly Marxist reading of Manet’s paintings in The Painting 
of Modern Life (1999a), and in Jonathan Crary’s Suspension of Perception 
(2001), the dynamic tension between what I call the stabilizing logic of 
identif ication and the threat of the dynamics of dissolution are played out, 
but played out differently.
1. Coordinating the Society of the Spectacle: Debord and 
Lukács
The spectacle suggests an overwhelming power that at a particular historical 
moment universalizes the separation of man from all around him, and all in 
him. But if the spectacle arises not out of a victory but out of the risks of a 
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historical development, revisiting those risks to investigate if they still exist 
in transformed form becomes politically relevant today. The contingency 
that had to be covered over by the awe-inspiring power of the spectacle 
needs revisiting, to ask how the concentrated, diffuse, and integrated forms 
of the spectacle were produced, registered, and struggled with in the late 
nineteenth century, and how, in transformed form, this same contingency 
might appear in our present. The historical development in question, out of 
which the ‘society of spectacle’ emerges, is the universalization of the logic 
of exchange in all spheres of life. This universalization is the generalized 
conversion of concrete specif icity, or quality, in Hegel’s and Marx’s terms, 
into quantity. The transformation of value’s form of appearance makes 
the universalization of exchange value possible, precisely because the 
sensuously felt and concretely experienced, it is claimed, gets transformed 
into an abstract logic of equivalency. Urbanization, the mass movement 
of peoples, the crowd, transportation and communications technologies, 
the institutionalization of all aspects of life—this historical development 
reaches its climax in the late nineteenth century in the ‘Age of Capital’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1984, p. 13). Clark extends this understanding of capitalist 
modernity in relation to the society of the spectacle, describing it as
a massive internal extension of the capitalist market—the invasion 
and restructuring of whole areas of free time, private life, leisure and 
personal expression. […] It indicates a new phase of commodity produc-
tion—the marketing, the making-into-commodities of whole areas of 
social practice which had once been referred to casually as everyday 
life. (Clark, 1999a, p. 9)1
But if the massive and intensive reorganization of all aspects of life in 
capitalist modernity is the claim on which the spectacle as a concept rests, 
it must account for how such an enormously diverse and differentiated set 
of processes can be so seamlessly coordinated. Noting the tension between 
massive coordinated transformations of capitalist societies on the one hand, 
and the inf initesimal ‘internal extension’ of the capitalist market into all 
areas of everyday life helps to begin thinking the intrinsic instability of the 
concept of the ‘society of the spectacle’.
Expropriation, which is an economic term for the alienation and ex-
ploitation of labour power (Arbeitskraft), operates on two levels. At the 
subjective level, mechanization and rationalization, Lukács (1971) argues, 
means the lived time of work is abstracted into a calculable input ele-
ment in the production process. The worker’s ‘whole human personality’ is 
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fragmented, the useful elements isolated and exploited through psychologi-
cal analysis. The reif ication of the ‘soul’ where the specif ic elements of a 
person’s capabilities get separated from him, and integrated into special-
ized rational systems, and human qualities reduced to ‘statistically viable 
concepts’ are part of this process of reif ication (Lukács, 1971, p. 88). Human 
qualities through psychological analysis and analytic separation become 
statistically calculated units of measurement. In disciplinary terms, this 
separation gets codif ied in f ields such as optics, labour-time management, 
psychology, home economics, etc., and in institutional spaces such as civil 
and criminal law, the state and its complex machineries, the economy 
and its organizations. To complete the dynamic of successful reif ication, 
separation at both subjective and objective levels must be matched by a 
concomitant coordination across different institutional spaces, practices, 
and bodies.
Lukács emphasizes that while the laws of commodity exchange and profit, 
exchange value over use value, seem to become rigid, all-controlling, and 
universal they can do so only if they succeed in ‘disregarding the concrete 
aspects of the subject matter of these laws’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 101, emphasis 
added). The laws congealed in the state, the economy, and civil society must 
disregard the concrete specif icity of the objects, practices, and bodies that 
they abstract into sites of control. Further, specialization, rationalization, 
and calculation results in fragmentation of these spheres, thus proliferating 
separated spaces of power with their own specif ic interests. Thus, law can 
contradict the state; one state opposes another; state support of national 
economic interests might come into conflict with support for international 
free trade. As a result, laws must ‘link up with each other through partial 
systems’ while as far ‘as concrete realities are concerned they can only 
establish fortuitous connections’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 101). The picture of a 
capitalist totality that Lukács paints then, and I insist on the relevance 
of the term ‘totality’, is that of ‘mutually interacting coincidences’ rather 
than ‘one truly rational organization’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 102, emphasis added).
It is precisely for this reason that the ‘society of the spectacle’ as an 
argument provokes such unease, because it is wrongly read as the successful 
achievement of sheer separation from concretely felt sensuous particularity 
registered in the lifeworld as a corollary of the successful completion of the 
transition to a consumer society. The spectacle’s changing form must be 
seen more or less as a response precisely to the contingencies, time lags, 
fragmentations, and often competing specializations which aim to grasp 
the concrete ‘subject matter’ of all aspects of everyday life. Debord makes 
this clear enough when, going back on the ‘separation perfected’ argument, 
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he admits ‘that spectacle’s grip on social reality had not yet been perfected’ 
(Debord, 1990, p. 7).
The falseness of reality is manifested for him in the reality of the image. 
This doubling of the Real is a marker of Debord’s recognition that the true 
and the false do not line up with the Real and the Unreal. If the image is 
the form that mediates alienated social relations, this image is as real as the 
real unreality of society. I will leave aside for now the continual reworking 
of Marx in Debord’s theses, and simply point out that the doubling of the 
Real is a function of this doubling between the spectacle and the social 
world of capitalist society whose contingencies it attempts to veil over. 
One glimpses it in Debord’s turning Hegel over once more when he claims 
‘in a world that has really been turned on its head, truth is a moment of 
falsehood’ (Debord, 1995, p. 14).
Thus, he states ‘[t]he real consumer becomes a consumer of illusion. 
The commodity is this illusion which is in fact real, and the spectacle is 
its most general form’ (Debord, 1995, p. 32). What is a real illusion? And 
how does the consumer consume a real illusion? On the one hand, this is 
clearly a Lukácsian argument—that is, the veil of reif ication undermines 
an apprehension of the concrete sensuous particularity of the object. The 
spectacle is the general form of this illusion through reif ication. But the 
spectacle’s logic is that of ‘separation perfected’ (the title of the f irst section 
of the theses). The formulation ‘perfected’ gives a sense of permanency but 
Debord’s argument is explicitly historical. Perfection can only be achieved 
at a specif ic moment in time. At least two elements must be mentioned 
here. Firstly, the concentrated and the diffuse spectacle, which translates 
as concentrated state power over the spectacle’s reach, and diffuse, frag-
mented coordination of logics occur within the same historical moment. The 
‘general form’ of the spectacle has multiple forms within the same period. 
Secondly, this ‘form of form’ undergoes yet another transformation when 
twenty years later the ‘integrated spectacle’ is posited. Perfection names a 
punctual strategy for managing the risk of continually evolving dynamics 
of unification and fragmentation, coordination and disaggregation, flux and 
stability. The transition from being to having to appearing which structures 
Debord’s thetic narrativization registers these dynamics’ co-appearance at 
different historical moments in particular combinations. And ‘separation’, 
like ‘reif ication’, registers this dynamic of dependency, contradiction, and 
opposition within and between historical moments.
The ‘society of the spectacle’, and its attendant concepts of reif ication, 
alienation, and separation, are both markers of the waning of sensuous par-
ticularity (quality to quantity, use to exchange value, having to appearing), 
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and an acknowledgement of the risks entailed in the massive reorganization 
of the diagrams of power in increasingly complex societies. The unstable 
relationality between the painted body, the social body, and the spectator’s 
body is the effect precisely of both the intensif ication of alienation and the 
risky, incomplete coordination of the destabilizations modernity produced.
2. Interception/Identification/Dissolution
Clark’s investigation of artistic modernism links the specif ic experience of 
modernity in the late nineteenth century to its realization through tech-
nique on the painted canvas. ‘Painting’, he argues ‘is potentially a means 
of investigation, […] a way of discovering what the values and excitements 
of the world amount to’ (Clark, 1999a, p. xxi). This painterly investigation 
involves the construction and transformation on the canvas of the experi-
ence of modernity outside it. Clark therefore asks ‘[H]ow do the values 
and excitements called “modernity” look when they are put down in two 
dimensions?’ The f ield of sensations, including the visual dimensions of 
modernity, do not just ‘appear’ but must be transformed through ‘a play be-
tween flatness and depth’, which ‘stress […] the picture’s limits […] [through] 
sorts of insistence, ellipsis, showmanship, restraint’ (Clark, 1999a, p. xxi). 
This transformation of a generalized experience of modernity into the visual 
experience of it onto the canvas emphasizes the necessity of transformation, 
realization, and construction in the gap between ‘having’ and ‘appearing’. 
Clark emphasizes the ideological work of this construction of appearances 
when he asks ‘[D]oes the ‘realization’ extend and intensify—that is to say, 
validate—the meanings and appearances, or disperse and qualify them?’ 
(Clark, 1999a, p. xxi, emphasis added). The representational practice of 
painting does two things then: it translates the experience of modernity 
through transformation within the limits and possibilities of painterly 
technique; and, this transformation into appearance of experience could 
either validate, or qualify and disperse the meaningfulness of experience.
Clark shows how painting as investigation shoves a wedge between the 
phenomenal apprehension of painting and the realization of the validity of 
the values of modernity which we call the spectacle. And it does so precisely 
by encountering in the process of picture making the intrinsic tension 
between the logic of identif ication and the dynamic of dissolution. The in-
creasing fragmentation, specialization, and acceleration of life, captured in 
the Impressionists’ love for painting trains, for example, threw up problems 
(coordination, alignment, etc.) for the efficient management of all aspects of 
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life. Society is marked by ‘a modernity of continual assessment, negotiation, 
and constraint in the public sphere, or demarcation and displacement, of 
segregation and self-management, of sexual and occupational inequal-
ity’ summed up ‘by the diff icult word “class”’ (Clark, 1999a, pp. xxi–xxii). 
Painting as construction, the social dynamic of modernity and the dialectic 
of mobility and stabilization are captured in the cultural experience of 
the ‘cultivated rentier’ by Meyer Shapiro. In this class-stratif ied society, 
Shapiro argues, the ‘cultivated rentier’ enjoys ‘the realistic pictures of his 
surroundings as a spectacle of traff ic and changing atmospheres’ while 
‘experiencing in its phenomenal aspect that mobility of the environment, 
the market and of industry to which he owes his freedom and income’ 
(quoted in Clark, 1999a, p. 1). The phenomenally experienced mobility of 
the social environment is experienced visually in the spectacles pictures 
provide of ‘traff ic and changing atmospheres’. Clark’s reading of Manet’s 
Chemin de Fer (1872–1873) captures precisely this dialectic of phenomenal 
mobility and pictorial stability, which exposes the co-presence of both a 
waning sensuality of the object-world and the separation and alienation 
furthered by capitalist modernity.
Debord’s argument when read through Clark and Shapiro reveals some-
thing specif ic—that the spectacle had to convert and stabilize into images 
the flux precipitated by modernity and this diff icult attempt is captured 
in the word ‘class’. The category of class, which keeps reappearing as the 
location of the viewing subject and the representation of a painted subject 
brings up the question of the social body in both reception and representa-
tion, yet the stability of this category is undermined by the diff iculty in 
accurately apprehending it through vision. Clark insists that ‘“class” […] 
was one of the images on which modernity thrived’ (Clark, 1999a, p. xxviii), 
precisely because of the instability in class formations thrown up by capital-
ist modernity which produced increasing complexity in class fractions and 
their relations to each other as well as to other classes, as Hobsbawm (1984, 
pp. 262–269) eloquently traces. For this reason class difference could not 
be stabilized adequately within the picture-frame, and its images were so 
central to modernity as a problem of representation. Clark goes on: ‘[C]
lass was one of its [modernity’s] favourite games, but the game observed 
essentially the same rules as all the other terms of the spectacle—rules of 
mobility, elusiveness, disembodiment, pure visibility, confinement to the 
world of signs’ (Clark, 1999a, p. xxviii). The logic of the spectacle then is the 
risky task of identif ication, of delineating class specif icity through visuality 
where the visual was itself identif ied as the experience of f lux on the one 
hand, and confinement on the other.
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The gaze of the woman in Chemin de Fer (Figure 5.1) is intercepted by 
the spectator, or rather, her gaze meets ours. The picture is an ‘interception’ 
but Clark argues ‘we sense that the woman is really somewhere else, still 
in her novel’s dream of consciousness’ (Clark, 1999a, p. xix). As much as the 
spectator would like to visually possess her subjective interiority (‘having’), 
the linking of her eyes to the f ingers that hold her open book signal that 
she is lost to us, in a space produced by the words on the page. She appears 
to us but we cannot have her visually. The logic of identif ication through 
brush strokes of the woman on the bench is dissipated by the object’s refusal 
to accede itself as subject to us, and to be subjected by us, opening a gap 
between the pleasure of enjoying a spectacle and the distance between 
the position of the spectator and the woman as object of scopic desire. 
The phenomenal experience of enjoying a spectacle is an experience of 
separation (Debord). Only this time, the separation is revealed rather than 
hidden through the painted representation of the presence of her body 
separated from the spectator’s desire to possess and f ix it, mimed in the 
steam from the train which in the painting block’s the child’s desire to see.
Figure 5.1. edouard manet’s Chemin de Fer, 1873.
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This dialectical process of exposure and dissolution is powerfully 
captured in Clark’s description of the grapes in the painting. Here is his 
sentence: ‘Likeness is perfect, but external. The bunch of grapes the child 
has put down—those Chardin still-life grapes, spilling over the sill for the 
viewer to pick—is like a pathetic after-image of sensuousness, already half-
melted into the thin air of spectacle’ (Clark, 1999a, p. xxiii, emphasis added). 
Perfection is achieved as perfect externality—yet precisely the perfection 
of the rendition is an after-image of what had been, a sensuousness whose 
concrete particularity melts away into thin air, like the steam of the train 
at Oisy. The thinness of the spectacle, deflecting ocular possession, and the 
sensuous presence of the ‘spilling’ grapes coexist in the same plane, in the 
flatness of the painting. This coexistence Clark describes thus: ‘what [the] 
staging of the picture’s exchange of looks […] makes comprehensible [is] 
the balance in Manet between hard, almost epigrammatic appropriation 
of things seen and deep distance, deep outsideness and displacement’. 
That is why Clark argues ‘[I]t is what the picture does with its identities that 
matters, not which identity it tries on f irst as its ‘own” (Clark, 1999a, p. xxiii, 
emphasis added). The picture as spectacle works to represent a body on a 
surface where separation is not yet perfected because the rendering of the 
distanced, alienated gaze of the woman coexists with the ‘after-image of 
sensuousness’ that modernity’s dynamic threatens to dissipate through 
abstraction.
Figure 5.2. Georges Seurat’s Parade de Cirque, 1887–1888.
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3. Suspension/Attention/Dissolution
Jonathan Crary’s focus on the construction of subjectivity through vision 
develops a Foucauldian understanding of modernity echoing the argu-
ments of Debord and Lukács. He argued that ‘the very possibility in the 
late nineteenth century of concepts of a purif ied aesthetic perception is 
inseparable from the processes of modernization that made the problem of 
attention a central issue in new institutional constructions of a productive 
and manageable subjectivity’ (Crary, 2001, p. 2). Crary (1989) explicitly rejects 
a simplistic focus on the gaze. He insists that ‘attention, as a constellation 
of texts and practices, is much more than a question of the gaze, of looking, 
of the subject only as a spectator. It allows the problem of perception to be 
extracted from an easy equation with questions of visuality […] simply as 
questions of opticality’ (Crary, 2001, p. 2).
A number of things need to be said here. Firstly, Crary’s turning to 
perception rather than viewing, seeing, and spectating, allows him to 
then focus on ‘non-optical visuality’ and the ‘embodied spectator’ as 
essential to understanding how the calculated, atomized, segmented 
modern subject is formed (the subtitle of the book is ‘Attention, Spectacle 
and Modern Culture’). This virtuoso performance of an archaeology of 
vision moves visuality into a philosophical, physiological, and psycho-
logical domain and thus explicitly addresses the spectatorial body. The 
scientif ic problems thrown up by the recognition of the ‘after-image’ in 
physiological optics severed the link between the image and the referent 
in time. The absence of the viewed object in the time of the after-image 
called attention to the density of the eye and the complexity of the retina. 
This recognition shifted the focus from a purely visual understanding 
of visuality to the complexities of embodied spectatorship. Here we see 
in the realm of embodied visuality precisely the risk emphasized in the 
terms ‘reif ication’ and ‘spectacle’ in Lukács and Debord. ‘Spectacular 
culture’, Crary argues ‘is not founded on the necessity of making a 
subject see, but rather on strategies in which individuals are isolated, 
separated, and inhabit time as disempowered’ (Crary, 1989, p. 3, emphasis 
added). Crary’s argument centralizes the tension between mobility and 
stabilization, attention and distraction within the f ield of embodied 
vision which ‘spectacular culture’ must manage. So where do we f ind 
this tension manifest? Once again, it is Manet, but this time the Manet 
of In the Conservatory (1879).
Crary’s reading points out two sides of the tension animating the 
painting. On the one hand, the tightly framed, vertically striped, corseted 
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character of the f igures and objects in the frame; and on the other, the 
dream-like, far-away, unavailable look of the woman. Till this point, 
Crary does a Clark—that is, articulating a tension between distance and 
unavailability on the one hand, and constraint and control on the other. 
This tension is identif ied in the representational function of the painting 
as the execution of brushstrokes. Crary shifts his reading however, beyond 
the picture frame to the body of the spectator as the f ield on which the 
disciplinary dynamics of modernity’s rationalizing imperatives take place. 
The unreliability of bodily perception (the retinal after-image, binocular 
vision) required the work of harnessing distraction and transforming it into 
eff icient forms of attention in the late nineteenth century. The year 1879 is 
the date for the start of ‘unbinding vision’ (Crary, 2001, p. 81), unravelling 
in front of the images of Manet’s many paintings, In the Conservatory in 
particular. This unbinding then gets fully revealed in 1888, in the Chapter 
titled ‘Illuminations of Disenchantment’, and is exemplif ied in Seurat’s 
Parade de Cirque (1887–1888) (Figure 5.2). The tension makes its appearance 
felt as the experience now of disenchantment, perspective vanishing into 
multiplanar staging and no single conceivable position for the spectator 
to occupy. Seurat’s knowledge of and experimentation with scientif ic 
principles of vision is well-known. Precisely this knowledge of physiological 
optics produces a displacement of vision in the pictorial realization of a 
scene. Depending on where the spectator is placed, the painting, Crary 
argues convincingly, is both realistic and identif iable, and amorphous and 
shape-shifting—a congeries of colours without bordering. The physical 
location of the body, the alignment of the eyes with the multiple picture 
planes on the single surface, the displaced composition of the elements in 
the painting, all taken together underline the spectatorial body’s mobile 
relation to the object of the gaze. Here we see the spectatorial body slowly 
being displaced by the painting, a displacement and a mobilization which 
reveals, or illuminates, the disenchantment suffered in modernity by 
a subject’s own unstable sense of self. The painting does not stabilize 
experience as a visual object separable from the spectator. Instead, by 
constructing multiple positions between the object and the spectator, 
it reflects rather than hides the shock-like, multiple displacements that 
mark human experience in modernity. The politics of Crary’s argument 
rests f irst on the insistence of perception as inherently unstable due to 
embodied spectatorship, and the destabilization and displacement of the 
spectatorial body, mirrored in the heterotopic place of viewing triggered 
by painting itself.
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4. From the Logic of Dissolution to the Dynamic of 
Identification
The critical potential of visual culture in the society of the spectacle lies 
in the unstable interplay between a desire for identif ication of bodies and 
the displacements, re-alignments, and instabilities this desire produces 
between the spectatorial, painted, and social body. In the previous two 
sections, or rather across them, three bodies emerge. The embodied and 
shifting spectator placed and dislodged by Crary’s reading of certain 
paintings, the distanced represented gaze and emplaced painted bodies 
of Manet read by both Crary and Clark, and the slippery, visually tense and 
complicated social body set in motion through class, analysed by Clark. The 
three bodies, when thought together, enable a conceptual reversal. They 
dynamize a ‘logic of identification’ through displacement, diffusion, and the 
coexistence of visual separation and sensuous proximity. The instability of 
this triple relation produces a ‘dynamic of identification’, which captures the 
necessarily incessant production of stable objects and bodies in the f ield of 
visuality. Yet till now, the argument has gestured rather than developed how 
class, and its relation to the social body, are integral to the f ield of visuality.
For Clark, it becomes very clear that the painted body manifests the 
anxieties of class mobility and the tension between segmentation and 
displacement, confinement and elusiveness, the rules of the game of class, as 
he calls it. The gaze that seeks and meets another gaze which in turn refuses 
to entertain communication but ‘is somewhere else, in her novel’s dream 
of consciousness’ (Clark, 1999a, p. ix)—this encounter between missed 
gazes manifests the tension between epigrammatic appropriation of things 
seen, and their identif ication on the one hand, and deep displacement and 
unavailability to the gaze, on the other. Clark’s reading seems close to what 
Crary writes much later, about dreams, reveries, hypnotic states, and the 
like. But Clark’s painted body has a different function—it is not the trigger 
to the displacement of the spectator’s body that Crary desires. That is why 
his woman in the conservatory does not meet the gaze of the spectator. 
She is truly lost elsewhere while we remain f ixed. Her unavailable gaze is 
a clue to a process that, as Clark shows, resists the alignment of seeing with 
knowing and identifying. The movements of classes and between them (as 
both class interest and class mobility), the changing contours of the city, the 
heterogeneous ambulatory populations of the boulevards—these, and other 
effects of modernity triggered also by rising consumerism, display, and 
spectacle, made the identif ication of class and its accurate representation 
such an obsession for painting in the nineteenth century. Clark’s reading 
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of another Seurat painting provides a clearer understanding of this relation 
between class, the social body, and visuality. This reading also reveals his 
distance from Crary, a distance, I argue, which makes Clark’s readings far 
more useful in understanding the capitalist dynamic of modernity.
Analysing Seurat’s Un Dimanche Après-midi à l’Île de la Grande Jatte 
(1884), Clark notices that the critics were unanimous in noticing one thing: 
‘[Seurat] wished to show the nature of class distinction in a place given over 
to pleasure, but also the various things that made distinctions hard to grasp’ 
(Clark, 1999a, p. 263, emphasis added). Capturing the tension ‘between 
diversity of social detail’ and a ‘uniform and as it were extreme execution’ 
(p. 264), the painting manifested both the precision of its technique and the 
imprecision of the social world’s class composition it sought to represent. 
The dissolution of dots into colour combined punctuated precision with 
separable form through colour, yet the object of this technique could not 
comfortably represent the uncomfortable proximity of different classes 
within the same social space and picture frame. The uniform technical 
composition of class-differentiated bodies sharing the same space both 
posed difference and undermined it. Jean Ajalbert in La Revue Moderne 
observed ‘[O]nce the f irst impression of surprise is over, the exaggerated 
stiffness of these people softens; the dots of colour are less fatiguing’ (quoted 
in Clark, 1999a, p. 264), producing a tension between stiffness and fluidity, 
separation, and coexistence. Clark argues ‘[T]he life is intense for all its 
rigidity’ (p. 265, emphasis in original). ‘Who precisely belongs to whom?’ 
he asks, for ‘class is present here unmistakeably but the fact that workers 
and bourgeois share the same pleasures does not result in this case in an 
inf inite shifting as much as an effort at reaching a modus vivendi, agree-
ing to ignore one another, marking out invisible boundaries and keeping 
oneself to oneself’ (p. 265). The term ‘invisible boundaries’ within an act 
of visual representation captures this dialectical tension between posing 
and dissolving separate identities. That is why Clark is right when he insists 
‘Seurat’s subject […] is the intermingling of classes, not their neat separa-
tion; it is the elaborate texture of controls and avoidances that the classes 
bring with them to the place of pleasure’ (Clark, 1999a, p. 265). The body’s 
disappearance into the numberless vibrations of a directionless spreading 
of an immense social body meets the coexistence of multiple bodies whose 
‘stiffness’ and consanguinity in the same space unites and divides. The 
picture renders the contradictions of an intense life shared by different 
sorts of bodies in the same conflictual space.
Clark insists on thinking both the logic of class identif ication and the 
dissolution of its perception in painted representation thus:
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The identif ication of class is not a brake on meaning: it is the trigger, 
once again, of a sequence of connotations which do not add up, which 
fail to circle back on themselves, declaring their meaning evident and 
uniform. It may be that we are too eager, now, to point to the illusory 
quality of that circling back, that closure against the ‘free play of the 
signif ier’. Illusion or not, it seems to me the necessary ground on which 
meanings can be established and maintained: kept in being long enough, 
and endowed with enough coherence, for the ensuing work of dispersal 
and contradiction to be seen to matter—to have matter, in the text, to 
work against. (Clark, 1980, p. 30, emphasis in original)2
Illusion is the paradoxical ground for meaning because even if connotations 
do not add up, this failure is not eccentric but internal to the production of 
meanings through visuality. Clark maintains this tension between illusion 
and meaning, refusing to succumb to the temptation of cancelling out 
identif ication in the name of the free play of the signif ier. This is precisely 
where the ‘socioscopic’ function of the gaze (Bolla, 1996, p. 79) establishes 
a dynamic relation between the logic of identif ication and the dynamic 
of dissolution, which is traceable in ‘an archival account of the society 
of the spectacle’ (Bolla, 1996, p. 65). For Crary, embodied visuality is the 
alibi for valorizing the dynamic of dissolution into the immense, border-
less, non-contradictory social body. But if the social body is apprehended 
socioscopically as the play between illusion and meaning, between multiple 
connotations and yet ‘enough coherence’, the dynamic of identification 
describes best the unstable practices of visuality in the society of the spec-
tacle. The after-image of sensuousness returns only if one can recognize 
the inherent tension between dot and form, between form and form in the 
same place, between stiffness and fluidity, between modus vivendi through 
avoidance and control. That is why the critics were caught, like Clark, in 
a dynamic of identif ication (‘Who belongs to whom?’) triggered by class 
as central to the representation of the social body. Art, Jacques Rancière 
argues, is one place where the seeming apportioning of class mobility on 
the one hand, and the appropriate forms of its rendition (in literature, for 
example) get derailed. He argues, through a reading of Stendhal, that ‘the 
promised concordance between the growth of a genre and the rise of a 
class gets muddled’ (Rancière, 2013, p. 42). This tension between a sociology 
of class mobility and an aesthetics concomitant with a period becomes 
palpable in vision.
For Crary however, the intensity of life in its rigidity is what he seeks 
to dissolve through a quasi-scientif ic logic of dissolution. Rather than the 
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painterly realization of the uncomfortable coexistence of a class-fractured 
social body, intensity for Crary is identif ied in the spectatorial body’s 
displacement by the fractured construction of Seurat’s multiplanar con-
struction of space in Parade du Cirque. Crary requires an archaeology of 
knowledge that cuts across physiological optics, philosophy, and psychology 
to construct this displacing dynamic. Crary constructs a logic of dissolution 
rather than maintaining a dynamic of identification, while Clark’s argument 
manifests a tension between rigidity and flux. The role of class within the 
composition of the social body as a problem that is both identif ied, played 
with, and struggled over, f ind little place in Crary’s arguments. Where 
Clark insists on the tensions and anxieties of class cross-contamination as 
manifested in the strictly painterly practice of the ‘realization’ of the values 
and excitements of modernity, Crary desires instead an escape through the 
sensorial dissolution of the body. The body vanishes.
Crary describes the leaves in Cézanne’s Study of Foliage (1903) in these 
terms: ‘[T]heir euphoric groundlessness’ provides ‘an intimation of a libidi-
nal release, of an intoxicating loss of self’ (Crary, 2001, p. 357). Cézanne’s 
works ‘diagram perceptual experience in constant transformation’ and his 
late works, Crary argues, ‘surely fulf il and perhaps extravagantly exceed 
Bergson’s hypothesis of an “attention to life” in their disclosure of a world 
that resolves itself “into numberless vibrations, all linked together in 
uninterrupted continuity, all bound up with each other, and travelling 
in every direction like shivers through an immense body”’ (Crary, 2001, 
p. 357; Bergson, 1988, p. 208). The visual encounter for Crary produces an 
immediate enervation, a libidinal loss of self, and a dissolving spectato-
rial body. Paradoxically, Crary’s discourse of immediacy, inspired partly 
by Bergson, seeks to escape positivism yet repeats the same logic, that of 
identif ication through immediacy. Clark takes the encounter between the 
three bodies produced in visuality as the occasion for thinking the work 
of mediation, while Crary’s identif ication of painting as the experience of 
immediacy avoids any mediating process for sensory immediacy. Crary’s 
reading exemplif ies the ‘unmediated acceptance of the so-called given as 
a f irm basis of knowledge’ (Adorno, 1993, p. 55).
For Hegel, sense certainty begins through immediacy and immediately 
starts dissolving into what he calls ‘a complex of many Heres’ (Hegel, 1977, 
p. 64). And the reason is time. ‘The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is 
similarly a this Here which in fact is not this here, but a Before and a Behind, 
an Above and Below, a Right and a Left. The Above is itself this manifold 
otherness of above, below, etc. The Here, which was supposed to have been 
pointed out vanishes into other Heres. […] [W]hat abides is a negative’ 
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(Hegel, 1977, p. 64, emphasis in original). Clark’s readings highlight precisely 
this negativity within the ‘pointing out’ in painting, which subverts the 
stabilization of place (here, there) and the temporalization (now, then) of 
pointing and representing. Visual experience, I argue, harbours precisely 
this function of negativity rendered in the term ‘dynamic of identif ication’. 
It undermines both a logic of identif ication and a dynamic of dissolution, 
and that is why spectacular culture promises but can fail in successfully 
rendering alienation invisible.
In his reading of Cézanne’s The Bathers (1904–1906), Clark describes the 
painting as ‘a kind of literalization of the notion of the body’s being always 
subject to movements of substitution, replacement, shuttling between pos-
sible places or identities’ (Clark, 1999b, p. 158, emphasis added). This is a 
Lukácsian reading of the subject in the advanced capitalist world of Debord, 
if anything. That is why Clark describes Cézanne’s technique in classically 
Taylorist fashion as ‘an idea of knowledge built out of singular, equivalent 
units—events, that happen in the eye, and which the dab of paint will 
analogize precisely’ (Clark, 1999b, p. 166). Yet The Bathers ‘are haunted by fig-
ures of inconsistency and displacement, or by kinds of coexistence (of marks 
and objects) that are more painful than natural, more like interruption than 
juxtaposition, more like grating and locking of the parts of a great psychic 
machine than the patient disclosure of a world’ (p. 166). The coexistence of 
the ‘ruthlessness’ of the painter’s precision and ‘their [the bodies’] will to 
resist […] vision’ (p. 167) is captured on the same plane. The body persists 
in ‘the inorganic chill in the air’ yet makes the painting breathe by ‘having 
its surface be vibrant, tense, or sensitive’ (p. 166). Inorganic time of singular 
equivalent units, of mechanical materialism (Clark’s reference is Freud’s 
‘Project for a Scientif ic Psychology’) is conjoined with the morphing of 
bodies, their inter-penetration and softness. That is why Clark argues that 
‘glimpses of alternative systems of representation are only thrown up by 
the most intense and recalcitrant effort to make the ones we have f inally 
deliver the goods’. He goes on: ‘It is only in the process of discovering the 
system’s antinomies and blank spots […] that the f irst improvised forms of 
contrary imagining come to light’ (p. 165).
In 1968 (one year after the publication of Debord’s Spectacle), when the 
May events were taking place in Paris, Foucault delivered a series of lectures 
in Tunis on Manet. The second to last painting he spoke on was The Balcony 
(1868). For Foucault this painting is a paradoxical study in invisibility—we 
cannot see what the three f igures are looking at. All three f igures are look-
ing in different directions, and of course we do not know if they are even 
looking at anything. ‘All three’, he says are ‘absorbed by an intense spectacle 
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which, evidently we cannot know, one because it is in front of the canvas, 
the other because it is to the right of the canvas, the third because it is to 
the left of the canvas. And, in any case we see nothing, we see only the 
gazes, not a place but a gesture and always the gestures of the hands, folding 
hands, unfolding hands, hands actually unfolded. […] It is simply this circle 
of hands […] which unif ies […] these divergent elements of a picture which 
is nothing other than the brilliance of invisibility itself’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 71, 
emphasis added). This is the body taking place, an event, in the present 
continuous, never once and for all. The gaze encounters bodies, and the 
bodies are only gazes, and this visibility of the gazes renders a nothing: 
the brilliance of invisibility. The dynamic of identif ication is precisely this 
contradictory perception—the brilliance of invisibility as the displacement 
of the body as it persists in its consistency. That is why Foucault closed 
his lecture with The Bar at the Folies Bergère, the same picture that closes 
Clark’s readings of Manet in The Painting of Modern Life, stating ‘Manet 
did not invent non-representative painting because everything in Manet 
is representation, but he made a representative play of the fundamental 
material elements of the canvas’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 79). Manet, the Painter 
of Modern Life, pushes representation to the limit and in this play with 
materiality pref igures the modernism which will centralize the failure of 
adequate representation. Clark argues that ‘the body may never take place 
anywhere once and for all; but what it is made of—what our imagining of 
it is made of—will take place, and take on its own consistency […] and the 
kind of consistency it has is hard for us to deal with—that is why we retreat 
into the world of the imaginary—just because it is ultimately inhuman, 
or nonhuman, or has humanity as one of its effects’ (Clark, 1999b, p. 166).
5. Conclusion
In a scathing review of Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, Clark comments 
that ‘[B]enjamin’s Paris is all dream and no spectacle: The apparatus of 
spectacle is not understood by him to invade the dream life and hold 
even unconscious imagining in its grip’ (Clark, 2003, p. 47). A critical and 
comparative perspective on Clark and Crary show that one way of loosening 
the grip of the apparatus of the spectacle is to note and perhaps exacerbate 
the gap between the dream and the spectacle. This would be where the 
‘endless desire’ of the epigraph can be the changing ground on which a 
counterweight to the spectacle can be constructed. The spectacle cannot 
always invade dream life perfectly, or map its diagrammatics perfectly on 
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the imaginary. Other imaginings become possible when the map slips over 
the surface it aims to cartographically stabilize. This is where the transition 
from ‘having’ to ‘appearing’ in Debord, and the alignment of subject matter 
to the proliferation of laws in Lukács, becomes the space for slippages, 
uncoordinated effects, and dis-alignments.
This is what Clark asks about the Here and Now of the Image: ‘Why 
should a regime of representation not be built on the principle that images 
are, or ought to be, transformable (as opposed to exchangeable)—meaning 
disposable through and through, and yet utterly material and contingent; 
shareable, imaginable, coming up constantly in their negativity, their non-
identity, and for that reason promoted and dismantled at will?’ (Clark, 
1999c, p. x).
The brilliance of invisibility as one perspective on contemporary visual 
culture continues then to provide a critical potential for the spectacular 
society of today. The unavailable bodies and gazes in Foucault and Clark’s 
readings are related to the fuzzy social body whose contours cannot be 
mapped by a determining socioscopy precisely because of the possibility 
of ‘negativity’ and ‘non-identity’. In their spectacular brilliance, bodies 
are contingent and fractured, whose unstable and dissonant composition 
produce ‘cryptograms of modernism’ (Adorno, 2003, p. 337).
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6. Art Criticism in the Society of the 
Spectacle : The Case of October
Noortje de Leij
Less than a decade after Guy Debord’s publication of The Society of the 
Spectacle, Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson in 1976 founded the 
journal October. Initially both associate editors at Artforum, Krauss and 
Michelson left the latter over a dispute on what Krauss ironically referred 
to as ‘the Lynda Benglis thing’: a controversy about a centrefold advertise-
ment for Linda Benglis, arranged by her dealer Paula Cooper (Bracker, 1995, 
p. 77). The spread was somewhat deviously arranged by Benglis’s gallery 
and revealed a provocative photograph of a naked Benglis holding a sizable 
dildo against her pubic area. Krauss and Michelson, along with four other 
Artforum editors, denounced the copyrighted advertisement as an object of 
obscene vulgarity. The image, they wrote in a letter to the editor, represented 
a ‘qualitative leap’ in the journal and the incident was ‘deeply symptomatic 
of conditions that call for critical analysis’. ‘As long as they infect the reality 
around us’, the editors wrote, ‘these conditions shall have to be treated in 
our future works as writers and editors’ (quoted in Bracker, 1995, p. 107).1 In 
line with this announcement, Krauss and Michelson established October: 
an advertisement-free journal that read on its cover ‘Art | Theory | Criticism 
| Politics’, indicating the journal’s dedication to connect these four hefty 
pillars. The writers who became, along with Krauss, most closely associated 
with the journal were Benjamin Buchloh, Douglas Crimp, Hal Foster, and 
Yve-Alain Bois.2
Although the Benglis incident might seem insignif icant, or Krauss and 
Michelson’s reaction a bit much, it does make sense in light of October’s 
overall concern to maintain a space for ‘critical’ art within the growing com-
modification and ‘spectacularization’ of art and the art institution under the 
conditions of late capitalism. ‘The tensions between radical artistic practice 
and dominant ideology will be a major subject of inquiry’, the editors wrote 
in their mission statement (October Editorial, 1976, p. 4). In this respect, 
Debord’s theory of the spectacle played a decisive role: both as a general 
cultural diagnosis of the ‘dominant ideology’ with which the October writers 
seemed wholeheartedly to agree and as a specif ic challenge for the f ield 
of art. Art, as Debord and the Situationists along with the members of the 
Frankfurt School showed, was constantly on the verge of being assimilated 
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to the conditions of spectacle, or as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
described in their influential text on the culture industry: ‘import[ed] into 
the realm of administration’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p. 104). The 
dialectic between art as a relatively autonomous site for critical practice 
and as an ideological manifestation of spectacular culture—complying 
with, rather than resisting what Debord had called ‘spectacle’—remained 
of central importance throughout October’s development. The October 
writers had witnessed that the ambition of Debord and the Situationists 
to dissolve art into life in an aesthetico-political revolution did not succeed. 
Yet, contrary to Debord—who proclaimed that true art could only subsist 
in praxis, by becoming life—they upheld the Adornian assessment that 
critical artistic practice might still be possible within—or only—under 
the putative autonomy of the art institution.3 To simply abandon or abolish 
the art institution under conditions of spectacular culture would mean 
‘the regime of total desublimation’, Buchloh avows (Buchloh in Bois et al., 
2004a, p. 325). However, acknowledging that the art institution is certainly 
not exempted from the conditions of consumer capitalism, it had to be 
constantly problematized and criticized, also and specif ically along the 
lines of Debord’s critical analyses.
My claim is that Debord’s alienating conditions of the spectacle, which 
‘proclaims the predominance of appearances and asserts that all human 
life, which is to say all social life, is mere appearance’, and ‘demands […] 
passive acceptance’, or passive spectatorship (Debord, 1995, pp. 14–15), are 
mirrored in October’s art critical project by a fundamental concern with 
the specif ic socio-political conditions of institutional mediation and with 
the ideological conditions of spectatorship in the sphere of reception. Both 
the art institution as a structure of mediation, and perception as a realm 
of subject formation are theorized in the art criticism of the October writ-
ers—albeit in various forms and sometimes more explicitly than others—as 
gradually more and more politicized in terms of spectacularization. As 
Buchloh states in an October roundtable discussion entitled ‘The Predica-
ment of Contemporary Art’:
The postwar situation can be described as a negative teleology: a steady 
dismantling of the autonomous practices, spaces, and spheres of culture 
and a perpetual intensif ication of assimilation and homogenization, to 
the point today where we witness what Debord called ‘the integrated 
spectacle’. (Buchloh in Bois et al., 2004b, p. 673)
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‘It’s a dire diagnostic’, Bois responds to Buchloh’s decree, ‘(after all, Debord 
committed suicide), but one I think we all share to some extent’ (Bois in 
Idem, p. 673).4 It is against the backdrop of this diagnosis that the October 
editors sought to revaluate radical historical avant-garde practices in light 
of post-war social conditions and endorsed the critical potential of neo-
avantgarde art. Their accounts of art’s critical potential are, however, in 
perpetuum both fuelled and threatened by the awareness of an ominous 
intensif ication of social alienation under the strangulating grip of the 
invisible hand of the market.5
In Krauss’s writing, the dismal conditions of spectacle are most clearly 
foregrounded in her essay on ‘The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist 
Museum’, in which she laments ‘Minimalism’s participation in a culture 
of seriality, of multiples without originals—a culture, that is, of com-
modity production’ (Krauss, 1990, p. 8). Even though Minimal art, as such 
initially championed by the October writers, foregrounded the presence of 
the subject and aimed to restore the ‘immediacy of experience’, in the end 
it had merely paved the way for a market-driven museum that advances 
ahistorical, spectacular spaces of ‘pure presentness’ (Bishop, 2011, p. 1): 
‘hyperspace’, as Krauss formulates it, in need of ‘a technologized subject, 
the subject in search not of affect but of intensities, the subject who experi-
ences its fragmentation as euphoria, the subject whose f ield of experience 
is no longer history, but space itself’ (Krauss, 1990, pp. 9–10, 17). Krauss’s 
text strongly echoes Debord’s portrayal of the spectacle’s false unity and 
homogeneity, ‘the official language of generalized separation’ (Debord, 1995, 
p. 12), in which the subject as a modern-day consumer Tantalus perpetually 
reaches towards the fulfilment of his pseudo-needs (in search of intensities), 
obliterating historical consciousness and preventing political action. Raoul 
Vaneigem, a prominent member of the Situationists, sardonically diagnosed 
this socio-political inertia as ‘survival sickness’: whilst having the means 
to eradicate social unjustness and despair, man only uses the minimum 
of his resources to barely stay alive, just enough to consume. Numbed by 
the cyclical motion of the marketplace, in survival mode the consuming 
subject is, in an utterly counterrevolutionary amnesia, satisf ied by merely 
avoiding actual death. Though ‘[t]he consumer cannot and must not ever 
attain satisfaction’, Vaneigem writes, ‘the logic of the consumable object 
demands the creation of fresh needs, yet the accumulation of such false 
needs exacerbates the malaise of men confined with increasing diff iculty 
solely to that status of consumer’ (Vaneigem, 2001, p. 162).
A substantial part of Krauss’s text deals with a concern for this se-
dated subject in late capitalism, or more specif ically, in the late capitalist 
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museum.6 The spectator was, in an almost utopian gesture, put on the stage 
by Minimalism yet ultimately fragmented and derealized as the submis-
sive, passive spectator Debord described in The Society of the Spectacle and 
Vaneigem diagnosed with survival sickness in The Revolution of Everyday 
Life. Referencing the Marxist theorist Fredric Jameson’s essay ‘Postmodern-
ism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’ (1984), Krauss uses the idea of 
‘cultural revolution’ to explain that, even though art might provide us with 
a utopian alternative to, or temporary exemption from the heteronomous 
conditions of capitalism, it also carves out a space for the further expansion 
of these conditions. Art prepares, so to speak, yet another domain for its 
imminent recuperation by a next, more advanced moment of capitalism. 
‘With Minimalism’, Krauss argues, ‘the potential was always there that not 
only would the object be caught up in the logic of commodity production, 
a logic that would overwhelm its specif icity, but that the subject projected 
by Minimalism also would be reprogrammed’ (Krauss, 1990, p. 12). That is: 
reprogrammed into a fragmented, passive spectator. The dispersal of the 
conscious, active (revolutionary) subject through the mechanisms of image 
consumption and the ‘appearance’ of individuality as a marketable image-
commodity are intrinsic functions and effects of spectacular culture as 
described by Debord. They are, he argued, ‘the eff icient motor of trancelike 
behaviour’ (Debord, 1995, p. 17).7 This aspect of Debord and the Situationists’ 
theories, I contend, takes on major importance in the October writings.
Jonathan Crary, a frequent contributor to October, extensively theorized 
and historicized the conditions of perception and attention ‘as an indis-
pensable part of an expanding terrain of modern spectacle’ (Crary, 2001, 
p. 361).8 Crary puts emphasis on spectacle as a way of organizing attention. 
Attention and perception under conditions of spectacle are displaced from 
attentiveness to the viewing subject and the mechanisms of perception and 
metaphorically rerouted to the window display where they are perpetually 
dispersed and sustained trough a constant introduction of novelty. This 
emphasis on spectacle as a way of organizing attention and perception is 
important to October’s reception of Debord’s spectacle and fuels the analysis 
of art as a sphere that can potentially counter this cultural diagnosis by 
putting attention to perception itself or by demanding active or conscious 
spectatorship.
With regard to Krauss’s text on the late capitalist museum it is important 
to note, however, that in her accounts of ‘multiples without originals’, ‘hyper-
space’, and, evidently, by her use of the term ‘simulacra’, she refers explicitly 
to Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulacrum (Krauss, 1990, pp. 10, 12). Yet, 
although of a similar historical origin, often used in the same context and 
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sometimes seemingly interchangeable, Baudrillard’s simulacrum should not 
be equated with Debord’s spectacle. It is, instead, a successive, intensif ied 
phase in which the real has been replaced by simulations (Baudrillard, 
1991, p. 256).9 The spectacle on the contrary, is, as Debord asserts: ‘itself 
a product of real activity’ (Debord, 1995, p. 14). Baudrillard’s simulacrum 
eradicates all reality: the real is not distorted or hidden; it is no longer 
even possible to identify anything as ‘real’. As such, Baudrillard’s theory is 
utterly totalizing and seems to obliterate any potential opposition. Krauss 
appears, however, to employ Baudrillard’s terminology rather freely, without 
clearly demarcating the consequences of his conclusion. This tendency is 
also noticeable in Foster’s texts. Foster frequently interchanges the terms 
‘spectacle’ and ‘simulacrum’ while holding on to the importance and pos-
sibility of mediation and resistance.
In an essay entitled ‘Contemporary Art and Spectacle’, Foster turns 
to Debord explaining the spectacle as the mediation of social relations 
between men as a relation between images. ‘In spectacle even alienation 
is turned into an image for the alienated to consume; indeed this may 
stand as a def inition of spectacle’, Foster parenthetically remarks (Foster, 
1985, p. 83). However, not much later in the text he repeatedly addresses a 
‘loss of the real’ and explicitly cites Baudrillard arguing that ‘it is no longer 
a question of false representation of reality (ideology), it is a question of 
concealing that the real is no longer the real, and thus of saving the principle 
of reality’ (quoted in Foster, 1985, pp. 84–86). Robert Longo’s work, whose 
‘simulations’ according to Foster deal with this loss of the real, discloses 
this ‘hyperreality’ and makes us aware of our own seduction. As we can see, 
Foster shares with the other October writers a specific concern for subjective 
manipulation and, as Crary def ined, spectacle as a way of administrating 
attention (through seduction and, as Foster states, ‘our fascination with the 
hyperreal, with “perfect” images that make us “whole” at the price of delu-
sion, of submission’) (Foster, 1985, pp. 83, 90–91.). But his explicit inclusion of 
Baudrillard’s world of simulacrum—which can, nevertheless, be ‘exposed’ 
in Longo’s work—seems inconsistent. Foster’s later writings, however, by 
and large abandon Baudrillard’s theory of simulacrum, whereas the notion 
of spectacle persists (in a sort of updated version) in his critique of the 
Bilbao effect—the spectacularized museum—and within his apprehension 
of ‘the designed subject’ or ‘identity branding’ (Foster, 2003a, pp. xiii–xv). 
In one of these later essays, Foster turns to the ‘mnemonic dimension’ of 
contemporary art as a potential strategy to ‘resist the presentist totality 
of design in culture today’ (Foster, 2003b p. 130). This statement reveals 
his construal of design as a spectacle that is, like Debord’s account of the 
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integrated spectacle, ruled by a timeless present in a society ‘[that] wants 
to forget the past and no longer seems to believe in a future’ (Debord, 2011, 
pp. 12–13). Foster’s reference to memory as a counter-spectacular artistic 
strategy exposes a strong intersection with Buchloh’s later art criticism, 
in which he advocates the ‘mnemonic’ as ‘one of the few acts of resistance 
against the totality of spectacle’ (Foster, 2003b, p.  130; Buchloh, 2003a, 
p. xxv).
Within the October context, Buchloh is arguably most indebted to De-
bord’s legacy.10 As such, I will analyse Buchloh’s incorporation of Debord’s 
theory of the spectacle into his art critical project in more detail, especially 
with regards to the artistic strategies that Buchloh advocates as potentially 
‘counter-spectacular’ or oppositional.
1. Buchloh’s Spectacle
Already in its title, Buchloh’s comprehensive collection of essays, Neo-
Avantgarde and Culture Industry, refers explicitly to Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s chapter on the ‘culture industry’ in Dialectic of Enlightenment.11 
Accordingly, his notion of spectacle, and his art critical project in general, 
is closely intertwined with the critique of culture industry in the tradition 
of the Frankfurt School. As Buchloh himself states:
My […] work is situated, methodologically, between two texts: one 
from 1947, The Dialectic of Enlightenment by Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, the chapter on ‘The Culture Industry’ in particular, and the 
other from 1967, The Society of the Spectacle by Guy Debord. The more I 
think about those texts the more they seem to historicize the last f ifty 
years of artistic production, for they demonstrate how the autonomous 
spaces of cultural representation—spaces of subversion, resistance, 
critique, utopian aspiration—are gradually eroded, assimilated, or simply 
annihilated. (Buchloh et al., 2004b, pp. 672–673)
Keeping with October ’s aspirations, Buchloh’s project is characterized 
by an attempt to recognize and analyse artistic practices that resist or 
counter this assimilation of artistic production to the culture industry and 
spectacular culture. ‘Still, then and now’, he writes in the introduction to 
Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry, ‘I would argue that one among the 
inf inite multiplicity of functions intrinsic to aesthetic structures is in fact 
to provide at least an immediate and concrete illusion, if not an actual 
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instantiation, of a universally accessible suspension of power’ (Buchloh, 
2003a, p. xxiv).
Although the term ‘culture industry’ shows much resemblance to De-
bord’s spectacle, Horkheimer and Adorno’s culture industry is principally 
a segment (yet both a result and a function) of advanced capitalist society. 
Their account of culture as an ‘industry’ signals its transformation from 
a f ield for individual expression and authentic experience into a reif ied 
site for commodif ied leisure and mass entertainment. Herewith, ‘culture 
industry’—analogue to ‘spectacle’—advances passive acceptance of the 
status quo instead of active engagement with prevailing social conditions 
and structures of domination. ‘The total effect of the culture industry’, 
Adorno writes, is a mass deception that ‘turned into a means for fettering 
consciousness… impedes the development of autonomous, independent 
individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves’ (Adorno, 
2001, p. 106). The culture industry can, as such, be seen as a tool for the 
ideological indoctrination of late capitalism. Spectacle on the other hand, 
is—boldly speaking—the ideology of late capitalism; it is, as Debord states: 
‘the prevailing model of social life’ (Debord, 1995, p. 13). Only understood in 
the ‘limited sense’ can it be defined as mass media (or the culture industry; 
p. 19). Debord thus posits the spectacle as the central, unifying, principle 
of social organization and emphasizes that it is not merely a ‘collection 
of images’ but ‘a social relationship between people that is mediated by 
images’, while the culture industry is a specif ic manifestation of spectacle, 
albeit a very powerful one (Debord, 1995, pp. 12, 15).
Although using ‘spectacle’ and ‘culture industry’ often within one sen-
tence as two allied—at times interchangeable—forces, overall Buchloh 
(along with the other October writers) appears to maintain the division as 
described above.12 Spectacle delineates an abyss of alienation, reif ication, 
and social atomization, imperviously concealing the detriments of capital 
accumulation and exploitation with pacifying images of a happy and 
gratifying world. The culture industry, on the other hand, acquires a more 
specif ic role as a division of the spectacle and the dialectical counterpart 
of critical art, although the latter only intermittently so, as art often as-
similates itself into a mere segment of spectacle.
Buchloh, however, rejects the Adornian modernist model of critical nega-
tion and refusal, which he condemns as too hermetic. Adorno, he states, 
‘ignores the fact that the concept of autotelic purity was actually disman-
tled early in the century’, and ‘failed to recognize [...] that those aesthetic 
changes and those new technological and social conditions constituted a 
historically irreversible reality’ (Buchloh, 2003b, p. 209). In his resentment 
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towards contemporary culture and a too rigid adherence to what Buchloh 
describes as ‘prescribed patterns of the political models of critique’, Adorno’s 
analysis of artistic negation lacks the contemporaneity of Debord’s theory 
of spectacle (Buchloh, 2003a, pp. xxv–xxvi).13 Instead, following the Situ-
ationists’ strategy of détournement, Buchloh recurrently advocates aesthetic 
strategies that appropriate the heteronomous conditions of the culture 
industry and spectacle in order to almost literally ‘détour’ them and reveal 
these conditions.14 Turning back to Adorno, it is however important to 
emphasize, again, that Buchloh and the other October writers maintain 
that this form of resistance takes place within the institution. Through a 
perpetual critique of the art institution’s conditions as heteronomous, art 
indirectly criticizes the ideological structures of society as a whole and 
can, momentarily, maintain a site for resistance. In spite of this, Buchloh 
often warns, however, of art becoming part of the culture industry, turning 
into an enforcement of Debord’s spectacle where it eradicates rather than 
enhances socio-political consciousness.
2. Use Value versus Exchange Value
This paradoxical tension between art as a site of resistance against spe-
cif ic forms of spectacularization and reif ication and its corruption into 
enforcing the very conditions it wants to challenge also formed the leading 
structure of Krauss’s critique of Minimalism, as I previously discussed. 
Krauss’s essay ‘The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist Museum’ (1990) 
distinguished between Minimalism’s good intentions and its septic, post-
modern ‘afterlife’. October had marked its beginning with an ardent support 
for the former ‘good’ Minimalism that attempted to challenge Modernist 
notions of authorship and originality. The October writers championed 
Donald Judd and Robert Morris, amongst others, for counteracting and 
demystifying the rigidity of Greenberg’s formalism. Minimal art supplanted 
the Greenbergian timeless and universal, ‘disembodied’ or optical experi-
ence of the artwork with a phenomenological experience of the object 
in space and time and def ied authorship and originality with seemingly 
authorless objects. The geometrical shapes, manufactured with industrially 
produced materials, instead revealed the work’s architectural support and 
foregrounded its contingency to the presence of an (actively) engaging 
subject. It is interesting to note that one of the movement’s most critical 
(formalist) opponents, Michael Fried, condemned the three-dimensional 
objects for contaminating the medium-specif ic purity of sculpture with 
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‘theatricality’—bearing in mind that the word ‘spectacle’ in French also 
signif ies theatrical staging.15
But, as Krauss’s essay also attests to, it did not take long before Minimal 
art became the object of critique for virtually all of the October editors. 
While Minimalism did take the f irst step away from the modernist su-
premacy of the visual, it merely addressed the walls of the gallery/museum 
as a material support instead of revealing their neutralizing whiteness and 
the socio-economic foundation that keeps them erect. And even though 
the minimal object acknowledged the spectator, it did not question her/
his subjectivity and, as such, presented the phenomenological experience 
as a neutral encounter between a somehow equal subject and object, as if 
to supplant Greenberg’s passive contemplation with a passive and ahis-
torical construal of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological experience. The 
specif ic subject that Minimal art construed, as Krauss argues in her 1990 
text, was emblematic for, or had even—ironically close to the meaning of 
the word ‘avant-garde’—served as the vanguard for the industrialization 
and spectacularization of the art institution. The late capitalist museum 
needed precisely this ahistorical and fragmented subject that Minimal art 
had presented (Krauss, 1990, p. 13). Krauss thus reveals how an initially 
radical art practice had paved the way for a further capitalization of the art 
institution. In an attempt to resist this neutralizing, detrimental dynamic, 
a critique of the heteronomous conditions of spectacular culture therefore 
had to encompass a critical examination of the art institutional context 
and an investigation of the ideological parameters of reception. This spe-
cif ic constellation of critique became, under the heading of ‘institutional 
critique’, a key issue in the October project.
The artists that feature most prominently in Buchloh’s different accounts 
of this specif ic form of (institutional) critique are Marcel Broodthaers, 
Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke, and Dan Graham, and at a later stage, James 
Coleman—the latter, repeatedly praised by Buchloh, Foster, and Krauss 
(not always for the same reasons), seems to be one of the sole survivors 
in October ’s quest for emancipatory artistic practice. Buchloh praises 
Coleman’s work for its ‘mnemonic’ quality, a term that starts reappearing 
more frequently in his later writings and which he, together with Foster, 
ultimately asserts as the only potentially critical or ‘counter-spectacular’ 
artistic strategy that is still possible under the all-consuming heteronomous 
conditions of the ‘integrated spectacle’.
In his earlier essays, however, (roughly speaking, before the 1990s), Bu-
chloh puts much emphasis on the artwork’s use value or ‘use value potential’ 
(Buchloh, 2003c, p. 199).16 ‘If artistic production gives up altogether the idea 
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of use value’, he contends, ‘it abolishes its own inherent potential to induce 
dialectics within the reality of cultural history, thus producing mere artistic 
facticity incapable of initiating further process of development’ (Buchloh, 
2003c, pp. 198–199).17 Use value’s counterpole, exchange value, is bound up 
with the logic of the commodity and Marx’s logic of equivalence. Buchloh 
characterizes it as decontextualized, immaterial, aligned with consumption 
and pertaining to the domain of simulacra by occluding any external refer-
ents. Within the context of this chapter, we can argue that ‘exchange value’ 
serves as an equivalent of ‘culture industry’ and ‘spectacle’. By contrast, ‘use 
value’ is characterized as ‘context-bound’, ‘functional’, ‘communicable’, and 
materially grounded (Buchloh, 2003a, pp. 188, 199; 2003b, pp. 220). Artists 
who ‘reinvest the artwork with a potential use value’, Buchloh contends, 
imbue art with the potential to construct an oppositional sphere to the 
conditions of the culture industry and spectacle (Buchloh, 2003c, p. 191).18
It is in this respect illuminating to consider Buchloh’s account of Dan 
Graham’s work in a 1978 essay entitled ‘Moments of History in the Work 
of Dan Graham’ (Buchloh, 2003c). Graham’s art practice critically departs 
from Minimal art. He intersects Minimalist concerns for place and time 
with conceptual art and engages Minimal aesthetics with the specific social 
relations of the institutional framework and the spectator-object relation-
ship. The main edifice that Buchloh creates in his analysis of Graham’s work 
is a dialectical opposition between politically mute art, on the one hand, 
and ‘functional’ art, on the other, understood as having a social function. 
He discerns this social function in Graham’s work both at the level of its 
material and within the sphere of perception. His early works, such as 
Homes for America (1966), Figurative (1965), and Schema (1966), dialectically 
invert and complicate Minimalism’s preoccupation with the art object and 
its material support. Homes of America (Figures 6.1 and 6.2), for example, is 
a series of photographs of suburban houses accompanied by informative 
texts, which was published in Arts Magazine. The work posits the art journal 
as its institutional frame, as a ‘found formal structure’ (Buchloh, 2003c, 
p. 181). By presenting the artwork directly as/in a publication, in an art 
magazine, Graham creates a relatively direct relation with the audience 
(for the experience of the work in the magazine is a ‘f irst-hand’ experience 
and not the description of the work by an art critic). On the other hand, the 
journal’s idiosyncratic character of mediation (through distribution, image 
selection and informative/interpretative texts) simultaneously reveals 
the fact that art is always already mediated—by extension, also by the 
seemingly neutral exhibition interior. Furthermore, Buchloh shows that 
the serial repetition of the industrial houses in Homes for America, along 
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with the reproducibility of the journal itself, mirror the formal principles 
of Minimalism while their subject matter as a ‘found reality structure’ is 
rooted in social reality: ‘the misery of everyday industrial housing’ (Buchloh, 
2003c, p. 181). Through Graham’s dissection of these processes of mediation 
and his dialectical play between social reality and formal organization he 
reveals, as Buchloh contends: ‘the found structures beyond visible reality 
and its seeming concreteness’ (p. 188, emphasis mine). The found objects 
or ready-mades in Minimalism and Conceptual art, are in fact less ‘real’, 
Buchloh argues, than the social structures underneath that impact the way 
we actually experience these objects (or, more generally, perceive ‘reality’). 
These structures ‘determine realty’, Buchloh writes,
with a more subtle and effective impact: equally the psycho-physiological 
motivations of subjective behaviour and the socio-economical conditions of 
objective political practice, or even more precisely, the omnipresent mecha-
nisms of interdependence within those systems revealed in the acutely 
observed situations of their combined effects. (Buchloh, 2003c, p. 188)
Rooted in Marx’s account of commodity fetishism and mediated by Georg 
Lukács’s conception of reif ication, Debord’s spectacle is founded upon this 
rift between ‘reality on the one hand and images on the other’, at the heart of 
which is the idea of the ‘contemplative attitude’: the spectator, blinded and 
sedated by a world that seems natural, passively accepts this ‘pseudo-world’ 
and ‘lapses into a contemplative attitude vis-à-vis the workings of his own 
objectified and reified faculties’ (Debord, 1995, pp. 12–13; Lukács, 1971, p. 100). 
‘The spectacle’, Debord writes in his concluding chapter, ‘erases the dividing 
line […] between true and false, repressing all directly lived truth beneath 
the real presence of the falsehood maintained by the organization of ap-
pearance’ (Debord, 1995, p. 153). Buchloh principally describes Graham’s art 
as able to counter this erasure, by revealing the social structures beyond 
visible reality and by challenging the spectator’s contemplative attitude 
with a reflection on her/his own conditions of perception.19
In Buchloh’s subsequent elaboration of Graham’s later performance 
work, we see how the artist’s specif ic concern for subjective behaviour 
increasingly potentiates his art with a social function. Graham’s notion of 
the viewing subject evolves beyond the Minimalist equation of object and 
subject. The artist believes that staging the presence of the spectator only 
acquires signif icance when it makes perceptible the ideologically imbued 
processes of perception itself (Buchloh, 2003c, p. 196). Lacking a specif ic 
visual analysis of how Graham’s works actually succeed in this process, 
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Buchloh sums up several of his performances that, for example: reveal 
‘stereotyped male-female roles’; increase ‘awareness of group behaviour 
versus individual behaviour’; or induce and elucidate ‘the mechanisms 
of group identif ication’ (Buchloh, 2003c, p. 197). These performances, he 
concludes, endow the work with aesthetic value to the extent that the 
Figure 6.1. dan Graham, Homes for America, 1989. Photo offset reproduction of layout for 
magazine article (Arts Magazine, december 1966–January 1967). Courtesy of the artist and marian 
Goodman Gallery, Paris.
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spectator experiences the inherent, historical, patterns of social reality 
while opening up future—instrumental—perspectives.
The outline of Graham’s interests and the strategies of his formal enter-
prises appear in the writings and in the works as a microscopic analysis 
of segments of the process of history itself, their given structures as well 
as the modes of perceiving them and the perspectives of analysing and 
transforming them. And it is to the degree that the analysis succeeds 
in mediating the patterns of a given reality structure […] that the work 
opens up an instrumental perspective of further historical proceedings, 
endowing the viewer with what he experiences as their artwork quality, 
their aesthetic value (Buchloh, 2003c, p. 197).
This ‘instrumental perspective’ or ‘functional model of recognition of 
actual history’, as he elsewhere describes, is what we should understand 
when Buchloh speaks about use value (Buchloh, 2003c, p. 180). And, albeit 
sometimes ambulatory, this idea of potential use value through an exposé 
of heteronomous structures of domination and a consequent instigation of 
socio-historical consciousness, occupies a pivotal role in Buchloh’s concern 
for art as an emancipatory and counter-spectacular practice. However, while 
Buchloh here already mentions the historicity of structures of perception 
Figure 6.2. Homes for America (detail), 1966–1967. one from 20 colour 35mm slides. Courtesy of 
the artist and marian Goodman Gallery, Paris.
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and mediation, it is only in his later writing that the ‘mnemonic’ takes on 
central importance in his search for artistic strategies of resistance. The idea 
of the ‘mnemonic’ as an aesthetic strategy of resistance, which also plays 
an important role in Foster’s later work, in many ways leads us back to the 
foundational structure of Debord’s spectacle, Lukács (and Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s) reification, and Marx’s commodity fetishism. That is: a ‘forgetting’ 
lies at the core of this genealogy. In a letter to Walter Benjamin, Adorno 
writes that ‘all reif ication is a forgetting: objects become purely thing-like 
the moment they are retained for us without the continued presence of their 
other aspects: when something of them has been forgotten’ (Adorno et al., 
1999, p. 321). That which is forgotten in the process of reif ication differs for 
Lukács and Adorno: Lukács locates this forgetfulness predominantly on the 
side of the subject’s mediating and transforming relation to the external 
world (resulting in the ‘contemplative attitude’ towards a world that seems 
natural and unchangeable) while Adorno emphasizes the non-identif iable, 
non-conceptual element that is forgotten by over-conceptualization (irra-
tional rationalism) and thus calls attention to the natural, or the enigmatic 
quality of the object, that is forgotten by human (over-)interpretation (Vogel, 
1996, pp. 78–79). I would argue that Debord’s theory of spectacle leans 
predominantly on Lukács’s conception of forgetting. The malevolence of 
Debord’s insidious world of images arises from its concealment of the social 
relations behind the seemingly natural world of spectacles and the resulting 
enucleation of the spectator’s consciousness of her/his potential to be an ac-
tive, revolutionary agent. In Thesis 74 of Spectacle, Debord writes: ‘As for the 
subject of history, it can only be the self-production of the living: the living 
becoming master and processor of its world—that is, of history—and com-
ing to exist as consciousness of its own activity’ (Debord, 1995, p. 48). The 
dissimilarity between Adorno and Debord (emanating from Lukács theory 
of reif ication) at the level of ‘forgetting’, so to speak, also accounts for the 
difference between Adorno’s advocacy of artistic strategies of determinate 
negation—that emphasize art’s enigmatic, sensual, and indeterminable 
character in its formal abstraction as a resistance against conceptualization 
and over-identif ication—and the call by Debord and the Situationists for 
much more active subversive artistic practices of détournement that reroute, 
and as such reveal, the illusoriness of the society of the spectacle. The latter 
hence not aim so much to reveal an enigmatic, ungraspable character of 
something real or natural underneath, but try to break the narcotic spell 
of that which seemed real in the f irst place. As I previously discussed, the 
artistic strategies that Buchloh predominantly favours are more indebted 
to Debord’s idea of uncovering the mechanisms of (ideological) mediations 
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than to Adornian notions of artistic negation. The ‘mnemonic’, as a resist-
ance to forgetfulness, also builds upon this aspiration to challenge the 
totalizing and alienating forces of spectacular culture.
3. Counter-spectacular Memory
Buchloh’s prioritization of the ‘mnemonic’ appears in many ways to be a 
more complex and more extensive conceptualization of his early ‘function-
alist’ model. The meaning and signif icance he attaches to art’s ‘mnemonic 
dimension’ are theorized in a comprehensive essay on James Coleman’s 
‘archaeology of spectacle’, in which he describes Coleman’s general project 
as ‘reconstituting a historically specif ic body to the universalist abstraction 
of phenomenology’ (Buchloh, 2003d, p. 163). Coleman’s artistic practice 
seems to gradually complicate the sphere of reception as a discursive site for 
psychological, social, institutional, and historical mediation. His work sets 
up a dialogue with the modernist dogma of the visual by means of including 
theatrical components such as narrative, performance, and rhetoric. Yet, 
Coleman challenges both (post-) Minimalist and Conceptualist strategies on 
the same ground. Even though Minimalism and Conceptualism refuted the 
formalist optical doctrine, they merely expanded the Modernist positivistic 
paradigm. To put it in a somewhat simplif ied formulation: If Minimalism 
added a body to the disembodied eye, then Conceptualism completed the 
subject by adding language, or the ‘brain’. Yet these were still presented as 
‘pure’ entities. They might have challenged their different aesthetic posi-
tions reciprocally, but none of them took seriously into account the idea 
that optical perception, phenomenological experience, and conceptual 
or linguistic understanding are all perpetually influenced and construed 
by a psychological, socio-political, and historical context. That is, by the 
bias of the spectator; the direct material context, and its mechanisms 
of mediation; and, most importantly, by the overarching specif ic socio-
historical conditions. By presenting either one of these perceptual modes 
as pure, Minimal and Conceptual art actually concealed the ‘social truth’ 
underneath. Buchloh advocates that consciousness of the conditions of 
perception, as socio-historically specific and concrete, is the only possibility 
to counter the totalizing claims of spectacle. ‘[I]t is only in the extreme 
emphasis on the particularity of historical experience’, Buchloh declares, 
‘that the last vestige or the f irst index of unalienated subjectivity is to 
be found’ (Buchloh, 2003d, pp. 163–164). In this line of thought, Buchloh 
introduces the ‘mnemonic’ as a counter-spectacular artistic strategy and 
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a necessary dimension for art to maintain—if possible at all—its social 
function (or in his earlier words, its use value potential).
Coleman’s work Box (ahareturnabout), for example, shows a found f ilm 
loop of a boxing match, interrupted by f lashes of black f ilm leader and 
accompanied by the sound of a monologue from the artist (Figure 6.3). 
Buchloh introduces the work as follows:
One could understand Box (ahareturnabout) […] as an announcement of a 
radical reversal of the paradigmatic features governing post-Minimal and 
post-Conceptual artistic production in the mid-1970s. As Coleman’s f ilm 
loop follows mimetically an exchange of punches in rapidly alternating 
sequences of blackouts and image-sound flashes, it literalizes the opti-
cal beat that has been brilliantly described by Rosalind Krauss as the 
moment of departure from disembodied Modernist opticality toward a 
phenomenological inscription, toward the grounding of visual experience 
in the range of the optical unconsciousness and its bodily foundations. Yet 
to the same degree that Box reiterates the experience of the perceptual 
pulse in the spectator, pushing it almost literally across the threshold 
Figure 6.3. James Coleman, Box (ahareturnabout), 1977. 16mm black & white film with synchro-
nized audio narration, continuous projection. Courtesy of the artist and marian Goodman Gallery, 
Paris.
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of physical discomfort, this pulse alternates with an iconic sign of two 
f ighters exchanging actual punches. Not only does this correspondence 
generate an effect of the doubling of the semiotic as the physical (bor-
dering on a pun), but it also situates the image of bodily performance 
within a very specif ic historical event and within the confrontation of 
two historically identif iable protagonists. (Buchloh, 2003d, pp. 161-162)
As we can discern in Buchloh’s description, Coleman literally introduces 
the body of the boxers into the visual f ield. The alternating black f ilm 
reveals the interplay between consciousness and unconsciousness and the 
interdependence of the psychic with the physical (referencing the idea of 
literally being knocked unconscious) while at the same time it disrupts the 
spectator’s otherwise uninterrupted (more absorbing) vision. Furthermore, 
as Buchloh explains, the work ‘literalizes the optical beat’; it almost ironi-
cally transfers the visual punches, through the arousal of an empathic bodily 
reaction at the sight of such violence, onto the spectator’s body. The text 
fragments introduce language as another level in the creation of meaning. 
Their performative recital endows the work with a certain theatricality, 
yet the content of the monologue seems unrelated to the boxing match 
and as such prevents the work to be purely theatrical or disclose a narra-
tive—lingering in between the visual, the phenomenological, the theatrical, 
and the linguistic. Yet what is most significant in Buchloh’s description is his 
last statement that the work shows two ‘actual f ighters exchanging actual 
punches’ and as such ‘situates the image of bodily performance within a very 
specif ic historical event and within the confrontation of two historically 
identif iable protagonists’. Herein lies the key to Coleman’s reconstitution of 
‘a historically specif ic body’. Buchloh then further complicates Coleman’s 
work in a meticulous analysis of the role of national identity and cultural 
mediation in such formations. The boxing match is on the one hand an 
emblem of spectacular mass entertainment. But on the other hand, Cole-
man—himself of Irish decent—chooses to show the Irish f ighter Gene 
Tunney in a battle to defend his national championship, which complicates 
the general and universalizing ‘spectacle’ with a specif ic national identity, 
which is by itself mediated and fetishized by the logic of spectacle: ‘con-
stituted by means of a cultural construct’ (Buchloh, 2003d, p. 163). This 
dialectic reveals the contradictory mechanisms between spectacularization 
and identity formation, between the spectacle’s universalizing homogeneity, 
its false unity, and its construction of specif ic (images of) identity. It is, 
however, only in hindsight possible to productively reveal the specif ics 
of (national) identity, Buchloh argues. If not, the work would itself have a 
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regressive and nationalistic sway and be a part of the culture industry’s 
mechanism of (suppressive) identity formation (Buchloh, 2003d, p. 163). Yet 
if, in retrospect, we can understand the socio-historical and cultural con-
structiveness of these spectacular subjective identities, we might also begin 
to realize that our current situation is similarly constructed. ‘Spectacular 
domination’s f irst priority was to eradicate historical knowledge in general’, 
Debord wrote in his Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (Debord, 2011, 
p. 13). In this world without memory, the spectacle’s power ‘already seems 
familiar, as if it had always been there’ (p. 16). Buchloh’s emphasis on the 
mnemonic dimension of art holds on to the possibility of dismantling this 
naturalized presentation of spectacle. ‘The effort to retain or to reconstruct 
the capacity to remember, to think historically, is one of the few acts that 
can oppose the almost totalitarian implementation of the universal laws of 
consumption’ (Buchloh in Bois et al., 2004b, p. 677). Nonetheless, Buchloh 
emphasizes once again that the potentiality of artistic practice to create a 
site for the examination of subject formation and historical consciousness 
inexorably puts it in the same arena as the spectacle:
The necessary cultural production of sites of subject articulation and 
structures of memory conflicts with the simultaneous, inevitably ideo-
logical enforcement of a mythical identity; and the same schism exists 
between cultural production as the most complex form of spectaculari-
zation and cultural practices as the last resistances against the global 
homogenization generated by the spectacle. (Buchloh, 2003d, p. 165)
Furthermore, memory itself is highly susceptible to spectacularization, 
recuperated and transformed into a further mystifying ‘memory industry’ 
(Buchloh in Bois et al., 2004b, p. 677). In the manner of Debord (post-May 
1968), Buchloh’s oeuvre is not exactly a sanguine charade of utopian prom-
ises and revolutionary hope. As his statement above also shows, Buchloh’s 
project perpetually appears to denounce all remaining possibilities for 
social agency and radical artistic practice, sweeping art altogether under the 
eradicating curtain of the culture industry. However, even in one of his most 
dismal texts, entitled ‘Critical Reflections’—which is predominantly f illed 
with dire announcements of ‘catastrophic assimilation’, the ‘annulment 
of social and political utopian thinking’, ‘universal fetishization’, and the 
effacement of ‘the last residual differences between spectacle and the sphere 
of cultural production’, he holds on to a conception of art’s mnemonic func-
tion as a last vestige for potential resistance against the all-encompassing 
conditions of the integrated spectacle (Buchloh, 1997). Consequently, in the 
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manner of his other major influence, Adorno, Buchloh seems to spark hope 
in the abyss of utter despair. ‘Where everything is bad’, Adorno quotes F.H. 
Bradley from Minima Moralia, ‘it must be good to know the worst’ (quoted 
in Adorno, 2005, p. 83).
This dictum might be idiosyncratic for the theoretical and aesthetic 
developments of the October discourse as a whole. Even though the 
other October writers seem slightly less pessimistic than Buchloh, their 
art criticism is, too, inherently characterized by the growing apprehen-
sion of a social narrative of alienation through mass consumption and 
passive spectatorship. Art might still play a critical role by revealing the 
constructed nature of this narrative, and as such it could evoke a latent 
potential for political and social self-determination. But even Foster, who 
presents himself as the more optimistic of the bunch, leaves us only with 
a pale glimpse of optimism when suggesting little more for art than the 
possibility of ‘living on’. ‘I wonder if […] we might substitute “art” where 
[Adorno] writes “philosophy”,’ Foster writes. In other words, having missed 
its ‘moment of realization’, is art merely left to ‘live-on’? (Foster, 2003b, 
p. 129; Day, 2010, p. 199). Nonetheless, in line with the overall dynamic 
of October’s project, Foster also still insists on the potential of politico-
aesthetic resistance and transformation to ‘live on’. Even in their most 
gloomy accounts of a society doomed to stupidity and of art fully integrated 
into the culture industry, the October writers, all sustain the possibil-
ity of resistance, of disruption, and of struggle, even if it is solely in the 
proclamation that all is lost. ‘Couldn’t we say that such a current amnesia 
is in great part what motivated us to write this book?’ Bois asks in ‘The 
Predicament of Contemporary Art’, the concluding roundtable in Art Since 
1900 (Buchloh in Bois et al., 2004b, p. 679). It is this suspended position 
between an emancipatory promise—echoed in the title of the October 
journal and the writers’ perpetual attempts to revitalize art’s critical func-
tion—however ghostly and distant it may be, and a despairing cultural 
diagnosis of society as an all-encompassing and inescapable ‘integrated’ 
spectacle, that characterizes the journal’s tone. Thus, even in the most 
determinate goodbyes there remains an attempt to instigate new forms 
of critical practice. As Buchloh writes:
When a class nears its terminal point in history, Marx once mused, it 
tends to mistake its own end for the end of the world. When art critics 
reach the end of their historical line, they tend to mistake the failure 
of their prognostic identif ications or lack of comprehension of present 
practices for the end of art. (Buchloh, 1997, n.p.)
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7. Spectacle and Politics : Is There a 
Political Reality in the Spectacle of 
Society?
Kati Röttger
In the terms established by Guy Debord, the theory of the spectacle is a 
critique of late capitalist society that diagnoses a form of depoliticization 
through isolation and a shift into mere role-playing as well as through the 
rule of totalizing image-based semblance. Drawing on the Latin notion of 
the spectaculum (theatre), the notion of the spectacle constructs an opposi-
tion between politics and theatre, in which a politico-ethical rejection of 
theatre as emblematic of the aesthetic is made explicit.1 It is important to 
note here that this rejection relies on the common understanding of theatre 
as an art of representation and an aesthetics of make-believe that is based 
on the separation between the action on stage and the beholding audience. 
This theatre in general is perceived as bad thing—it is ‘the stage of illusion 
that forbids action’ (Rancière, 2007, p. 272). Debord’s critical theory can 
therefore be placed in the lineage of a history of philosophical critique of 
aestheticization and animosity to this kind of theatre that stretches back 
as far as Plato, who made a distinction between imitating and engendering 
(hervorbringende) art. At the same time, the political potential of theatre is 
denounced indirectly, as Juliane Rebentisch showed in her book Die Kunst 
der Freiheit (2012, p. 272). As soon as the political community is staged and 
‘breaks into spectacle and audience’ (Rebentisch, 2012, p. 18), she argues, 
politics is conceived as theatre that undermines the social binding of a 
collective where participation and aff iliation def ine social and political 
practices. While the metaphor of theatre is used here to describe the 
alienation of politics, theatre itself is suspected of having a depoliticizing 
effect. In this line of argumentation politics and aesthetics are contrasted 
so that—to say it bluntly—politics is understood as a form of theatre that 
implies the existence of a spectator rather than being understood as an 
intercommunity of action. This latter form of politics goes along with a 
connotation of aesthetics that appreciates collaborative and participatory 
forms of action that constitutes a community as a performing body.
This approach to aesthetics is connected with the notion of play, be it chore-
ography (Plato), popular festivities (Rousseau), or—in the case of Debord—the 
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construction of situations: ‘interventions of plays of another kind’ (Debord, 
1995, p. 40) like détournement and dérive to resist the spectacular usurpation.2 
In a Marxist tradition Debord conceives the overcoming of the spectacle (and 
theatre) by the elimination of art through the realization of art to end up in 
the sublation (Aufhebung) of art. In terms of the theatrical spectacle that 
means the overcoming of the (visibility of the) stage that isolates the spectator.
By contrast, Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy have pointed out 
that the political is realized precisely by the respective establishment of 
a particular stage, a visible space, within which something akin to collec-
tive political practice f irst becomes possible. Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that 
‘there is no society without the spectacle because society is the spectacle of 
itself’ (Nancy, 2000, p. 67). This means that the spectacle connoted to the 
visible realm of the stage is perceived as a pre-condition—a space—of a 
co-appearing without which there would be no society. Claiming the neces-
sity of the spectacle for the communitarian being, he puts his f inger on the 
paradox innate in the concept of the spectacle. The spectacle construed as 
venue or play determines a society and is at the same time identical to it. In 
this regard, the paradox Nancy formulates can be considered both confirma-
tion and criticism of Debord’s concept of the spectacle.3 To gain a greater 
insight into the special relationship between politics and the spectacle we 
must therefore ask from the viewpoint of theatre studies what kind of stage 
or theatre is intended with the particular spectacle that in the one instance 
prevents politics and in the other enables it. This question becomes all the 
more complex if one remembers that in the history of philosophy theatre is 
closely bound up with a definition of the (ideal) conditions for democracy or 
other forms of peaceful coexistence. For example, Plato’s animosity towards 
democracy derives from his mistrust of a ‘colourful diversity of forms of life’ 
and of the ‘dazzling democrats who have learned from playwrights that you 
can take more than one role in life’. If we follow Rebentisch:
[T]he logic of semblance is, so he diagnoses, nothing other than the es-
sence of democracy itself: the ethical orientation to the good is replaced 
by an aesthetic emphasis on existences, and the good (i.e., aligned to the 
good) government is replaced by the rule-less spectacle of seducing the 
people—and thus it is only a small, dangerously unobtrusive step from 
democracy to tyranny. (Rebentisch, 2012, p. 14)
This idea hinges on the defence of the virtue of the people’s self-identity 
(demos), which assumes that fraudulent images and actors must be banished 
from the state. The related suppression of the people as a visible entity in 
SPeC TaCle and PoliTiCS 135
favour of an immersive community in which all simply have assigned places 
relies on an anti-theatrical stance. This is the result not only of a concern 
about deception and fraudulent behaviour; this is also a condemnation of the 
separation—the aesthetic distance—a stage creates between spectators and 
actors. For each spectator is then respectively not in his/her place but in that 
of the other, as their attention focuses not on their own or communal action. 
Instead, they are seduced and distracted from the real issues. In Rebentisch’s 
view, this theatre-critical stance influences the political theories of thinkers 
as different as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, 
and even Guy Debord. Even if, for Rousseau (and unlike Plato), democracy 
is not identical with theatricality but opposed to it, all the above theorists of 
democracy are of the shared opinion that ‘the theatricalization of the politi-
cal threatens the life of democracy’. Indeed, ‘they agree with the hypothesis 
that the true essence of democracy is realized in a communality of action 
that overcomes the separation of the political space into hypocritical actors 
and an audience’ (Rebentisch, 2012, p. 272). Without a doubt, this proposition 
applies to a basic theme in Debord’s critical theory of the spectacle. Follow-
ing Marx and Rousseau, Debord bemoans the separation of individuals that 
the spectacle triggers. Yet in the actual historical context of the mass-media 
consumer society in which Debord penned his 221 hypotheses, the spectacle 
has already become the totality, at least in the sense of what he called the 
integrated spectacle, because the spectacular ‘has never before put its mark 
to such a degree on almost the full range of socially produced behaviour 
and objects’ (Debord, 1998, p. 9).
Debord elevated the spectacle in the literal sense to a perspective: a point 
of view—or, as he wrote, to a ‘weltanschauung that has been actualized, 
translated into the material realm’; meaning ‘in its totality, […] both the 
outcome and goal of the dominant mode of production’ (Debord, 1994, 
p. 13). In doing so, he directly linked the mass production of commodities 
to a culture industry of technologically reproduced images, which, under 
the banner of consumption, characterize the conditions of modern society 
since commodification creates, to quote The Communist Manifesto, ‘a world 
after its own image’ (Marx and Engels, 2008, p. 38), whereas this image veils 
the social relations by which it is produced.
Debord insists that the spectacle must not be understood as a product 
of the mass image technologies, but that it is rather identical with the jus-
tif ication of the system it represents. It thereby constitutes a totality and 
emerges as the purpose of modern consumer society. The world-in-image, 
having thus become detached, is characterized by separation: individuals 
are separated from life and from one another. This is because the ‘social 
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relationship between people that is mediated by images’ (Debord, 1995, p. 12) 
leads to separation and to the isolation of individuals. In the f inal instance, 
this isolation results in the complete loss of all sense of time, as time is 
now experienced solely as powerlessness, as frozen time, or a standstill. If 
nothing else, Debord’s diagnosis of modern society can be traced back to 
television’s spread as a mass medium at the time he was writing. Technology, 
and especially television, made it possible to almost constantly supply an 
audience with images and had a decisive part in reinforcing ‘the isolation 
of the “lonely crowd”’ (Debord, 1995, p. 22). It thereby confirmed the general 
process of reif ication, which, according to Lukács, separated the producers 
from each other and from their capacity to create their own life forms.
Debord’s notion of the spectacle thus combines a Marxist critique of the 
effects of commodif ication on social relations, of mass-media information 
technologies, and of techniques of individuation to offer a critique of a sys-
tem of domination, a totality driving the lives of the people into dependency, 
alienation, and deception. Against this backdrop, the spectacle emerged as a 
powerful analytical model for diagnosing the ‘maladies’ of modernism and 
the crisis of the subject in the twentieth century (see Crary, 1999).
1. Spectacle and Post-democracy
In the historical epoch since 1989, which with the collapse of communism in 
the so-called Eastern Bloc countries comes under the sign of the worldwide 
dissemination and digital networking of economies and societies with a 
market focus, not to mention with contemporary mass media’s compulsive 
obsession with the spectacle of war and ‘terror’, the spectacle has become 
greatly relevant again. This is not just the product of Debord’s own view, 
who in 1992 in his preface to the third French edition of his book noted with 
regret that the spectacle continued to be topical:
The striving of the spectacle towards modernization and unif ication, to-
gether with all the other tendencies towards the simplif ication of society, 
was what in 1989 led the Russian bureaucracy suddenly, and as one man, 
to convert to the current ideology of democracy—in other words, to the 
dictatorial freedom of the Market, as tempered by the recognition of the 
rights of Homo Spectator. (Debord, 1995, p. 9)
More recent social theories, which def ine the current form of societal 
organization as post-Fordist (Amin, 1994), post-democratic (Crouch, 2004; 
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Rancière, 1999), or in terms of the concept of ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 
2000), show that the primacy of entrepreneurialism extends ever further 
into private, public, and individual domains of life under the conditions 
of agglomerating capitalism (see Nancy, 2003). ‘The highest function of 
this power’, so Hardt and Negri suggest drawing on Foucault’s notion of 
biopower, ‘is to invest life through and through, and its primary task is to 
administer life’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 24). Social life (the family, health, 
family planning, education) becomes the main component of commodity 
production. Under these conditions, communication, affects, and ethical 
values (solidarity, interest, care) are as determined by profit, competition, 
eff iciency, and a market mind-set as they are by knowledge and cognitive 
abilities. With the alliance of digital media technology and capital, the flow 
of capital becomes global, literally the de-materialization of wealth, and 
establishes it qua cyber-capitalism beyond tangible wealth.
This ‘new spirit of capitalism’, as Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) have 
shown, differs from the spirit of capitalism in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
ideology-related transformations took place through a major re-organization 
in dominant value systems. On the basis of a detailed analysis of manage-
ment manuals from the 1960s to the 1990s, they describe the conditions 
under which this new spirit of capitalism arose, and the impact it has had. 
While in Debord’s day an ethical system of norms that took its cue from 
the idea of a virtuous, self-identical coexistence formed the basis for the 
critique of capitalism, the new capitalism stands out for its inherent ability 
to co-opt the anti-capitalist critique in order to perfect its own functioning. 
The anti-capitalist ideals of an alternative, collectively self-determined life 
current in the 1960s are integrated into the language of new management: 
creativity, empathy, and sharing become the primary characteristics of 
the entrepreneurial individual (Florida, 2002; Röttger, 2015). With Debord, 
one could say that the spectacle has been improving in the fusion of the 
integrated spectacle since 1989. ‘It was only because this fusion had already 
occurred worldwide on the economic and political plans that the world could 
be declared officially unified’ (Debord, 1994, pp. 8–9). As a result, the alliance 
of technological power and economic logic is successively replacing a politics 
that tends to a convergence of knowledge, ethics, and good coexistence. For 
collective and individual action now only arises in the self-referential image of 
a self-consuming spectacle—the latter’s social logic entails transforming the 
social into a matter of supply and demand in the cabinets of mirrors created 
by the digital media. Since politics withdraws from social responsibility, each 
ordinary citizen who is part of this cycle necessarily becomes a prototype 
of the spectacular merchant, who sells the simulacra of this logic in order to 
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participate in the social. Since the individual’s interest necessarily hinges on 
the free development of market forces, the state’s task is primarily to remove 
any obstacles to such a development. Could it be that in this historical situa-
tion we are therefore witnessing how the democratic concept of the people 
(peuple) is being transformed into a concept of audience (publique) that 
‘pays with its life’ in order to participate in demos and democracy, as Bernard 
Stiegler (2006, p. 18) suggests? Are we now ensnared more than ever in the 
spectacle, confronted with a pure simulation, a theatre of democracy with 
a post-demos democracy, and therefore with the ‘disappearance of politics’ 
(Rancière, 2002 p. 110)? Many agree with this hypothesis. For example, Crouch 
explicitly aff irms that politics in post-democratic societies is reduced to a 
theatre of democracy, to fake negotiations in the mode of the spectacle:
Under this model, while elections certainly exist and can change govern-
ments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed 
by rival teams of expert in techniques of persuasion, and considering a 
small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of citizens play 
a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to signals 
given them. Behind the spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really 
shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites 
that overwhelmingly represent business interests. (Crouch, 2004, p. 4).
2. The Dilemma of the Spectacle
Despite this renaissance in the theory of the spectacle, I believe that the 
critique implicit to it can only to a limited degree explain what the conse-
quences are for the public sphere and the political community if the value 
system of the market appropriates the language of art in order to invade, 
to an ever greater extent, interpersonal relations. This is also true of the 
question as to what impact we can discern with respect to the social function 
of art and theatre if the democratic culture of liberty has economic/aesthetic 
foundations rather than ethical/political ones. For if the spectacle in the 
lineage of Rousseau and other positions inimical to theatre can categorically 
be assigned to aesthetic opposition to an ethically-informed politics, then 
this occurs (as in Crouch’s thought) by reverting to a metaphorical and 
ahistorical concept of theatre aligned to the theatre of illusion, the theatre 
of representation. In this context, theatricality is associated with pejorative 
qualities such as deception, artif iciality, exaggeration, fraudulence, and 
semblance and with the practices of role-plays, hamming, superf iciality, 
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masquerade, and pretence.4 Rebentisch’s attempt to counter the objections 
in the history of philosophy to an aestheticization of politics itself suffers 
from being restricted to such a concept of theatre and theatricality. If she 
suggests that aesthetic distance must be considered a key condition for a 
functioning democracy in the sense of an art of liberty (as a key individual 
aesthetic understanding of the world) and cites as evidence the f igures of 
irony and role-play, then she, too, has in mind an ahistorical concept of 
theatre that relies on a predefined script and actors who as persuasively as 
possible embody an aesthetics of the as-if. This concept of theatre is f irmly in 
the Enlightenment philosophical tradition of eighteenth-century aesthetics, 
which posited the good, the beautiful, and the true as the very condition 
of successful subjectivization, by distinguishing between semblance and 
essence. However, in this way it has little means to counter the problem of 
the unconditional critique of the aesthetic semblance of politics. It succeeds 
in placing the aesthetic distance that theatre can create on centre stage, 
and with theatre then advocates freedom towards oneself and a demo-
cratic society that is not indebted to the ideal of an inherently consensual 
community (which it claims latently entails the danger of authoritarian 
communitization). Yet by remaining shackled to the same metaphorically/
illusionistically defined concept of theatre and to the authors that criticize it, 
the dilemma of the spectacle persists. The f igures of the aesthetic that it can 
bring to bear for the art of freedom in a ‘good’ democracy, namely role-play 
and irony, are admittedly geared on the basis of the requisite distance to 
‘providing an understanding of the ethical/political structural conditions 
of freedom per se’ (Rebentisch, 2012, p. 22) and therefore not to mask the 
problem of sovereign power, but expose it. However, this thought still re-
mains rooted in an idea of representation in which the identity of action and 
speech constitutes a sovereign self. This likewise applies to the distanced 
change of positions that Rebentisch proposes qua irony and role-play. To this 
extent, the construct remains entrenched in the contrast between theatre 
as the art of semblance that accepts this identity and politics as the art of 
reality in which speech and action constitutes society. As a result, it has no 
conceptual means for opposing a post-democratic form of rulership that 
transforms the ethical/political concept of political freedom by degrading 
it to the status of an economic/aesthetic one, inverting the right of the 
individual to freedom into a compulsory obligation to practice freedom. For 
if the primacy of entrepreneurial action takes the place of social action and 
if aesthetic qualities such as creativity and improvisation enter the capitalist 
system of reproduction as new productive forces, then aesthetic critique that 
could oppose the current trend towards depoliticization is soon exhausted.
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3. Spectacle as the Condition of Politics
So what happens if theatre is construed as the condition for the political the 
way Nancy and Rancière propose, and what categorical choices then need 
to be made for this experiment? First, the concept of theatre needs to be 
rethought in such a way that the theory of the spectacle is also placed in a 
different light.5 The diff iculties that confront such a rethinking given the 
long and powerful Western tradition of the distribution of roles between 
theatre, politics, and philosophy can be best described with the following 
passage from the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy:
A major sign of the diff iculty we have regarding the spectacle is indicated 
by the paradigmatic character that the Athenian theater has for us. 
There is certainly nothing accidental in the fact that our modern way 
of grounding the so-called Western tradition involves a triple reference: 
to philosophy as the shared existence of logos, to politics as the opening 
to the city, and to the theater as the place of the symbolic-imaginary 
appropriation of collective existence. The Athenian theatre […] appears to 
us as the ‘one’ presentation of being-together, yet as a presentation where 
the condition for its possibility is the irreducible and institutive distance 
[…] of representation. Moreover, this distance defines the theater, insofar 
as it is neither political nor philosophical at the same time—and neither 
of these in a specif ic way. The Athenian theater appears to us as the 
conjunction of logos and mimesis, but when we see it in this way, we 
systematically efface the moment of mimesis in favor of the moment of 
logos. (Nancy, 2000, p. 71).
It should be clear from the above that the attempt to think theatre not as 
separate from but as the precondition for the political faces the problem of 
how to overcome that speculative division between theatre and politics/
philosophy that defines Western thought per se. The core problem here is the 
concept of mimesis that is limited in meaning to imitation. This notion of 
mimesis was rejected by Plato, Rousseau, and Debord, among others. What 
gets overlooked is that mimesis is a praxis of poeisis, as Lacoue-Labarthe 
has shown, a mode of producing appearance in the form of representation 
that he summarizes with the label the ‘paradox of mimesis’ (see Lacoue-
Labarthe, 1989, pp. 248–266).6 In this way, he construes mimesis in a manner 
close to the concept of techné that Heidegger directly related to the art of the 
Greek tragedy: ‘The Greeks call […] art techné in the emphatic sense, because 
it brings in the most immediate way Being to stand, in the work’ (Heidegger, 
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2000, p. 176). As art work, theatre puts Being to work. Consequently, Being 
becomes conf irmed and accessible as Being. This interpretation of the 
stage as an event space that enables something to appear drives Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s proposal that the political be linked to the condition of staged 
co-appearance: ‘Anterior to all thought—and in fact, the very condition of 
thinking [logos]—the “thought” of “us” is not a representational thought 
(not an idea, a notion, a concept). It is instead, a praxis and an ethos: the 
staging of co-appearance, the staging which is the co-appearance—but the 
stage must be reinvented; we must reinvent it each time, each time making 
our entrance anew’ (Nancy, 2000, p. 71). Viewed in this way, the spectacle 
reminds us that ‘there is no society without the spectacle of society’ (p. 67), 
but also warns what the obverse can be, the ‘bad spectacle’, where ‘the social 
being imagines the exteriority of interests and appetites, of egoistic passions 
and the false glory of ostentation’ (p. 68). By being unwilling to address 
the ‘good spectacle’ Debord possibly snared himself in the totalitarian 
image he himself created of the spectacle that offers no opening for what, 
according to Rancière, constitutes the political and the democratic, namely 
dissensus (mésentente). One could argue that the Situationist practice of 
détournement, the misappropriation of prefabricated aesthetic elements, 
aims to deconstruct the bad spectacle for the purpose that ‘set free by 
détournement, commodif ied meanings reveal a totality of possible social 
and discursive relations which exceeds the spectacle’s constraints’ (Plant, 
1992, p. 87). But this practice, operating in the public sphere and tending 
to strategies of undercover action, denies any idea of a stage where people 
emerge—a stage that Rancière similar to Nancy identif ies as a condition 
for politics:
Lastly, there is democracy if there is a dispute conducted by a nonidentical 
subject on the stage where the people emerge. It is the institution of politics 
itself, the system of forms of subjectif ication through which any order of 
distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their ‘nature’ [i.e., 
gender, race, class, etc.] and places corresponding to their functions is 
undermined, thrown back on its contingency. (Rancière, 1999, pp. 100–101)
Like Rebentisch, Rancière also contends that democracy and politics do 
not rest on the identif ication of people and form of government. However, 
Rancière presumes a fundamentally different concept of aesthetics, and by 
extension a different concept of stage and theatre. Unlike Rebentisch, who 
retains the aesthetics of semblance and the metaphorical stage of represen-
tation, Rancière champions an aesthetics of materialization of that which 
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can be perceived by the senses, that focuses on the logic of distribution, the 
distribution of the sensible (Rancière, 2006) that then unfolds on the stage 
of appearance. For him, the stage as the place where the people appears is 
the precondition for democracy. The distribution of the sensible, meaning 
the distribution of bodies, voices, and places, including the distribution 
between speech and action that occurs at this venue of the stage, posited as 
heterogeneous, logically no longer takes its cue from the model of role-play 
(which is always preceded by an ethic of the unity of speech and action, 
as advocated by Rebentisch), but from the break with that ethic. Rancière 
describes this rupture as ‘the gap experienced between the capability of 
the speaking being and any ‘ethical’ harmony of doing, being, and saying’ 
(Rancière, 1999, p. 101). Democracy is def ined by the interruption of this 
harmony. Post-democracy, by contrast, introduces total consensus, ‘the 
success of democracy, in our societies, would then consist in its hitting on 
a coincidence between its political form and its tangible being’ (Rancière, 
1999, p. 98). It is precisely this, Rancière suggests, that the theorists of the 
spectacle and simulation overlook, namely that suppressing the appearance 
of the people on the stage of democracy leads to a suppression of politics. 
What counts is not self-identity in a stage-free space, but disagreement over 
distribution under the condition of visibility:
The crucial point is that the logic of simulation does not so much oppose 
the real and realist faith as appearance and its powers. […] The identif ica-
tion of the real with its reproduction and simulation is the ‘dismissal of the 
case’ for the heterogeneity of appearance, and with it, the dismissal of the 
case for the political constitution of nonidentical subjects that upsets the 
homogeneity of the perceptible by showing separate worlds together, by 
organizing worlds of litigious community. The ‘loss of the real’ is in fact 
a loss of appearance (Rancière, 1999, p. 104, emphasis added).
4. In Praise of Theatre
What does this inversion of the spectacle mean for the possibility of a 
political theatre in the age of empire and post-democracy? Below I wish 
to propose that this inversion be construed in terms of peripeteia. In other 
words, I wish to explore the question as to the extent to which peripeteia 
can be construed as the condition for a (new) poetics of art in the theatrical 
space of the spectacle. I focus here on a new artistic practice in regular 
evidence of late, namely so-called urban interventions that take place in the 
SPeC TaCle and PoliTiCS 143
network of global urban spaces. Theatre makers are increasingly abandon-
ing the stages traditionally assigned to theatre and experimenting with 
urban spaces and other stages with an appearance of openness.7
It is well-known in theatre studies that peripeteia is a term from dramatic 
theory f irst def ined by Aristotle in his Poetics—where it is used to signify 
a turnaround or reversal, the moment in a plot marking a sudden change 
towards fortune or misfortune. Aristotle writes that peripeteia is a change 
by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to the rule 
of probability or necessity. Thus, peripeteia describes a particular moment 
in a temporal sequence of actions that constitutes a break in the continu-
ity. With this reversal the plan of action, the causality, that which is to be 
achieved, is inverted. Here, the irrevocability of what has been done and 
the unpredictability of actions coincide in the immeasurability of an event 
happening to someone.8 And it is precisely this moment of sudden change 
itself which captures several states of being at the same time: both doing 
and being-done-to, intentionality and responsivity.
This also means that the moment of reversal into action in the opposite 
direction reveals the limits to intentional action. With this reversal, time 
itself is turned around. It condenses and builds up: a time of the now, which 
strips the past of its logic, leaves the future open. This moment of peripeteia 
can therefore be understood as an open situation, as a space of opening. 
Qua poetological condition for the urban invention, the peripeteia should 
therefore be construed as that moment through which this ‘labour of art’ 
creates a public space in this reversal and opening, a space that lodges itself 
in the space-time of globalization. How is this to be understood?
In order to take this thought further, it is f irst necessary to relate the 
theatrical terms of the scenario or the stage in relation to the concepts 
of space or public space. The objective is to open up possible stages of the 
political that have been expanded by a connotation associated with the 
English term ‘stage’, meaning at the same time both a section or phase, as 
well as a pedestal, framework, or support structure. In this sense I would like 
stages to be understood preliminarily (I would like to note at this point that 
scaffolding is always needed for construction sites) as aesthetic space-time 
bound to the public sphere (and in this, it is always also political and ethical) 
that establishes the possibility for action and, conversely, urban interven-
tions as possible actions that intervene in the space-time of globalization.
If the stage is understood in the broadest sense as a dynamic, spatio-
temporal configuration of appearance and in the narrow sense of providing 
something to view (and listen to), in which the simultaneous presence of 
actors and spectators is envisaged, then we see interesting analogies with 
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Michel de Certeau’s def inition of spaces and places here (Certeau, 2006). 
Starting from the diagnosis of the postmodern decay of the city as a concept, 
he addresses the question of our ways of treating space, ways which in 
turn inform the conditions of our social life: His approach leads back to 
those strategies of the construction of situations that Guy Debord and 
the Situationist International linked to the recoding of the public space, 
especially the practice of dérive. Dérive (literally ‘drift’ or ‘drifting’) means 
to take an unplanned journey through a (typically urban) landscape, during 
which the stroller forgets everything and is absorbed into the attractions 
and encounters of the experience. In his ‘Theory of the Dérive’ (1958, 
pp. 58–63), Debord defines it as a ‘technique of rapid passage through varied 
ambiences. Dérive involve playful-constructive behaviour and awareness of 
psychogeographical effects, and are quite different from the classic notion 
of journey and stroll’.9 Organized by the principle of chance, it is meant 
to surpass the capitalist separation between passive leisure and enforced 
labour and offer the possibility of the free construction of daily life.10 The 
space for this playful behaviour is clearly def ined: at maximum it is the 
metropolis, and at minimum it is a small city block. So, while Debord was 
certainly at the forefront of what today is called ‘urban interventions’, in 
relation to the special theory of Certeau a tiny but important difference 
must be pointed out. What Certeau is concerned with are the practices 
taking place in a realm of experience arising from an ‘uncanny familiarity 
with the city’ in order to establish a new ‘relationship to the world’ (Certeau, 
1985, p. 129). Essentially, place and space differ from each other in degree of 
abstraction or concretization. While place is determined by a predefined 
present constellation of f ixed points, space is ‘posited as an act of presence 
(or a time)’, as a ‘result of activities that give it a direction, that temporalize 
it’ (Certeau, 1985, p. 345). Space is thereby a place with which one does 
something. With Certeau, the relationship between space and place takes 
on a theatrical dimension. While Debord exclusively stresses the action of 
drifting as a liberating embodied movement in a quite literal sense, Certeau 
is pointing to the constitution of places and spaces both in a material as 
well as in a metaphorical sense of stage. This is because this relationship is 
established through precisely that configuration of seeing (spectators) and 
acting (actors), which brings together eye and movement in ‘space-forming 
actions’ that refer to what they produce—namely, an imagination of places 
(Certeau, 2006, p. 349) in images. If this constitutive act by theatre has been 
tied to the drama (from Aristotle to Modernist theatre in the West) and if it 
thereby is also tied to the action of the actor, which resides in speech, then 
this emphasis changes under conditions of a stage of appearance.11 These 
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space-building actions, which point to what they produce, are in general no 
longer tied to language. Instead they are tied to the formation of space that 
stems from the configuration of the ‘genuine’ urban activity of movement 
(potential spectators’ acts of walking) and in the spatial transformation 
achieved by the actors pointing to that which they produce, namely, a space 
within space. In other words: the stage of appearance creates an event in 
which the urban space of the global city is temporarily (in the sense of 
this happening in a transitory movement) transformed into public space. 
Would it then be justif iable to claim, with Hannah Arendt, that in this case 
inter-venire produces inter-esse (Arendt, 1998, p. 182)?
According to Hannah Arendt, the precondition for public life is the hu-
man condition of plurality, that, as she says, ‘men not Man’ (Arendt, 1998, 
p. 7) inhabit the earth. Only in plurality can that which constitutes public 
life—activity between humans (inter-venire) and appearance amongst 
humans (inter-esse)—occur, because it is only in this plurality that all share 
something in common, namely their human being. Only those who can be 
seen and heard can be perceived by the commonality, meaning the general 
public. At the same time, this is what our sense of reality depends on. ‘The 
presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us 
of the reality of the world and ourselves’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 50). Our sense 
of reality ‘depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the exist-
ence of a public realm’. In other words, action—as opposed to ‘labour’ and 
‘work’—as the only dimension of the vita activa that brokers the coexistence 
of people and ‘constitutes […] the public part of the world common to us all’ 
(p. 198) serves to preserve the political commonality (p. 188). Action as such, 
then, creates the preconditions for history, memory, and the continuity of 
the body politic, but also the possibility of a ‘new beginning’ as within the 
idea of peripeteia as an ‘opening to the future’, particularly in relation to 
speech and art—the ideal form of which is the theatre (Arendt, 1998, p. 15). 
Thus, action is more than just consumption—action is to the political as 
consumption is to the social. Since the beginning of the modern era at the 
latest, this def inition of public space, based on the Greek polis, has been 
marked by its difference from private or intimate space. It is what we share 
in common as ‘world’ and in this it is different from the place ‘we call our 
private property’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 58). The special power of public life and its 
quality as a world that gathers people together is lost, according to Arendt, 
in mass society, because people are neither separated nor connected but 
are rather forced together as though held together by a band of iron.
This points to a problem—the aliasing of separateness and con-
nectedness—the severity of which f irst emerges under the conditions 
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of post-democracy: At the point at which language and production are 
coincidental with the political and economic in a consensual democracy, the 
private and public realms relate to each other like a Moebius strip, with each 
side constantly merging with the other. This is even more pronounced when 
politics, generally ascribed to the state, is increasingly defined through the 
technical administration of life, when active life is increasingly becom-
ing a question of biotechnology, meaning the (market-driven) feasibility 
or manufacture of life, and service systems are increasingly networked 
through communication media that do not allow for a distinction between 
work and leisure.12
As stated, Jacques Rancière advocates a distribution of the sensible in 
order to subsume community, and public realm under a definition of politics 
that no longer requires a community of inter-esse, but which instead calls for 
the inter as the in-between in human existence in the sense of an interrup-
tion or interval (Rancière, 2002, p. 146). What he means is a division of the 
logic of identity in order to posit the lost division of the spheres of the private 
and the public in a different, sensible logic of segmentation. By contrast, 
Jean-Luc Nancy urges us towards a more consistent thinking of a together 
or cum of cooperation: the together as mediator between singularities and 
being-plural creating the world that Hannah Arendt deems lost:
Co-appearance, then, must signify—because this is what is now at 
stake—that ‘appearing’ (coming into the world and being in the world, 
or existence as such) is strictly inseparable, indiscernible from the cum 
or the with, which is not only its place and its taking place, but also—and 
this is the same thing—its fundamental ontological structure. (Nancy, 
2000, p. 61)
This with occurs in simultaneity and co-presence. In appearing together 
it produces its own stage, because if the ‘being-together is the sharing of a 
simultaneous space-time, then it implies a presentation of this space-time 
as such’ (Nancy, 2000, p. 105). On this stage, every single individual has the 
consistency of the public. It is not ‘stage-like in the sense of an artif icial 
space of mimetic representation. It is stage-like in the sense of being a seg-
ment and of opening up a space-time of the dissemination of singularities’ 
(Nancy, 2000, p. 106). In this sense, Nancy sees social coexistence as a stage 
that presents itself through its ‘scenographical practice’: experience and 
ethos in one. Seen thus, we can conclude that in the age of post-democracy, 
political theatre consists of a juxtaposing a politics of the ‘good spectacle’ 
against a democracy of the ‘bad spectacle’.
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8. Reification, Sexual Objectification, 
and Feminist Activism
Willow Verkerk
Georg Lukács introduced the notion of reif ication in 1922 as the process 
by which living beings, relationships, and all subjective qualities come to 
acquire the characteristic of a thing. In contemporary feminist terms Rosi 
Braidotti (2013, p. 61) writes that ‘the opportunistic political economy of 
biogenetic capitalism turns Life/zoe—that is to say human and non-human 
intelligent matter—into a commodity for trade and profit’. In today’s late 
capitalism, not only our labour, but also each one of our nameable attributes 
can be placed for sale on the market. Donna Haraway (1991, pp. 161–162) 
states that we are changing from an industrial society ruled by white 
capitalistic patriarchy into an ‘informatics of domination’. The control 
of information is in high demand, as is the ability to market, modify, and 
consume every living and non-living thing.
The potential of late capitalism to commodify all and any potentialities 
is one that Lukács foresaw when he stated that commodity fetishism is the 
problem of the modern age of capitalism (Lukács, 1971, p. 84). His reflections 
on reification are foundational and vital for understanding how the political 
economy functions. In particular, I am interested in how capitalism normal-
izes the objectif ication of human subjects and interpersonal relationships 
and reduces human attributes to potential market value. ‘What is of central 
importance here is that […] man’s own activity, his own labour becomes 
something objective and independent of him, something that controls him 
by virtue of an autonomy alien to man’ (Lukács, 1971, pp. 86–87).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between 
reif ication and sexual objectif ication in order to illuminate the effects 
that late capitalism has on women, and the potential for feminist activ-
ism within it. Although we may dream of a post-gender world, we are not 
there (yet) and late capitalism views women as having a privileged set of 
marketable attributes that are primarily connected to their reproductive 
functions. Sexual objectif ication acts to shape women as both consumers 
with buying power and as consumable objects. The hegemonic order is still 
racist, classist, and sexist, although it is f inding new and creative pathways 
in which to discriminate.
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In order to understand the challenges for women living in a posthuman 
age, social, technological, and biopolitical mediums of exploitation that 
are supported by capitalism, but also exceed it, must be considered. In 
the following paragraphs I will examine the concepts of reif ication and 
sexual objectif ication and ask what spaces are available for women seeking 
agency within late capitalism. This examination will be pursued in three 
steps: in the f irst section I will explicate Lukács’s notion of reif ication and 
question its relevance in light of societal changes. In the second section I will 
provide an account of objectif ication by engaging with Catharine MacKin-
non, Elisabeth Anderson, and Martha Nussbaum in order to examine how 
women are shaped by male dominance. In the third section, I will explain 
what performative agency and cyborg feminism involve and consider the 
prospects for feminist activism in late capitalism with the assistance of 
Judith Butler, Haraway, and Braidotti.
1. Lukács and Reification
Lukács states that under capitalism one’s
qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, 
they are things he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ like the various objects of the 
external world. And there is no natural form in which human relations 
can be cast, no way in which man can bring his physical and psychic 
‘qualities’ into play without their being subjected increasingly to this 
reifying process. (Lukács, 1971, p. 100)
For Lukács, commodity fetishism, and the practices associated with it, 
shift our perceptions and penetrate deeply into human life. The question 
that Lukács asks, namely how far commodity exchange and its structural 
consequences are able ‘to influence the total outer and inner life of society’ 
(Lukács, 1971, p. 84), is one that will be pursed in this chapter. In capitalism, 
the human way of being in the world is fundamentality reconstructed at a 
social-ontological level to cohere with the production of value.
A contested point in the literature about Lukács’s notion of reif ication is 
whether his critique is (and should be) a moral or a social-ontological one.1 
For example, there is concern with Axel Honneth’s claim that Lukács’s 
notion of reif ication is to be read as inauthentic life-praxis instead of a 
moral error. In order to imply that reif ication has harmful consequences, 
the presumption is that one must rest this concern on a particular moral 
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framework, as is done in the works of contemporary authors such as Nuss-
baum and Anderson who turn to Kantian arguments.
My contention is that it is precisely the social-ontological reading of 
reification that is important for cyborg performativity and feminist activism 
in late capitalism. Reading Lukács’s notion of reif ication as social ontology 
instead of moral critique is salutary because it makes a truth claim instead 
of a merely polemical one.2 It allows for a plurality of ethical motivations 
for problematizing reif ication and Lukács’s ideas to be workshopped for 
contemporary ethical and political critiques. Yet this reading is limited by 
Honneth’s notion there is a more ‘natural’ state to return to or remember 
that is somehow liberated from commodif ication. As such, the following 
questions must be asked: Is Lukács making an implicit normative claim that 
we should attempt to return to that ‘better’ place? If reif ication occurs as a 
pathological form of life-praxis rather than a moral error, what opportuni-
ties are there for agency and transformation to occur within reif ication that 
will not perpetuate self-alienation?
In ‘Reif ication and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ Lukács explains 
commodif ication: ‘a relation between people takes on the character of a 
thing and thus acquires a “phantom objectivity”, an autonomy that seems so 
strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamen-
tal nature: the relation between people’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 83). Reif ication in 
this respect affects intersubjective relations because it changes the way that 
people conceive of what they have to offer and receive from others. A process 
of ‘rationalization’ objectif ies human attributes so that they are turned into 
things without human qualities. The consequence is that a mechanized 
life-praxis eclipses the world of emotions and empathetic values. Reification 
involves the social-ontological normalization of a hegemonic order in which 
production and profit are the highest values.
Lukács’s description of reif ication rests upon an account of the self-
alienation of the worker and progressive rationalization. Rationalization 
involves a quantitative approach to work in which productivity is measured 
through mathematical formulas and workers are encouraged to limit their 
unique characteristics to achieve neutral functionality. As a result, indi-
vidual attributes are conceived as ‘mere sources of error’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 89). 
The worker is encouraged to conform to the systematization of work life and 
to perceive his labour as something that is independent of him. Through the 
process of rationalization, the worker learns to separate his physical and 
psychological selves and creates a wedge between the work process and 
the work results. The disconnection between work life and the needs and 
abilities of the worker has an adverse effect on self-consciousness: issues 
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are approached from a standardized, formal, and inhuman attitude and 
workers subsume their ethics to production. The object of labour becomes 
a carefully calculated result of a specialized system of operation instead 
of one crafted by people who perceive their labour to have a specif ic use 
value. A world of objects or commodities is created and their activities are 
governed by the laws of capitalism (Lukács, 1971, p. 87).
Lukács states that rational mechanization extends beyond the worker 
and begins to transform all of society when the ‘free worker’ ‘is freely able to 
take his labour-power to market and offer it for sale as a commodity “belong-
ing” to him, a thing that he “possesses”’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 91). This is indeed 
the predicament of late capitalism. The problem is that objectif ication of 
one’s labour power and individual attributes result in self-alienation. When 
the commodity becomes the universal unit of measurement in society, one’s 
consciousness is subjugated to it and develops a ‘second nature’ (p. 86). 
The mode of being under advanced capitalism and reif ication is one of 
self-alienation for Lukács because the individual has become estranged 
from those characteristics that formerly shaped him as a human being—his 
personal signif icance is bound up in his value as a commodity. Although 
reif ication is the ‘immediate reality of every person living in capitalist 
society’ (p. 197), Lukács states that the classes experience this process much 
differently: whereas the bourgeoisie feel affirmed by self-alienation because 
it is a familiar product of their culture that they benefit from, the proletariat 
are devastated by it and face their ‘own impotence’ (p. 149)3 through its most 
dehumanizing features.
The process by which one is transformed from a world of human feelings 
and relationships into one in which labour power, human activities, and 
attributes are perceived as mere things to be bought and sold under capital-
ism is explained by Honneth as being a ‘distorted consciousness’ (Honneth, 
2008, p. 25) that occurs through habituation and an amnesia or forgetting of 
precognitive recognition. Although this is an inaccurate reading of Lukács, 
it points to a pressing question. Namely, if under advanced capitalism, a 
second nature has become the new way of life, to which direction do we 
seek change? Are we to move to some formerly pure, f irst state, before ‘the 
fall’? Also, how do we come to have an awareness of this second nature; or 
how do we penetrate the web of self-alienation?
Lukács states that once the commodity has become universalized and 
reif ication becomes more pervasive, people do have the opportunity to 
pursue an understanding of this new structure or ‘to rebel against its disas-
trous effects and liberate themselves from servitude to this second nature 
so created’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 86). For Lukács, the pressure to conform to the 
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laws of commodif ication is inescapable, but one can obtain knowledge 
of them, and learn to use them for one’s advantage.4 However, using the 
known laws for personal advantage does not mean that one can individually 
change them, or how one is subjugated under them through reif ication. 
One of the problems that Lukács is concerned about is that capitalism has 
no moral compass: because reif ication is disconnected from its sources of 
labour and is driven by production each new transformation is embraced.5 
The worker ‘has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not’ (p. 89). In 
Lukács’s account, reif ication is an inflexible process that cannot be modi-
fied through the individual agent who embodies its effects (this differs from 
contemporary accounts of agency, such as Butler and Haraway). It is only as 
a collective member of a class, specif ically the proletariat, that commodity 
fetishism can be overturned.
Lukács believes that the proletariat has the unique ability to see inside 
the political economy because of its subjection to it: since the proletariat 
experience the most serious dehumanization from capitalism, it will be 
the class to desire change and have the insight to make it happen (Lukács, 
1971, p.  149). They differ from the bourgeoisie who feel themselves to 
benef it from it and thus do not question it (p. 156). Self-alienation is an 
inevitable predicament in capitalism, but it is more likely to be inf iltrated 
by those who experience its greatest harms. Lukács critiques ‘bourgeois 
thought’ for having an impenetrable facticity that takes its economic and 
cultural norms as timeless and objective (p. 157). However, he also states 
that bourgeois culture is the point of departure from which proletariat 
self-consciousness must begin (p. 163).
Lukács, contrary to what Honneth claims, is not making an implicit 
normative claim that we should attempt to return to a ‘better’ place or 
some f irst nature. Lukács states that ‘proletarian thought does not require 
a tabula rasa, a new start to the task of comprehending reality and one 
without any preconceptions’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 163). In fact, Lukács thinks that 
it is precisely the relationship of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie within 
capitalism that gives rise to its own ‘standpoint’, or class consciousness and 
the desire to overcome self-alienation. The path of the proletariat towards 
socialism is, as Andrew Feenberg states, ‘a reorganization of the society 
around a dialectical mediation of the capitalist inheritance’ (Feenberg, 2011, 
p. 110). For Lukács, activism occurs through the collective understanding of 
the current predicament; change cannot move backwards to a former state 
but only forwards through negotiation and re-appropriation. As we will 
see, this is precisely the approach that Haraway suggests cyborg feminists 
should take.
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Still, Lukács’s account of reif ication has its limitations, as he admits 
in his ‘Preface to the New Edition’ (1967). Lukács attempts ‘to explain all 
ideological phenomena by reference to their basis in economics’ (Lukács, 
1971, p. xvii). His concern with the petrifying qualities of bourgeois thought 
and the potential of the proletariat class to uniquely overcome it fails to 
consider how ideological indoctrination from other sources of power has 
resulted in exploitation and objectif ication of entire groups of people, such 
as women and minority groups.6 He gives what Fredric Jameson calls an 
‘epistemological priority’ to the working class (Jameson, 2009, p. 214).
Feminist activism requires an understanding of reif ication under late 
capitalism that allows for transformation to occur and an individual agency 
that is not solely dependent upon class consciousness. Haraway claims that, 
‘most Marxisms see domination best’ (Haraway, 1991, p. 172) but are not able 
to recognize changes that have and do occur under capitalism. For women, 
in particular, the nostalgia that Honneth portrays connected to going back 
to a more ‘natural’ or so-called ‘human’ time prior to capitalism seems 
ironic since oppression against women has become less severe over time 
(and under a capitalist society). Butler correctly argues that the structures 
of capitalism are not immune from social influences or the speech acts of 
individuals (Butler, 2010, pp. 148–149). Social-ontological indoctrination is 
pervasive through both economic and social structures that import norma-
tive equations into the minds of the populace, but this does not stifle the 
abilities of individuals to f ind performative agency within these systems.
Contemporary feminists such as Haraway, Butler, and Braidotti look for 
the opportunities to achieve change within an order that is dehumanizing 
but malleable. However, all three of these thinkers write with an aim to 
transcend the gender binary and are not specif ically interested in how late 
capitalism affects women. In order to understand the particular set of chal-
lenges that women have, it is necessary to look to another group of feminist 
authors who analyse the consequences of female sexual objectif ication as 
a life-praxis.
2. Sexual Objectification and Reification: Feminist Problems
Lukács’s critique of capitalism explains how women, as do men, experi-
ence its dehumanizing effects; yet women are further constrained by the 
ideological structures of male domination that exploit female sexuality in 
order to remain in power. Catharine MacKinnon writes, ‘Sexuality is to 
feminism what work is to Marxism: that which is most one’s own, yet most 
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taken away’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 515). The challenges that women have 
differ from men because they are connected to and gravitate around the 
commodif ication of female sexuality. Although signif icant changes have 
occurred since MacKinnon wrote in 1982, late capitalism, which seeks to 
exploit the most marketable human characteristics, retains patriarchal 
interests in objectifying female sexuality and reproductive labour. In ad-
dition, the aesthetics of desirability supported through an increasingly 
medicalized cosmetic industry that generates vast amounts of capital rests 
on the assumption that female value is connected to being sexually at-
tractive to men. The predominance of sexual inequality between men and 
women means that women have different opportunities for agency under 
capitalism and require a feminist understanding of reif ication that includes 
its sexually objectifying trajectories.
MacKinnon states that similar to workers who are def ined as a class 
through their work being used for the benefit of others, women are defined 
as a sex through their sexuality being used for the benefit of others, namely 
men (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 516). Women are dominated through the objec-
tif ication of their sexuality, yet, ironically, they f ind a sense of personal 
signif icance through this experience. Sexual objectif ication naturalizes a 
‘truth’ that the role of women is to be or become sexually desirable for men. 
‘Objectif ication makes sexuality a material reality of women’s lives, not just 
a psychological, attitudinal, or ideological one’ (p. 539). Sexual objectif ica-
tion involves the social-ontological normalization of a patriarchal influence 
in which female desirability becomes the highest good for women. Like 
workers who function under a distorted life-praxis, women perceive their 
sexual attributes as constitutive of who they are and are alienated from 
a sense of being that values their other characteristics. This is a form of 
reif ication. At the same time, female sexual desirability is perceived as a 
way in which to access greater freedom: it is a bartering tool, a commodity 
accessible through products that women buy, or a quality that a woman 
has within her person to be sold on the market.7
Under a capitalistic political economy, work that involves the use of 
female sexuality and reproductive functions is likely to be most vulnerable 
to its reifying and exploitative tendencies (and a strong location for political 
change). Similar to Honneth’s reading of Lukács, Anderson argues that 
imposing market values onto female labour connected to sexuality and 
reproductive function assigns a price to that labour that detracts from 
its human value: these women are then assigned a worth that does not 
reflect their ‘real’ value. She claims that they are made into things, valued 
for their use instead of being respected and having the human dignity 
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that is accorded to them (Anderson, 1993, pp. 8–10). Anderson turns to a 
Kantian argument for the justif ication of the moral problems of use when 
she states that ‘use is a lower, impersonal, and exclusive mode of valuation. 
It is contrasted with higher modes of valuation, such as respect. To merely 
use something is to subordinate it to one’s own ends, without regard for its 
intrinsic value’ (p. 144).8
Anderson argues against the legalization of sex work. She claims that 
when one makes sex for sale, it detracts from the ‘human good of sexual 
acts’ and its status as a gift to be shared through mutual recognition, at-
traction, and offering (Anderson, 1993, p. 154). The sex worker’s autonomy is 
threatened because she ‘subjects herself to his commands’ (p. 156) and this 
devalues her as a property to be used without consideration for her ‘personal 
needs’ (p. 154). In other words, the sex worker’s sexuality is appropriated by 
the customer without thought of her humanity. Anderson claims that sex 
work threatens the dignity of all women through condoning disrespectful 
behaviour to women. For these reasons Anderson believes that the state is 
justif ied to prohibit sex work (p. 156).
There are a few striking problems with Anderson’s arguments against sex 
work. Like Honneth’s misreading of Lukács, she assumes that there is a more 
‘natural’ place to return to and this imports a ‘pure’ status to women who 
are not sex workers (as if sex work is a fall from a better place). She presumes 
that the ‘gift’ of sex is equally shared between men and women without 
consideration that the coercive factors active in sex work, facilitated by male 
domination, are also part of marriage and other legal sexual relationships. 
Anderson does not adequately consider that the problems with sex work 
are based on deeper institutional and social problems connected to sexual 
inequality. The dehumanizing roles that are prevalent in sexual relationships 
of all kinds between men and women (and same-sex relationships), and are 
exacerbated in sex work, are structured by patriarchal and puritanical values 
that must be considered in addition to the problems of capitalism. As the 
writings of feminists who are sex workers can attest, consensual contractual 
negotiations are part of sex worker relationships, but the legal prohibition 
of sex work and puritanical attitudes can inhibit the consensual quality of 
them. Disrespectful attitudes to sex workers are often a result of shameful 
attitudes towards sexuality and anger at women who are perceived to be 
controlling their sexuality on their own terms (see Queen, 1997, pp. 125–135).
I turn to sex work as an example because Anderson’s analysis exemplifies 
what is problematic about approaching a feminist problem related to sexual 
objectification from an institutional and theoretical framework that does not 
connect with or consider the women who are living within its effects. Whereas 
ReiFiCaTion, Sexual obJeC TiFiCaTion, and FeminiST aC TiViSm 157
Anderson thinks that problems must be tackled externally through changing 
the institutional order, other feminists realize that activism happens from 
within and without and involves consciousness raising (MacKinnon, 1982, 
p. 520). Like Lukács’s claims about the proletariat, I think that those who 
experience the most harmful consequences of the political economy that 
they live in (in this case sex workers within a patriarchal capitalistic world 
that promotes sexual objectif ication) have the most knowledge of it from 
which to generate change. Although female sexual objectif ication occurs 
through subjugation, this does not prevent women from achieving agency 
that extends beyond a false consciousness and allows for joy and change to 
occur. In the case of sex workers, paternalistic regulations are ineff icient: 
concern for them means listening to their experiences and providing them 
with the support necessary to make their work safe and empowering and 
providing an exit strategy for those who want out. What is also important 
to consider is how politically aware women working in sex work have the 
power to change stigmatizing attitudes towards female sexuality.9
There is a spectrum of female sexual objectif ication that f inds its most 
explicit representations in the sex industry. What I am attempting to get 
at with the rather diff icult example of sex work is that even when female 
sexual objectif ication appears to have taken over the lifeworld of an 
individual, this does not foreclose the opportunity for agency, nor does 
it necessarily result in the woman being denied her humanity. There are 
both harmful and liberating aspects of female sexual objectif ication and 
an accurate account of it must consider both. Although women are limited 
by sexual objectif ication because it shapes their values and aspirations 
towards becoming desirable under a male gaze, not all forms of objectif ica-
tion are harmful or wrong: it is important to consider the context because 
sometimes the experience of objectif ication is an enjoyable aspect of sexual 
life (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 251), a chosen form of income, or a location for 
political change. Nussbaum argues that although it is morally impermissible 
to instrumentalize another person, she qualif ies this statement, stating 
that if it occurs in a context that is aff irmative of one’s humanity it is ac-
ceptable (p. 289). From the perspective of a feminist sex worker, one which 
exceeds Nussbaum and the other authors mentioned above, recognizing the 
predominance of sexual objectif ication and learning how to perform that 
objectif ication with irony, self-empowerment, or a sex-positive approach 
that de-stigmatizes female sexuality can be a path towards greater agency 
for some women.10 In order to explain what performative agency looks like 
and how it repeats, mimics, and challenges the normative orders of late 
capitalism, I turn to Butler, Haraway, and Braidotti.
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3. Performative Agency and Posthuman Feminism
Haraway claims that feminists and Marxists err in their attempts to create 
a revolutionary subject from a perspective of hierarchical dualisms, moral 
superiority, nature, or innocence (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). Yet, Lukács’s ac-
count of the activist potential of the proletariat is closer to her notion of 
cyborg feminist than might be supposed. They share the notion that late 
capitalism must be the point of departure for those most dehumanized 
by it so that they can move forwards through experimentation and re-
appropriation. Haraway’s cyborg feminist rejects the notion of salvation and 
views herself as embedded in the world. The term ‘cyborg’ is an ironic one 
meant to explain subjects who are ‘the illegitimate offspring of militarism 
and patriarchal capitalism’ (Haraway, 1991, p. 151).
The pursuit of individual agency and progressive political action involve 
learning to employ the languages and methods of the hegemonic order, 
but with a satirical performance that upsets its foundations. ‘Posthuman 
feminists look for subversion not in counter-identity formations, but rather 
in pure dislocations of identities via the perversion of standardized patterns 
of sexualized, racialized, and naturalized interaction’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 99). 
In this section, I will explore what feminist activism might look like in late 
capitalism by way of Butler’s performative agency and Haraway’s cyborg 
feminism.
Butler’s analysis disputes Lukács’s notion that the individual cannot 
effect signif icant change from within the political economy. She argues 
that the market is open to being shaped by many different factors including 
social institutions and structures of meaning, individual speech acts, and 
technological networks (Butler, 2010, pp. 148–150). The social-ontological 
naturalization of particular ways of being in this world, as a woman or a 
worker, for example, are themselves effects of a performatively produced 
market, that is so continuous in its reiterations that it appears to allow for 
little variation (p. 149). However, performatives as reiterations inevitably 
involve failure since they are not exact copies (p. 153). The failing yet poly-
valent character of late capitalism ‘that actively produces differences for 
the sake of commodif ication’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 58) means that it is open to 
manipulation and change. Butler’s notion of performative agency suggests 
that women (and men) can f ind malleability within the hegemonic order 
that is sexist, racist, and homophobic to exert an agency that both recalls 
and transgresses its reifying practices. Butler states that ‘performativity 
seeks to counter a certain kind of positivism according to which we might 
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begin with already delimited understandings of what gender, the state, and 
the economy are’ (Butler, 2010, p. 147).
It is vital, however, not to forget that the reifying effects of late capital-
ism are prolif ic, and in many instances without a moral compass. It is 
a multiplier of deterritorialized differences, which are packaged and 
marketed under the labels of ‘new, dynamic and negotiable identities’ and 
an endless choice of consumer goods. This logic triggers a proliferation 
and a vampiric consumption of quantitative options (Braidotti, 2013, 
p. 58).
In other words, the current society will not only allow for performative 
agency and cyborg personalities to emerge, it will also learn how to com-
modify them. The question that re-emerges is whether what is experienced 
as empowerment is not merely another form of commodity fetishism that 
perpetuates self-alienation.
Haraway thinks that the world is shifting dramatically from an industrial 
and organic one into a polymorphous world dominated by the control of 
information; there is no going back, at an ideological or a material level 
(Haraway, 1991, pp. 161–162). Humans are increasingly systematized through 
statistics and forecast; they are no longer ‘sacred in themselves’ (p. 163). The 
capital today includes data storages of human information ranging from 
genetic to consumer tendencies, as Facebook can attest to,11 and profit is 
built upon owning what was previously considered to be private informa-
tion. Whereas Haraway considers the current political economy to be an 
informatics of domination, Braidotti calls it biogenetic capitalism because 
it ‘invests and profits from the scientif ic and economic control and the com-
modification of all that lives’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 59). It exploits the generative 
capacities of ‘women, animals, plans, genes, and cells’ (p. 95) and it is without 
limits as to what can be bought and sold. One of the challenges that activism 
currently faces is that there is not one source of domination from which to 
push against, as earlier feminists and Marxists believed, there are multiple 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 160). This means that activism cannot work in the same 
ways as previously supposed and must learn how to approach change from 
multiple perspectives even if they are incomplete and imperfect.
Haraway conceives of the cyborg as a new ‘self’, a model for activism of 
a social-feminist politics that looks to biotechnologies and communica-
tion technologies to redesign bodies and social relationships through the 
shaping of information (Haraway, 1991, p. 164). She states that the notion 
of the cyborg has transformative and political potential because modern 
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machines challenge the ubiquity and spirituality of the Father through 
their mobility, f luidity, and their omnipresence (p. 153). ‘Cyborg unities are 
monstrous and illegitimate; in our present political circumstances, we could 
hardly hope for more potent myths for resistance and recoupling’ (p. 154). 
The political potential of activism is not about ‘the fall’, the presumption 
that there was some prior wholeness or natural state, but instead it happens 
through ‘seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other’: 
such tools are the re-telling of stories to displace naturalized identities 
and hierarchical dualisms (p. 175). Haraway believes that technological 
culture helps to open up the hierarchies of formerly privileged dualisms 
because boundaries have become more fluid between the organic and the 
mechanical. Borders between the human and the animal, man and woman, 
the real and the virtual, and the ‘self-developing and externally designed’ 
(p. 152) are starting to overlap.
Haraway critiques the notion that women as a category can be mobilized, 
stating that there is no such thing as being def initely ‘female’. Instead of 
looking to some kind of ‘natural’ identif ication between people such as 
gender, class, or race, Haraway argues that we need coalitions, political 
kinships, and aff inities—otherwise ‘taxonomies of feminism produce epis-
temologies to police deviations from off icial women’s experience’ (p. 156), 
as was exemplif ied above during Anderson’s assessment of sex work. The 
problem with the positing of women as a political group is that it necessarily 
seeks to subsume the diverse experiences of women under one banner and 
in doing so fails to acknowledge the variant and irreducible interests of that 
broad category. It ends up assimilating the ‘polyvocal’ into one feminist 
voice without admitting to it.12 What Haraway points to is a signif icant 
problem with feminist discourse that continues: women associate with their 
class and cultural background more than they do with other women. For 
example, white feminists, socialist and liberal, have failed to consider the 
concerns of women of colour, transgender people, and sex workers, among 
others. Haraway thinks that feminists have erred (as Lukács also erred with 
his concentration solely on the bourgeoisie) ‘through searching for a single 
ground of domination to secure our revolutionary voice’ (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 160). In fact, the presumption that domination comes from one primary 
source is, again, another form of reif ication.
I agree with Haraway that supporting an essentialist theory of ‘woman’ 
disavows the polyvalent character of women’s voices, both individual and 
dissenting, to be heard (see Haraway, 1991, p. 160). What, however, can be 
achieved through asking how late capitalism affects women is not a move 
towards entrenching a limited conception of what a ‘woman’ is. Instead, it 
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helps us to understand how the confluence of the market commodification 
of human life and the sexually objectifying drive of male dominance shape 
those people that the state recognizes as female. Polarized forms of sexual 
difference are still active and strong. This is not to presume there is a common 
life-praxis that all women share or one female language that can be spoken. 
However, once we understand how ideological systems of meaning work to 
shape our consciousness as women, we can learn how to break down these 
influences and employ them for what Haraway calls new ‘fusions’ (Hara-
way, 1991, p. 173) or new performative options in late capitalism. Machines, 
animals, the gender roles and sexualities of all people, provide sources of 
innovation for feminist cyborgs. As Haraway states, the point now is not 
to f igure out what is false consciousness and what is a clear consciousness. 
Yet we must still ask how to reduce self-alienation in late capitalism with 
a combined interest in learning how the new ‘pleasures, experiences, and 
powers’ (p. 173) can be employed to shift the hegemonic order of things.
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9. Reified Life : Vitalism, 
Environmentalism, and Reification 
in Guy Debord’s The Society of the 
Spectacle and A Sick Planet
Joost de Bloois
 La défense immunitaire a fait son temps sur la terre.
– Guy Debord, Son art, son temps
‘Revolution makes the sunshine’, Guy Debord (2008, p. 94) writes in A Sick 
Planet (La Planète Malade). At f irst sight, the latter appears as a rather 
peripheral text in Debord’s oeuvre. Written in 1971, its dozen or so pages were 
intended to f igure in the thirteenth volume of The Situationist International 
that never saw the light of day, due to the dissolution of the SI shortly before 
its projected publication. A Sick Planet was published posthumously in 
2004. However, this short text constitutes a key moment in Debord’s oeuvre. 
A Sick Planet brings to the fore Debord’s thought as ‘environmentalism’ 
that is as constant as it is complex. That is to say, the crucial signif icance 
of A Sick Planet is not that it is, at f irst sight, literally, a reflection of the 
state of ‘the environment’. In it, Debord, in fact, dismisses the emerging 
‘green’ movement: its lamentations of ‘pollution’ are themselves part of a 
spectacle that does not hesitate to mesmerize us with images of its auto-
destruction, the ultimate tautology of the spectacle’s own disintegration. 
Rather, what emerges in A Sick Planet is the intricate entanglement of 
seemingly mutually exclusive discourses: on the one hand, a vitalism (or 
a vitalist materialism) and on the other, and less surprisingly, a historical 
materialism; with a third discourse spanning these two: that of anthropol-
ogy. I use the notions of ‘vitalism’ and ‘anthropology’ here in fairly broad 
strokes. Obviously, Debord’s thinking does not explicitly proceed from 
or engage with a (Francophone) vitalist tradition (that would span from 
Bergson to Canguilhem to Deleuze)—at least evidently not to the extent 
that his thinking is rooted in historical materialism. Nor does he engage 
extensively with contemporary anthropological theories (e.g. Levi-Strauss 
or Leroi-Gourhan). However, in this chapter I argue that Debord’s think-
ing—in particular in his conceptualization of ‘environmentalism’—does, 
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and signif icantly so, dovetail with f igures of thought that are at the heart 
of philosophical vitalism and modern anthropology (i.e. notions of ‘life’, 
‘becoming’, ‘transience’, plural humanity, to name but a few). It is in the 
light of such perhaps surprising parallels that I approach Debord’s work 
here. Debord’s analyses of the environmental catastrophe reveal the set 
of Borromean rings (the interlocking of vitalism-historical materialism-
anthropology) that is at the heart of his thinking and that is vital to its 
understanding, in particular that of the ‘later’ Debord of the 1970s–1990s 
(i.e. his very last televisual work, the 1994 ‘documentary’ Guy Debord, son 
art, son temps that is foremost a montage of news footage showing the 
devastation of the human eco-system and its psycho-pathological costs). 
In what follows, I will provide a chiasmic reading of Debord’s canonical The 
Society of the Spectacle and the lesser-known, but nonetheless crucial short 
essay A Sick Planet that shows the peculiar intersection of the vocabularies 
of vitalism, historical materialism (in particular the concept of reification), 
and anthropology in Debord’s work.
In this chapter, I will also tentatively trace the central narrative of 
Debord’s work: that of the history of modernity as the history of reification, 
which, for Debord, ultimately signif ies the reification of life itself. As we will 
see, this narrative runs as follows: the spectacle signif ies reif ication in its 
absolute form, the materialization of the world of commodity relations, or 
better still: commodity relations made world. The spectacle does not so 
much refer to the image as mediator between man and his world, but to 
the image-as-commodity turned into man’s very environment. Debord’s 
notion of reif ication dovetails with Lukács’s analyses in History and Class 
Consciousness (quotes from which serve as an exergue in The Society of the 
Spectacle). As Lukács argues, the dominant form of commodity exchange 
influences ‘the total outer and inner life of society’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 84, 
emphasis in the original); the extent to which commodity exchange de-
termines the totality of (social) life is not merely a quantitative matter: the 
reifying effect of the commodity form ‘permeat[es] every expression of life’ 
(p. 84). Foremost, the reif ication that results from commodity relations is a 
qualitative matter: it touches upon ‘the subjugation of men’s consciousness 
to the forms in which this reif ication f inds expression’ (p. 86).1 Commodity 
exchange thus becomes man’s ‘second nature’ (p. 86). As Lukács writes: 
‘reif ication requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in 
terms of commodity exchange’; reif ication implies that all ‘natural relations, 
which exhibit human relations’ are replaced with reif ied relations (p. 91). 
Reif ication comes at the price of generalized separation: of producer and 
means of production, of primary social relations, and, ultimately, of the 
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human subject and life itself. In Debord, this history of reif ication, the 
vocabulary of historical materialism, is grafted upon, and perhaps paradoxi-
cally so, anthropological and vitalistic thought. The history of reif ication is 
the history of life itself: ‘life’ is negatively revealed insofar as it falls prey to 
reif ication; yet, it is within this same history that life can be restored to its 
(a-historical) quintessence, as pure transience. The history of life itself—of 
bios—reveals itself as the history of man—of the anthropos—insofar as 
man, as the producer of (his own) irreversible temporality, reflects on life 
as pure transience: man is the consciousness of life as pure becoming. 
Debord thus makes a very complex (tripartite: vitalist, historical materialist, 
and anthropological) claim that, if taken seriously, forces us to rethink 
Debord’s work as a sustained and fundamental work of bio-politics: on the 
reif ication and subsequent politicization of bios. Such a reading of Debord 
allows us to shed a new light on the Situationist Debord (as it allows us to 
think of Situationism as a radical environmentalism positing the primacy 
of the environment over the subject, and as a bio-political project: of living 
versus dead time, of living environment).2 Moreover, it allows us to avoid 
reading the later Debord merely as a melancholy writer, deploring the 
passing of the enfants perdus of Parisian bohemia, the waning of historical 
knowledge, of poetry, of ‘good wine’—but as a radical environmentalist 
who proposes a wholly original holistic vitalism against the spectacle’s 
automated catastrophe.
Finally, as we will see throughout this chapter, such a reading also 
situates Debord in close proximity to the German-speaking proponents of 
Western Marxism. In particular, The Society of Spectacle echoes Adorno’s 
(posthumously published) The Idea of Natural History (Adorno, 1984). In it 
Adorno attempts to ‘dialectically overcome the usual antithesis of nature 
and history […] [by] pushing these concepts to a point where they are medi-
ated in their apparent difference’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 111). He does so by tracing 
such mediated differences in his contemporaries Lukács and Benjamin. In 
Lukács’s Theory of the Novel, according to Adorno, we f ind the notion of a 
‘second nature’. The second nature that environs modern man is a commodi-
f ied world—a world of things, world of convention—created by man, yet, 
as such, lost to him for its intrinsic meaninglessness (‘this world supplies 
neither a meaning for the subject in search of a goal nor sensuous immediacy 
as material for the acting subject’, Adorno paraphrases Lukács, p. 117). For 
Adorno, Lukács demonstrates a dialectics similar to his own undertak-
ing. The petrif ied life of Lukács’s ‘second nature’ is thoroughly historical; 
inversely, what appears as nature is nothing but petrif ied history (p. 118). It 
is Benjamin, who, according to Adorno in The Idea of Natural History, solves 
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the riddle of the chiasmic relation between history and nature: nature, 
in Adorno’s reading of Benjamin, ‘carries the mark of transience’ (p. 120, 
emphasis added). Because nature is transitory, ‘it includes the element of 
history’ (p. 120). The passage of time reveals itself to be the minimal unit 
of history: history itself is rooted in ‘the basic quality of the transience of 
the earthly’ (p. 121). Thus, ‘all being or everything existing is to be grasped 
as the interweaving of historical and natural being’ (p. 121). In Debord, we 
see how, in a sense, Adorno’s aborted project of reformulating the idea of 
natural history is picked up and completed: in The Society of the Spectacle 
and A Sick Planet, the spell of the young Lukács’s ‘second nature’ (history 
as the history of reif ication) can only be broken by means of recognizing 
the irreducible transience of life (of human life as transience), which, as 
the conditio sine qua non of history, is alone capable of negating history’s 
petrif ication under the capitalist mode of production.
1. Dialectical Vitalism: The Society of the Spectacle
In the opening section of The Society of the Spectacle, Debord writes that ‘any 
critique of the spectacle must expose it as a visible negation of life’ (Debord, 
1995, p. 14, emphasis added). In fact, Debord’s insistence throughout The 
Society of the Spectacle on the notion of ‘life’ is signif icant: the critique of 
the spectacle is a truly titanic task in that it faces the spectacle dubbed by 
Debord as ‘the autonomous movement of non-life’ (p. 12). At the heart of The 
Society of the Spectacle we find the ultimate antagonism life/death whereby 
the spectacle ‘in its generality is a concrete inversion of life’ (p. 12). For Debord, 
the spectacle thus signifies ‘the absolute denial of life’ (p. 18, emphasis added). 
As such, it is not so much a pseudo-theology—a purely contemplative askesis, 
a false idolatry or belated idealism—rather it is a fully materialized negation 
of life that is ‘no longer projected onto the heavens, but finds its place instead 
within material life itself’ (p. 18). The spectacle’s negation of life is not a form of 
transcendence of life, it is as concrete as it is absolute in that it introduces the 
negation of life within life itself. Debord is categorical: spectacle is not mere 
ideology, it is the materialization of ideology, Weltanschauung made flesh 
(p. 150). As the autonomous movement of non-life, the spectacle parasitizes, 
drains, and in the end completely phagocytizes material life. If, as we will see 
is the case for Debord, the spectacle signifies the reification of life, it can only 
do so if it simultaneously signifies nothing less than the negation of life itself.
How to read the notion of ‘life’ in Debord? Perhaps surprisingly, we f ind 
in Debord’s work a peculiar vitalism, an oxymoronic ‘dialectical vitalism’ 
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that aff irms life and historicizes it.3 On closer inspection, this vitalism 
consists of three main, apparently conflicting, components. Firstly, we 
might claim that, in The Society of the Spectacle, Debord remains faithful 
to the anthropological project of the young Marx: he poses the life of the 
human species as that of social being. Secondly, it is man’s sociality, as we 
will see, that makes him a historical being. Thirdly, by a dialectical reversal 
of fortune, it is this historicization of life that allows for a consciousness 
of ‘life’ as it occurs beyond the realm of human existence, and crucially 
for Debord, as enjoyment or consummation of life as such, that is to say: 
of the life of man as irreversibly transient, as becoming. It is at the lat-
ter point where Debord departs from Marx: he heralds a vitalism that is 
emphatically non-productivist. The Society of the Spectacle demonstrates 
the ontology behind the Situationist slogan Ne travaillez jamais: ultimately, 
the signif icance of the life of human beings does not reside in collective 
production, but in the seizing and subsequent enjoyment of ‘life’ as pure 
transience, as the pure passing of time. From A Sick Planet onwards, Debord 
will move more and more towards a holistic vitalism: once ‘life’ exceeds 
human life in Debord, it is seen by Debord as part of its living environment. 
That is to say, Debord does not so much abandon a dialectical or historicist 
perspective, but in fact demonstrates that the historical development of the 
spectacle, as the acme of the history of the capitalist mode of production, 
culminates in the antagonism life/death, vital transience/reif ication, and 
leaves no other formula for resistance than a holistic vitalism. The latter is 
reflected in Debord’s political project, outlined in The Society of the Spectacle 
and explicitly articulated in his later writings: the properly bio-political af-
f irmation of the consummation of life against the spectacle, which consists 
of environmental, anthropological, as well as epistemological positions. As 
we will see, in particular in The Society of the Spectacle, Debord emphasizes 
the concurrence between the spectacle, as the reif ication of life itself, and 
Western philosophical modernity. In that sense, Debord’s (later) work can 
be read as a vindication of the singular (and singularly f inite) life of the 
anthropos against the universalist abstractions of the humanitas4 (and a 
critique of reif ication as universalizing reif ied universality).
For Debord, the spectacle is an automaton: ‘the spectacle is simply the 
economic realm developing for itself ’, he concisely argues in The Society 
of the Spectacle (1995, p. 16). The spectacle is foremost the separation of the 
realm of power located in economic production from its living environ-
ment. At the root of the spectacle we f ind the specialization of power. The 
spectacle is fundamentally fetishistic: ‘thus the most modern aspect of 
the spectacle is also at bottom the most archaic’, Debord writes (p. 18). In 
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Debord we thus f ind at the same time a historical narrative (the spectacle 
as the dialectical development of reif ied power), as well as an anthropo-
logical narrative: the spectacle, in all of its stages, repeats a foundational 
moment of cleavage within the life of the society of man. This moment 
of ‘self-cleavage’ (p. 18) of the anthropos is a double-bind: it gives birth to 
modern, Vitruvian man (as universal subject) and heralds his inevitable 
extinction, since the condition for his coming into being ultimately is 
the reif ication of life itself. Debord here resonates with Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s narration of Odysseus’s estrangement from nature: ‘Odysseus, 
they write, like the heroes of all true novels after him, throws himself 
away, so to speak, on order to win himself’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 
p. 38). In Dialectic of Enlightenment, man, as personif ied by Odysseus, 
pays the ultimate price for his cunning triumph over nature, since it is 
only by denying himself as nature that Odysseus domesticates its powers. 
Odysseus thus ‘saves his life by making himself disappear’ (p. 47); after his 
neutralization of the Sirens, he re-emerges as Nobody: he has exchanged 
himself as living being for the mere token ‘man’. Therefore, Horkheimer 
and Adorno conclude:
With the denial of nature in human beings, not only the telos of one’s own 
life becomes confused and opaque. At the moment when human beings 
cut themselves off from the consciousness of themselves as nature, all 
the purposes for which they keep themselves alive—social progress, the 
heightening of material and intellectual forces, indeed, consciousness 
itself—become void and the enthronement of the means as the end. 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p. 42)
Horkheimer and Adorno point to a fundamental moment of cleavage be-
tween man and nature, or better still: between man and man-as-nature. 
The price Odysseus has to pay is, in a sense, death by reif ication.
Throughout his work, Debord scrutinizes (historical) opportunities 
to restore this (self-)cleavage, to restore the anthropos as that being that 
mirrors life itself through his enjoyment of it. In this sense, for Debord, 
the spectacle is inseparable from the rise of the modern state and modern 
philosophy’s complicity with it, in its attempts at universalizing the Western 
humanitas. The Hobbesian moment is the spectacle’s foundational mo-
ment: it is precisely in Hobbes that ‘life’ in the state of nature is famously 
def ined as the absence of society, of industry, of knowledge; ‘and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 84).⁠ Debord 
performs a détournement of Hobbes’ anthropological narrative: the state is 
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edif ied against life, the state is the automatization of non-life against man 
and his living environment. Debord argues:
The spectacle is self-generated, and it makes up its own rules: it is a spe-
cious form of the sacred. And it makes no secret of what it is, namely, 
hierarchical power evolving on its own, in its separateness, thanks to an 
increasing productivity based on an ever more ref ined division of labor, 
an ever greater communication of machine-governed gestures, and an 
ever-widening market. (Debord, 1995, p. 20)
The complicity of Western philosophy with the unbridled development of 
state power, for Debord, lies in the fact that modern philosophy provides 
the epistemological matrix for the profoundly tautological character of state 
power. The spectacle is nothing but the state, insofar as the state culminates 
and consolidates the capitalist mode of production, presenting the spectacle 
of its own power. The state offers nothing but the spectacle of reif ication: 
reif ication of power, reif ication through the production of commodities, 
reif ication of social relations, reif ication of life itself. By privileging vision, 
modern thought posits the subject as a contemplative subject (Debord, 1995, 
p. 17). At the same time, post-Cartesian philosophy offers the epistemologi-
cal matrix for the reif ication of the lifeworld and a naturalization of the 
separateness of state power. The isolation of Vitruvian man from his living 
environment is co-extensive with his unconditional acceptance of state 
power. The universal subject of Western modernity, the humanitas, thus 
universalizes the reif ication of and by state power.
2. Time’s Crooked Arrow
The anthropological narrative in The Society of the Spectacle is doubled 
with the historical narrative of the reif ication of the life of the anthropos. 
Debord’s peculiar ‘dialectical vitalism’ consists of the minute analysis of 
the stages of an ever-tightening [dialectics of the] reif ication of life. That is 
to say, Debord scrutinizes the latter’s self-contradicting logic: in The Society 
of the Spectacle he appears to be on the outlook for those moments where 
the history of reif ication, as the history of the negation of life, f inds itself, 
in turn, negated. It is in those moments (the sumptuous banquets of the 
Renaissance, the proliferation of leisure time of the post-war years) that he 
identif ies potential modes for the resurgence of a vitalism that is potentially 
revolutionary. At the basis of the reif ication of life, according to Debord, we 
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f ind what he calls ‘the temporalization of man’. Again, he starts from the 
triad anthropology-dialectics-vitalism: the ‘temporalization of man’ refers 
to the socio-cultural history of man doubled as ‘natural history’ (Debord, 
1995, p. 92). It is the anthropological a priori of the socialization of man that 
turns him into a temporal being. It is as a social being that man becomes 
endowed with a consciousness of time, that is to say, for Debord, a conscious-
ness of life as transience. Social life, for Debord, originally is organized 
according to distinct temporalities: cyclical, eschatological, etc. It is thus 
social life that installs the collective consciousness of time’s passing as the 
proper mode of being of man. In this sense, the history of man, the history 
of the anthropos as a social being, is always already ‘natural history’: bios 
reflecting (upon) itself. ‘Time’s natural basis, the sensory data of its passage, 
becomes human and social in so much as it exists for human beings’, Debord 
writes (p. 116). In The Society of the Spectacle Debord underlines the dialectics 
of this ‘natural history’. Time bifurcates, on the one hand, into history 
as the history of reif ication; on the other hand, into the understanding, 
and foremost consummation of life as irreversible transience, as the pure 
becoming of temporality. As such, the latter resists reif ication by becoming 
a plurality of times.
Debord’s dialectical vitalism reveals itself to be profoundly bio-political 
in that what might joyously await us at its outcome is a ‘communism’ that 
is understood as the ‘withering away of the social measurement of time, 
socially necessary labour time, in favour of an individual and collective 
irreversible time which is playful in character and which encompasses, 
simultaneously within it, a variety of autonomous yet effectively federated 
times’ (p. 116). For Debord communism heralds the end of reification: insofar 
as communism heralds the end of the history of reif ication, it discards 
the (falsely) universalizing aspirations of reif ication. In doing so, com-
munism restores the anthropos to the immediate enjoyment of bios for 
each according to his own. That is to say: under communism, the immediate 
enjoyment of life takes the form of a necessarily plural becoming. The 
history of political modernity can thus be read as ‘the tireless pursuit of a 
monopoly of historical life’, f irst by the absolute-monarchist and later the 
bourgeois state (p. 103). For Debord, the narrative of political modernity is 
the monopolization of irreversible time, of the conversion of transience into 
history understood as the history of state and reif ication.
Once more, the peculiar logic of Debord’s dialectical vitalism demon-
strates that the struggle over the ‘ownership of history’ (p. 96) is a tortu-
ous one. It is within the history of reif ication that we encounter epochs 
within which the cleavage between anthropos and bios is restored, albeit 
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momentarily. The pivotal example of such an epoch, for Debord, is the 
Italian Renaissance ‘in the exuberant life of the Italian cities, in the arts of 
the festival, life came to recognize itself as the enjoyment of the passing of time. 
But this enjoyment of transience would turn out to be transient itself’ (p. 103, 
emphasis added). Over and again time’s crooked arrow turns against life 
itself. The very movement that temporarily re-unites bios and anthropos in 
the Renaissance festival, at the conjunction of a power formation that is not 
quite the state and a mercantilism that is not quite capitalism, that is to say: 
the movement of reif ication itself, f inally paves the way for the emerging 
bourgeoisie. ‘The victory of the bourgeoisie was the victory of a profoundly 
historical time’, Debord argues (p. 104). The decisive dialectical ruse of the 
bourgeoisie consists of the reification of irreversible time, of the reif ication of 
the time of life itself via the production of commodities. ‘The irreversible time 
of production is f irst and foremost the measure of commodities’, Debord 
claims (p. 107). According to Debord, this appropriation of life’s def ining 
temporality is twofold. On the one hand, the production of commodities 
signif ies the rationalization of the production process, the breakdown 
of the transient temporality of life into measurable, exchangeable, and 
thus universalizable units. Again, Debord f inds himself at Lukács’s side, 
who makes a similar case in History and Class Consciousness. In it, Lukács 
sketches the transformation of (man’s consciousness and use of) time in an 
environment constituted by the reifying effects of commodity production: 
in such an environment ‘time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; 
it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantif iable continuum f illed with 
quantif iable things’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 90). Essentially, Lukács argues, time 
becomes space: it is ‘transformed into abstract, exactly measurable, physical 
space’ (p. 90); time’s fundamental fluidity and transience are morphed into 
a static juxtaposition of exchangeable, quantif iable units: the reif ication of 
time entails its—literal—objectif ication.
On the other hand, the consumption of commodities, the generalization 
of commodity fetishism, subsumes any remaining or freed up irreversible 
time: ‘the development of capitalism meant the unif ication of irreversible 
time on a world scale’ (Debord, 1995, p. 107). In The Society of the Spectacle 
Debord underlines the profoundly antagonistic character of the leisure 
time that is freed up in consumerist capitalism: as the time liberated from 
the impetus of production it holds the promise of the amalgamation of 
anthropos and bios, of the enjoyment of life’s transience; however, leisure 
time, rather than being devoted to the consummation of life, is entirely 
devoted to the consumption of commodities. Perversely, as Debord argues, 
in the society of the spectacle, it is time itself that becomes consumable 
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(p. 112). ‘The consumable disguise of the time-as-commodity’ effectively 
suppressed any qualitative dimension of time, that is to say: any potential 
for a non-reif ied consummation of life. Again, the spectacle shows its bla-
tant tautological nature. What is ultimately consumed in the society of the 
spectacle is the spectacle of the consumption of time, and consequently of life 
itself ’ (p. 112). In the society of the spectacle, we consume images of a reif ied 
life: ‘all that once was directly lived has become mere representation’, 
famously says the very f irst thesis from The Society of the Spectacle (p. 12). 
It is through the reif ication of the temporality of bios that the spectacle 
becomes, in Debord, the ultimate incarnation of bio-power: the reif ied 
time of the spectacle signif ies ‘that augmented survival in which daily 
lived experience embodies no free choices and is subject, no longer to the 
natural order, but to a pseudo-nature constructed by means of alienated 
labor’ (p. 110). Spectacle is the perfection of the management of life itself 
in that it creates a pseudo-time and thus a pseudo-life that is perfectly 
contained within a perfectly reif ied lifeworld. It constitutes a properly 
spectacular bio-politics insofar as it sells off as the image of authentic 
life the very life of the anthropos that it has negated. In particular, it is 
the falsely ritualistic ‘pseudo-cyclical’ time of leisure (holidays, fashion, 
sports events, etc.) that is crowned with the aura of authenticity: yet even 
in such special moments, ostensibly moments of life, the only thing being 
generated, the only thing to be seen and reproduced, is the spectacle ‘and 
what has been passed off as authentic life turns out to be merely a life more 
authentically spectacular’ (p. 112). Despite a difference in tone (Debord’s 
axiomatic formalism hardly resembles Adorno’s melancholy), Debord 
appears to be in close proximity to the Adorno of Minima Moralia. ‘Our 
perspective of life has passed into an ideology which conceals the fact 
that there is life no longer’, Adorno writes (2005, p. 15). For Adorno, too, 
‘life has become appearance’: the relation between life and production, in 
the contemporary mode of production, has become irreversibly dissym-
metrical; life itself has been debased to a mere ‘ephemeral appearance’ 
of production, which has now become ‘absolute’ and by consequence 
‘monstrous’ (perhaps foremost in the sense of: living a life of its own, a 
life independent from man—the life of the artefact that has become the 
automaton) (p. 15, emphasis added).
For Debord, the spectacle holds one f inal, devastating contradiction: the 
more man’s environment is man-made (that is to say, reif ied, supplanted by 
the inf inite procession of commodities), the more man becomes separated 
from his living environment and ultimately life itself. ‘Though separated 
from his product’, Debord writes, ‘man is more and more, and even more 
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powerfully, the producer of every detail of his world. The closer his life 
comes to being his own creation, the more drastically he is cut off from that 
life’ (Debord, 1995, p. 24). As automaton, the spectacle congeals ‘everything 
that in human activity exists in a fluid state’ (p. 26), that is to say, for De-
bord life itself as pure transience.5 As ‘self-movement’ (p. 26) the spectacle 
expropriates the anthropos from his world, and the living environment is 
supplanted by the morbid fruits of dead labour. ‘The spectacle is a map 
of this new world’, Debord claims (p. 23). ‘We already live in the era of the 
self-destruction of the environment ’, we read in The Society of the Spectacle 
(p. 123): the reif ication of the environment irreducibly signif ies the negation 
of ‘environment’ as such.
The Spectacle erases the dividing line between self and world, in that 
the self, under siege by the presence/absence of the world, is eventually 
overwhelmed; it likewise erases the dividing line between true and false, 
repressing all directly lived truth beneath the real presence of the false-
hood maintained by the organization of appearances. (Debord, 1995, p. 153)
The spectacle simply is the environment of the false, and as we will see, will 
also hold up a false environmentalism. Debord’s peculiar environmental-
ism, as laid out in A Sick Planet, thus proceeds from his peculiar vitalism: 
the disappearance of the lifeworld is the ultimate logic of spectacle, the 
outcome of a long and tortuous dialectics. Life has a history: ‘natural history’ 
as the history of man insofar as he represents foremost life reflecting (upon) 
itself. Yet that history remains grafted upon a fundamental vitalism that 
proves to be the driving force behind any fundamental contestation of the 
spectacle: to live without dead time.
3. A Sick Planet: Life as Revolutionary Wildcard
In A Sick Planet Debord draws environmentalism, insofar as it encom-
passes biopolitical and vitalist assumptions, as a revolutionary wildcard. 
As Debord argues in The Real Split in the International, the stakes are 
high in the years that immediately follow 1968: these represent a rare 
and precarious syncope in the dialectics of reif ication (Debord and 
Saguinetti, 2003). A Sick Planet argues for the politicization of bios as a 
means of resistance (and perhaps the only viable resistance left) against 
the spectacle’s morbid politics of reif ication. It is this wager that continues 
to be the ground of Debord’s later polemics, f ilms, and writing. A Sick 
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Planet addresses the issue of environmental ‘pollution’, as the idiom of 
the early 1970s has it. Debord’s modest text is in fact contemporary with 
the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth and uses much of its terminology. In 
it, Debord stresses the fundamental antagonistic nature of ‘pollution’: 
the ‘struggle against pollution’ becomes an intrinsic part of spectacle’s 
subsistence—albeit as a palliative of sorts—and it refers to a ‘real process’ 
that effectively rips through the seamlessness of that ideology (Debord, 
2008, p. 77). Even though, in perfect line with his analysis in The Society of 
the Spectacle, Debord again and again emphasizes the eminent material-
ity of the impending ecological catastrophe, environmental pollution is 
in fact caught up in a dialectical process. Or perhaps better: what goes 
under the name of ‘pollution’, for Debord, is the dialectical moment that 
exposes the mutual entanglement of history and living matter (and brings 
both of them to their conclusion). The ecological catastrophe exposes the 
spectacle as an eminently bio-political project. ‘Pollution’ is the name for 
two fundamentally antagonistic movements between which ‘the cur-
rent moment’ oscillates. ‘The current moment’ is that of ‘the supreme 
stage of commodity production’ and, simultaneously, ‘the project of its 
total negation’. The latter movement for Debord is again bifurcated: the 
historical-revolutionary project of the negation of spectacle runs parallel 
to the negation of spectacle through the environmental catastrophe. ‘Pol-
lution’ becomes a veritable revolutionary wild card. As a keen gambler, 
for Debord, the question is to know how to use the wild card. This is, I 
argue, exactly what is at stake in A Sick Planet: how to play the wild card 
of environmental catastrophe in the revolutionary critique of spectacle; 
how, as good dialecticians, to draw lessons from the idiom of vitality, 
materiality, and Umwelt that imposes itself in ‘this historical moment’. 
The ‘historical moment’ Debord refers to, is the post-68 momentum: ‘the 
moment when it becomes impossible for capitalism to carry on working’ 
(p. 77). This moment is antagonistic in its own right. On the one hand, 
spectacle, along historical-dialectical lines, produces the new proletariat 
(of disgruntled consumers, workers, youth, minorities, and women) in 
opposition to its totality; on the other hand, there is reif ication’s perhaps 
unanticipated offshoot of ‘pollution’ that negatively affects proletariat and 
spectacle alike—a different totality: the totality of living matter. Since 
Debord remains a cunning dialectician, in A Sick Planet this cleavage folds 
back onto itself: it exposes the spectacle as a self-contradictory process 
that colonizes life and its inestimable habitats, only to ultimately negate 
these. As the ultimate stage in the history of reif ication, the spectacle 
turns the tables on historicity itself.
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Therefore, Debord underlines that the environmental critique of the 
spectacle should not be confused with an essentially conservative aestheti-
cism, heralding quality-of-life issues. Debord writes in A Sick Planet:
The problem of the degeneration of the totality of the natural and human 
environment has already ceased to present itself in terms of a loss of 
quality, be it aesthetic or of any other kind; the problem has now become 
the more fundamental one of whether a world that pursues such a course 
can preserve its material existence. (Debord, 2008, p. 79, emphasis added)
He vehemently rejects the analyses of those whom he brands ‘backward-
looking gas-bags’—the ‘staunch defenders of good cooking’—who offer 
nothing but an aesthetic critique that remains f irmly within the logic of 
reif ication of the spectacle (Debord, 2008, p. 79). In A Sick Planet, Debord 
continues the critique of the society of the spectacle as the critique of the 
totality of commodity relations; yet, this totality now in fact comprises its 
own material possibility of existence. As the materialization of ideology, the 
spectacle produces the environmental catastrophe that threatens to destroy 
the very possibility of ideological embodiment itself. The materialization of 
the spectacle comes at the expense of the material conditions of life itself. 
It is the metabolism of the spectacle itself, the process of reif ication that 
pumps life into the spectacle itself that threatens to short-circuit its own 
material survival. In its ultimate stage, the spectacle touches upon the limits 
of the future of organic life per se.
In A Sick Planet, Debord apparently has recourse to The Blue Marble, 
the iconic photograph of the Earth taken by the crew of Apollo 17, which 
plays such an important role in the spectacle’s own imaginary: from the 
space race to the notion of a unif ied humanity to its palliative use of the 
spectre of pollution. He presents to us our sick planet to demonstrate how 
the spectacle now dictates the ‘transformation of the conditions of life on 
Earth’ (Debord, 2008, p. 78). Just when spectacle effectively ‘globalizes’ 
our world by reifying it, as exemplif ied in the poster of The Blue Marble, 
it simultaneously lays bare the Earth as a living ecosystem. Once more, 
the spectacle appears as fundamentally alien to an original vitalism. The 
world of the society of the spectacle is determined by a part of itself that 
ontologically remains exterior to it (Debord, 2008, p. 81). Over and again, 
Debord asserts the self-negating logic of the spectacle: it kills the social 
organism upon which it is grafted, thereby revealing its own irreducible 
materiality. (Debord’s assertion of the spectacle’s ‘limits to growth’ has 
nothing moralizing: it is to be taken in dead earnestness.)
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For Debord, ‘our moment’ simply proves that the history of reif ication 
has reached its limits. That is to say, the impending ecological catastrophe 
shows that its limits are not so much quantitative—in fact, the search 
for new markets is limitless, as Debord contends—but qualitative: as the 
ultimate stage in the history of reif ication, the spectacle is simply at odds 
with life. Thus, in A Sick Planet, Debord describes what he calls the ‘terrors 
of the year 2000’: the pollution not just of the atmosphere and waters, but 
also the ubiquity of noise, plastic debris, modif ied food, urban sprawl and 
proliferation of mental illness (p. 80). Debord paints a psycho-pathological 
Umwelt of social relations now irreparably damaged in their very material-
ity. The ‘qualitative’ here does not refer to the ‘aesthetic quality’ mourned 
over by the aforementioned ‘backward-looking gas-bags’: the qualitative 
simply is the material according to Debord. ‘The qualitative is the most 
decisive dimension of real progress’ (p. 82), he argues. The spectacle, as 
the ultimate stage in the history of reif ication, recomposes the world as 
false environment. Debord writes: ‘a society that is ever more sick, but ever 
more powerful, has recreated the world—everywhere and in concrete 
form—as the environment and backdrop of its sickness: it has created a 
sick planet’ (p. 81).
In A Sick Planet Debord attempts to formulate an equally entangled 
proletariat whose agency is crucially grafted upon its bios. This is what, 
for Debord, constitutes a properly materialist demand for revolutionary 
change: the ecological catastrophe represents ‘an immense motive for 
revolt, a material requirement of the exploited just as vital as the strug-
gle of nineteenth-century proletarians for the right to eat’ (p. 82). The 
‘materialist demand’ is that of an environmental justice or sustainability 
in the literal sense of the very possibility of the material subsistence of life 
and its manifold environments. As we have seen, such a vitalist-materialist 
demand is no less engrained in a historical-dialectical movement since it is 
in the spectacle that the process of reif ication, as the completed negation 
of man ‘has reached its perfect material conclusion’ (p. 84). ‘Negation’ and 
‘conclusion’ here take on the double sense of end of a dialectical as well as 
a vital-biological endgame; the spectacle reveals itself as a life-negating 
force through the slow phagocytizing of man’s milieu. Consequently, 
in A Sick Planet Debord presents the environmental catastrophe not 
so much as an event, but as the general result of alienated labour. The 
spectacular, late capitalist mode of production drags the environment 
itself into the sphere of commodities, and not just literally by turning 
water and even clean air into sellable goods or by cluttering our planet 
with ever more stuff. As we have seen in our analysis of The Society of the 
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Spectacle, the spectacle foremost signif ies the production of a milieu. In 
A Sick Planet this production of a milieu has lead to its self-contradictory 
conclusion (spectacle has crossed the last threshold of its progress): the 
completed materialization of the spectacle’s false milieu affects its mate-
rial subsistence (the very possibility of any milieu). As Debord writes: 
from the ‘production of [mediated] non-life’, ‘a f inal threshold’ has just 
been passed: ‘what is now produced, directly, is death’ (Debord, 2008, 
p. 85). In this context, politics equals bio-politics. Debord argues: ‘that 
the management of everything has become directly political, right down 
to the herb of the f ields and the possibility of drinking water, sleeping 
without pills or washing without developing sores’ (p. 86). For Debord 
such a moment heralds the end of specialized politics: the concern of any 
contemporary emancipatory politics is none other than the milieu; any 
true politics is environmentalist in the dual sense of the word. ‘The enemy 
at its gates of historical consciousness’, Debord writes, is not illusion but 
the death of consciousness itself (p. 86). Consequently, the environmental 
catastrophe equally heralds the end of voluntarist politics: there is no 
managing poisonous riches (p. 87). The ecological catastrophe cannot be 
warded off through bureaucracy (again, the battleground is the qualitative 
and not the quantitative). As an example of such a ‘voluntarist politics’, the 
‘f ight against pollution’ (not yet named ‘green politics’ in A Sick Planet) can 
only be part of the spectacular machinery: it merely serves the creation 
of new types of employment, advancing the proliferation of spectacle’s 
own toxic milieu; the high tech industries (or cognitive capitalism) that 
accompany it can only be palliative for the pollution that results from 
the mode of production of which they are intrinsically part (pp. 82–83). 
If ‘seizing the means of production’ has any meaning left, in A Sick Planet, 
it signif ies taking hold of the means of production of a milieu or lifeworld 
(the qualitative reconstruction of the totality of the world taken in its 
material sense). Debord is equally keen to point out the incompatibility 
between representative democracy and truly environmental politics: 
any representative system is by its very nature conservative—that is 
to say, geared towards the conservation of the existing status quo (‘qua 
voters, they would not change even if the world was coming to an end’, 
Debord writes [p. 89]). Environmental politics is thus played elsewhere: 
in the opposition to the automated process of late capitalist production. 
If anything, environmental politics is thus a politics against reif ication, 
of which it shows its entangled historical and material sense—this, for a 
start, constitutes the enduring signif icance of Debord’s modest treatise 
on A Sick Planet.
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‘The immune system has had its time on earth’, Debord proclaims in 
his very last documentary, Guy Debord, son art son temps (1994) (Debord, 
2006, p.1875, my translation). For Debord, the current, and f inal, stage of 
the spectacle, that of the ‘integrated spectacle’ that no longer faces any 
noticeable opposition (and, in an unprecedented bio-political project that 
effectively raised and ‘moulded to its laws’ (Debord, 1998, p. 7) a whole 
generation born after 1968), has turned life against itself: the ultimate form 
of reif ication. The world of the ‘integrated spectacle’ is characterized by the 
generalized breakdown of the immune system: at its very core life, in all its 
aspects, becomes defenceless against reif ication—or in its ‘contemporary’ 
euphemism: pollution. In his Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, De-
bord writes that ‘there remains nothing, in culture or in nature, which has 
not been transformed, and polluted, according to the means and interests 
of modern industry. Even genetics has become readily accessible to the 
dominant social forces’ (1998, p. 15). The integrated spectacle has succeeded 
in its main and only objective: it ‘is mixed into all reality and irradiates 
it’ (p. 9). According to Debord, the AIDS epidemic of the early 1980s and 
nuclear catastrophes such as the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 have become 
emblematic of the spectacle’s radical inhumanity (its fundamental anti-
anthropology and anti-vitalism): ‘the economy has now come to openly 
make war on human beings, not only on our possibilities for life, but also 
those of survival’, he argues (Debord, 1998, p. 39). The breakdown between 
spectacle and environment, which resulted from this history of reif ication, 
has resulted in the breakdown between man and environment: only this 
time, the ‘environment’ is already reif ied, already signif ies the direct pro-
duction of non-life. The integrated spectacle completes Debord’s narrative 
of the spectacle’s appropriation of human temporality and through it the 
temporality of life itself: the integrated spectacle heralds the irreparable 
reif ication of the irreversibility of life’s transience by turning life into non-
life, bios into thanatos. ‘Negation has been so thoroughly deprived of its 
thought that it was dispersed long ago’, Debord laments in his Comments 
(p. 84). Negation, as the weapon of choice of dialectical thought, has been 
falsif ied by a now integrated spectacle. As the later Debord’s incessant 
writing as well as his insistence on the veracity of materiality (really lived 
time, real city life, real history) demonstrate: what remains at the heart of 
his thought, after the stratagems of historical materialism, is not so much 
negation, but what has always been his main project: the revolutionary 
aff irmation of life’s transience.
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10. Images of Capital: An Interview with 
Zachary Formwalt
Samir Gandesha and Johan F. Hartle
SG/JH: Your work is of tremendous interest for this book for one obvi-
ous reason: In many different ways it again and again deals with the 
echoes and effects of the form of capital on the technologies of visual 
representation, reading visual culture with Capital. Long-time exposure 
and time-lapse photography are, for instance, discussed as visual means 
of making labour invisible—much in line with the logics of commodity 
fetishism, which conceals the social relations in the commodity. In this 
attempt it can be located in the theoretical transitions from Lukács’s 
analysis of reification to Debord’s critique of spectacle, a continuity that is 
often neglected. How has this tradition become important for your work? 
And would you characterize this continuity yourself? Where would you 
see the most interesting discontinuities and how do you relate to them?
I think it was Badiou and I think this was in relation to Deleuze that he says 
somewhere, difference is what there is, sameness is what must be produced. 
I think you could, in relation to this, characterize a continuity between 
Lukács and Debord in their development, in the direction of generality, of 
the concept of commodity fetishism. This would of course be a dialectical 
development, with Marx’s term as the primary instance, Lukács’s ‘reif ica-
tion’ as the middle term, and Debord as some kind of return to the f irst in 
a more specif ic, or historically adequate, form of commodity fetishism: 
the spectacle. In all three of these cases, there is the articulation of a form 
through which capital produces sameness. It’s been a while since I’ve read 
both Debord and Lukács, but as I remember it, Marx seems to be a little more 
optimistic about this sameness that capital produces, at least in relation 
to the eventual possibility of another kind of unity being articulated and 
empowered to act against the interests of capital and in the interests of 
its by-product, the exploited masses. Capital produces a unif ied body of 
disempowered individuals and aspects of that unif ication can be used 
against it.1 This is also a way of saying that there are formal aspects of the 
process of capital accumulation that can be used against it.
If Lukács generalizes commodity fetishism into a broader formal process 
of reif ication, at which point it could perhaps become usable as a form 
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through which actions can be orchestrated against capital, then it seems 
that Debord shows how this opportunity has been lost to capital itself and 
in a way this forces a return to the more specif ied realm of commodity 
fetishism at a moment when the objects of aesthetic experience have all 
been reduced to the commodity form.
Is it the case that social relations are no longer primarily mediated by the 
goods we as labourers produce, which obscure the very manner in which we 
produce them, thus making the true nature of our relations to one another 
inaccessible in any immediate form of action? If so, can we instead say that 
these social relations are now directly taken up in the realm of the spectacle, 
and that we are constantly presented with representations of them, which 
make it all the more diff icult to see, there, a space of action? I think that’s 
one way of articulating a discontinuity. On the other hand, it could be that 
what we produce now, primarily, are images in the realm of the spectacle. 
This would then be a way of articulating the continuity with commodity 
fetishism, reif ication, and spectacle. The form of the commodity has not 
changed, just its material, in a crude sense.
I am more sceptical about the discontinuity formulation, because I think 
that making an image of social relations is the exception rather than the 
norm and that such images have the potential to assist in the development 
of actions against capital, rather than in their containment. But I also think 
that one must be aware of the primary role of images as commodities. And 
perhaps this is really the true continuity with Marx: that in our society, the 
commodity is the most basic material. It is not only what we produce, but 
what we have to produce with. Any attempt to get to the origin of a given 
commodity will lead us at best to an image, which is itself a commodity. The 
idea that one can get to an origin that lies at the threshold where a natural 
substance encounters a social process whereby it is formed into a good that 
can be sold on the market is one of those images. It’s the kind of image that 
keeps its audience in a world that they don’t actually inhabit and are thereby 
powerless to act in.2 So what kinds of images don’t do that? Those are the 
images that, very generally, I am interested both in f inding and producing.
SG/JH: One can agree with the claim that Marx, Lukács, and Debord are 
concerned with the manner in which sameness is produced in capitalist 
society. Where Debord seems to return to Marx with his famous opening 
statement in The Society of the Spectacle that ‘Spectacle is capitalism 
accumulated to the point where it becomes images’ suggests a specifically 
historical thesis that around the mid- to late-1920s, we see a dialectic of 
the transformation of quantity into quality. Yet in your film In Place of 
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Capital (2009) you seem to suggest that with the equiprimordial origin 
of finance capital and photography we find a certain inescapable logic of 
fetishism. That in capital’s movement from M to M1, the moment in which 
what you call, quoting Henry Talbot, the ‘moving multitude’ disappears 
just as in the earliest photographic experiments of Talbot and Daguerre, 
given the extremely long exposure time, movement, itself, could not be 
represented. Are you saying here that the medium per se cannot function 
in a critical or if you like ‘de-fetishizing’ way? This point is reinforced by 
your reference to the way in which photography is absolutely key to the 
Taylorism that would further accelerate the passage through capital’s 
circuit of valorization.
I don’t at all think, or mean to imply, that photography is incapable of func-
tioning in a critical manner, especially in relation to capital. Photography 
is a technology just as f inance is. I’m not so sure that they have shared 
origins, but they certainly interact with each other in various ways at certain 
moments. These interactions are much more interesting and complex than 
is usually suggested through the kinds of photographs used as illustrations 
in the f inancial press. I made In Place of Capital in 2009, so a couple of years 
into the f inancial crisis that had begun to unfold in 2007. At that time 
there were all kinds of stories relating to the crisis, and to the f inancial 
sector in general, that were being illustrated by photographs. In Place of 
Capital took up Henry Talbot’s 1845 photographs of the Royal Exchange 
in London (Figure 10.1) as a counterpoint to the contemporary images of it 
and other banking and f inance institutions that were appearing daily in 
the newspapers at the time. On one level this was to draw out a legacy of 
failure in photography; the failure to capture certain types of movements. 
In 1845, photography failed to capture bodies moving in space—specifically 
the bodies of passers-by in front of a commodities exchange in London. In 
2009 it failed to capture the movement of capital. But I was also interested 
in trying to see that earlier failure in the depiction of moving bodies as 
itself an image of capital. The building façade and the allegorical pediment 
sculpture are rendered as clearly in the 1845 photograph as they are in 
the average newspaper photograph of the same façade today. But there’s 
something missing from the earlier photograph. An economy of represen-
tational forms appears: the allegory of commerce is rendered perfectly at 
the expense of the actual commerce below. A good portion of the f ilm is 
spent ‘discovering’ the traces of those bodies in movement below. The failure 
to capture the movement of those bodies—the crowds around the Royal 
Exchange—can also be seen as a successful expression of a key aspect of 
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the aesthetic situation of capital: the history of movements responsible for 
the accumulation of capital is continually erased in this very process of 
accumulation (see Marx, 1992b, pp. 159–160).3 So at that early moment in 
the development of photographic technologies, the medium was actually 
well suited to depict this particular aspect of capital.
But to return to your question about photography and fetishism, I think 
it’s important not to fetishize photography as such. Ultimately, photography 
is something practiced. A fetishistic deployment of it in one place does not 
preclude its opposite. Especially today with its widespread use in social 
media, photography should neither be taken for granted, nor reif ied.
SG/JH: When viewing your work one finds not only reflections on the con-
vergence of capital and visual media and, thus, reification and spectacle 
but also a very elaborate interest in the spatialization of capital through 
both the geometries of power and social abstraction (the glass towers 
of, for instance, Shenzhen and Amsterdam) but also the picturesque (as 
in your Through a Fine Screen, your film on Central Park). This comes 
with an immense attentiveness to geometric form. This formal approach 
is in a great deal of tension with a Lukácsian, realist emphasis (which, 
through your historical inquiries, your social contextualization of formal 
practices, however, also comes to its own right) on narrativization. It also 
seems to be quite opposed to the more subversive stylistic practices of 
détournement, while your film essays are, at the same time, as through 
Figure 10.1. Video still from zachary Formwalt, In Place of Capital (2009), showing a part of one of 
Henry Talbot’s 1845 photographs of the Royal exchange in london.
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somewhat monotonous and melancholic voice-over, quite clearly in 
line with some of Debord’s own work. How would you characterize your 
own aesthetic strategy in relation to a Lukácsian de-reifying attempt at 
narrativization and historical embedment on the one hand and the Situ-
ationist agenda (of détournement, dérive, and the tradition of Debordian 
film essays) on the other?
The détournement in the f ilm essays sometimes relates to just a single 
image, or more recently, to a particular kind of image. Through a Fine Screen 
takes up the f irst image to be printed in a newspaper by mechanical means 
(Figure 10.2). When it was printed in 1880, it was only described in terms 
of its technical properties. The whole point of the image in that context 
was to demonstrate the directness of its relation to the photograph—that 
there was no artist in between the photograph and the newspaper print 
as there was in every other photographic image appearing in newspapers 
of the time in the form of etchings. This, The Daily Graphic, the newspa-
per in which it appeared, claimed, was how images would be printed in 
newspapers in the future. And they were, more or less, correct in their 
prediction. But aside from this technical aspect that The Daily Graphic 
described, what was this an image of? The only textual hints given in the 
paper are the caption, ‘A Scene in Shantytown, NY’, and the aff irmation in 
the main article referring to the image, that the photographer had taken 
the photograph in the immediate presence of the structures depicted. So 
why would ‘A Scene in Shantytown, NY’ be chosen to illustrate the technical 
properties of mechanically reproducing photographs in newsprint that had 
been taken in the immediate presence of that which they depict? This was 
the starting point of the f ilm, which spends a lot of time looking at Central 
Park and theories of the picturesque that were influential in the design of 
that park. In the form of the park, the picturesque was another strategy for 
bringing nature into view, in an apparently immediate manner. The theory 
and practice of picturesque park design, just like that of a certain strain 
of photography, was very much a practice of reif ication that resulted in a 
particular idea of nature and one’s relation to that. It grasped reality in a 
form which denied the constructedness of this reality, making it impossible 
to see the specif ic conditions of its production.
With Central Park, this meant that the clearing of houses and the strate-
gies of representing those living there as undesirable in order to justify their 
removal was not seen as a condition of the park’s existence. With the image 
in the newspaper, the immediate presence in which the photographer made 
the image of Shantytown, NY, remains abstract, being both historically and 
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geographically indeterminate. There is no way to verify where this image 
was actually taken. Part of Shantytown, NY, was demolished to make way 
for the park twenty years before that image appeared in The Daily Graphic, 
but part of it still existed at the time, just west of the park (and the name 
‘shantytown’ was really a more general term that would come to be used 
interchangeably with ‘slum’). So there was a possible, material connection 
between the image in The Daily Graphic and the construction of Central 
Park. That there was no way to verify this was largely due to the way in 
which the photograph had been described in the newspaper, simply as an 
image of the future of print media.
The détournement was related to this image’s place at the origins of the 
photo-illustrated press. I wanted to reinscribe this reif ication of the photo-
graphic print technology, and a certain kind of fetishization of the slum as 
something detached from its real social conditions, onto these origins. And 
I wanted the photograph to be considered in a different history. Not only 
in the history of photojournalism, as a key moment in the technological 
development of that f ield, but also in a history of urban development. The 
détournement was really not so much in relation to this image itself, but 
in relation to its place in the history of photojournalism. At the beginning 
of the photo-illustrated press, there was not simply a camera, halftone 
screen, printing press, etc., but also a way of describing the image as both 
Figure 10.2. ‘a Scene in Shantytown, nY. Reproduction direct from nature’ (The Daily Graphic, 
1880). Production still from zachary Formwalt, Through a Fine Screen, 2010.
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an objective registration of presence and a denial of the very place and time 
of that presence. A description of the technological guarantee of objectivity 
in place of the social conditions of the scene objectively reproduced.
SG/JH: Then, of course, there is a very specific interest in your work in 
spatial form that situates your work in yet another way in between and 
in opposition to the tradition of Lukács and Debord. For the specific 
context of our book, this is, secondly, we think, also interesting because 
of its affinity to the work of Henri Lefebvre, who could be said to hold 
a mediating position between Lukács and Debord, reinterpreting the 
critique of reification in spatial terms (and indeed in dialogue with the 
Situationists). The key idea here of course is the production of space and 
the role of visual forms of representation, photography in particular, in 
such production.
One thing that I think is particularly prevalent in the present moment, is 
this notion that capital is beyond comprehension. This idea relates to the 
neoliberal concept of the market as the supreme calculator—the computer 
of social relations. The market is seen as the only entity capable of calculat-
ing at the scale of social relations. So what kind of entity is this market? Is it 
locatable? Does it exist in space and time, or is it rather the very condition of 
space and time as we now experience it? In a way, market functions here as a 
spatial counterpoint to capital. The market is the place where, and through 
which, capital f lows. So what does this place look like? Well, look around. If 
what you see is a series of transactions taking place wherein individuals are 
each pursuing only their separate, individual interests, then you’re looking 
at the market. In the market all relations beyond the transaction are void. If 
you look around and you see a series of social relations which are not simply 
reducible to the transaction, then you’re quite possibly looking at capital. 
Ultimately, you can’t see the two together.
To relate this to Debord and Lukács, I would say that ‘the market’ is a 
reif ication of the capital relation. It’s much easier to make a photograph, 
or a f ilm for that matter, of ‘the market’ than it is to make one of capital. I 
think the actual process of making images is much more related to capital 
than the outcome of this process, i.e. the images themselves.
Over the past four years I have been working on a series of f ilms, two 
of which were shot on the construction site of the new Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in China and the last was shot in the former Grain Trading Hall of 
Amsterdam’s Beurs van Berlage, which became, in the late 1970s, the home of 
Europe’s f irst options exchange. Both of these exchange buildings were built, 
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not only to provide shelter for market activity, but also to symbolize this 
market. To literally ‘broadcast’ this activity, as the architects of the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange put it. Marx’s famous description of capital overcoming all 
spatial barriers and ultimately, through the physical infrastructure of the 
exchange and its extension through means of communication and trans-
portation, annihilating space by time, is relevant here. These buildings are 
meant, not only to house the activity of coordinating the flow of capital via 
various markets, which carries out, to some extent, the annihilation Marx 
describes, but their façades, and in some cases the surfaces of their interiors, 
are also meant to travel as images, primarily in the form of photographs, 
representing ‘the market’. These buildings are built as much for these images 
as they are for sheltering market activity. In the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
for example, a press photographers’ platform is built into the main cer-
emonial space where the opening and closing bell ceremonies take place 
just in front of a massive LED screen that is to show market data in various 
graphic and numerical forms (Figure 10.3). This LED screen stands just in 
front of a glass wall overlooking the city. From the inside, photographers are 
positioned in front of this surface, so that the images they take will picture, 
in close up, whoever might be standing in front of the LED screen ringing 
the bell, and in a wide shot, this would be placed before the view out onto 
the city. The LED screen as backdrop makes an image of the bell ringer in 
a world of market f igures and the city as backdrop makes an image of the 
market f igures as interface with the city/world. When photographing the 
outside, this space where the opening ceremony takes place becomes part 
of a huge cantilevered podium that seems, again in the description of the 
architects, to ‘f loat’ over the ground beneath (Figure 10.4). Now, the image 
of a floating podium, which required an enormous amount of capital and 
labour to produce, along with the patterned glass façade of the tower that 
extends above it, described by the architects as ‘revealing the construction 
technology behind’ the façade ‘while simultaneously rendering it mysterious 
and beautiful’ are both, I think, extremely good examples of the reif ication 
of capital relations in the image of the market as f igured by the architecture 
of the stock exchange. And I think this reif ication is something that extends 
to most elements of the built environment, but it is of course interesting 
to see stock exchange architecture as a kind of paradigmatic case. This is 
especially so because it turns on its head the famous annihilation of space 
by time, which the extension of the market as the place where capital can 
flow, is supposed to accomplish. Because here in these images, it is time, 
and specif ically labour time, that is annihilated. Understanding architec-
ture as an adjunct of capital, as a very different architect, Michael Bell, 
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has suggested, means seeing that ‘architecture produced by the market 
systems that dominate the contemporary city is embedded with time-
based processes of material and labour, yet these modes of time are rarely 
knowable or recoverable in the f inal form of building; the memory of the 
city’s production is essentially inaccessible’ (Bell, 2004, p. 120). So while the 
extension of market mechanisms entails an annihilation of space by time, 
this time is no longer on the scale of human experience. We are left with 
spaces whose histories have been replaced with the transaction. In the last 
two exchange f ilms I wanted to replace this time of the transaction with 
the time of construction. Not so much the physical construction of the 
building, though that is very much included in some parts of In Light of the 
Arc, but the construction of this image of the market as something which 
forecloses images of other social processes.
SG/JH: Marx’s concept of ‘primitive accumulation’ seems to have made a 
big comeback recently in, among others, the work of David Harvey who re-
names it ‘accumulation by dispossession’—the idea being that capitalism 
manages to solve the contradictions flowing from ‘over-accumulation’ 
by a specific spatial logic with the city as its central locus. The massive 
surplus accumulated by capital in the immediate aftermath of ‘les trentes 
Figure 10.3. View from the press photographers’ platform of the opening and closing bell 
ceremonial space, Shenzhen Stock exchange, China. Production still from zachary Formwalt, In 
Light of the Arc, 2013.
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glorieuses’ congealed as finance capital led, of course, to tremendous 
speculation in the real estate market and a massive process of gentrifica-
tion, displacement and marginalization of the poor. To what extent were 
you thinking of this relation between this specific ‘production of space’ 
(Lefebvre) and violence (‘insects bravely removed by the force of police 
bludgeons’ [New York Times, 1866]) in Through a Fine Screen?
This was a big part of Through a Fine Screen and the book, Reading the Econo-
mist that was produced alongside it. The book begins with some sections from 
a notebook that Marx kept in 1868, part of which followed The Economist (then 
a weekly newspaper, now a magazine, though it is the same institution) in its 
reporting on what their editor referred to, in 1866, as the f irst credit panic in 
living memory (Figure 10.5). So Marx was looking back a couple of years and 
following the emergence of this credit crisis through the reporting on it in the 
financial press. The Economist articles on the panic that Marx copies into his 
notebook draw out a kind of aesthetics of f inance, or what is perhaps better 
described as an anaesthetics of f inance, with particular emphasis on the 
money market. The basic argument was that when the credit system works, 
its mechanisms are imperceptible, but when there is a panic the anaesthesia 
wears off and the mechanisms suddenly begin to appear. This appearance 
leads people to make a panicked attempt to exchange whatever store of value 
Figure 10.4. exterior view of the Shenzhen Stock exchange in China under construction. Produc-
tion still from zachary Formwalt, In Light of the Arc, 2013.
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they possess, that they now see as a mere token of credit, for a store of value 
that does not appear to be credit-based, i.e. cash is withdrawn from a bank, 
or paper money exchanged for gold in the extreme case. It is the collective 
action of these panicked individuals which perpetuates the crisis. If everyone 
would just calm down and look away from the credit mechanisms underlying 
their various stores of value, then the value would return. The Economist was 
trying to limit the scope of the crisis in 1866 through an explanation of the 
virtue of invisibility in the sphere of f inance. This was at a time when scenes 
of panic, of bank queues, were being reported in the daily press. I had been 
working on the research for this book throughout the time of the 2007–2009 
crisis, when images of bank queues were again appearing in the press, along 
with discussions of the ethics of running such images which were seen to 
contribute to the very scenes they were depicting. In 2007, The Economist ran 
a photograph of the bank run on Northern Rock in an issue that explained 
securitization as the thing which connected ‘the f irst bank run in Britain 
since 1866’ to what they described as ‘dodgy American mortgages’ (Economist, 
2007a, p. 15; 2007b, p. 89), in the caption of this photograph.
Reading the Economist ends with a section in which the Shantytown 
image from The Daily Graphic that appears in Through a Fine Screen is 
(re)connected to another story from the same issue of that newspaper. It 
Figure 10.5. Pages in a notebook that marx kept in 1868, from zachary Formwalt, Reading the 
Economist, 2010. The notebook can be found at the international institute of Social History, 
amsterdam.
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turns out that this photograph could very well have been an illustration of 
a story about William H. Vanderbilt’s purchase of land in Manhattan for the 
development of infrastructure for shipping and receiving ocean and railway 
freight. The story points out that the land is, at the time of writing, ‘devoted 
to nothing except squatters’ (Formwalt, 2010, p. 71). Certainly not as harsh 
language as that used earlier in the New York Times but also clearly not a 
defence of the right of the ‘squatters’ to the land either, something which must 
be understood in the context of that term’s usage at the time, as in the case of 
the parts of Shantytown that were cleared to make way for Central Park, when 
even landowning residents were described in the media, f irst as ‘squatters’, 
and then by the New York Times as ‘insects’. In either case, their removal was 
presented, at the very least, as a necessary part of urban development.
In all of this one can see a series of disappearances; certain events which 
are disarticulated in relation to ‘the economy’ through its articulation via 
other events. With the Shantytown image in 1880, described as the future of 
media imagery, but completely abstracted from the real context in which the 
photograph was taken, a context in which the destruction implied by urban 
development is explicit.4 With the ‘dodgy American mortgages’ connected 
in 2007 to the bank runs in Britain, the very real disaster of foreclosure for 
millions in the United States would have to be described elsewhere.
SG/JH: Obviously a particular mode of visual representation goes hand-in-
hand with the expanded reproduction of capital in an under-capitalized 
space à la Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital. In art historical terms 
your reference to such modes of primitive accumulation also reminds 
one of Canada’s most famous artistic movement, the Group of Seven, as 
constituting in visual terms the ideology (crystallized in the Roman legal 
term ‘terra nullius’) by disappearing the original inhabitants of Canada’s 
northern landscape. Space is imagined as ‘terra nullius’—‘land belonging 
to no one’, de-populated, uninhabited, eminently colonizable. And of 
course, in your project on Ghana (A Projective Geometry) you explicitly 
refer to Marx’s comments on the theory of colonization (as an element of 
his reflections on primitive accumulation). How do you see the function 
of (in some cases technologically mediated) visual representation here?
In the scene from A Projective Geometry that you refer to, the screen is 
divided in half. On the left side is the f inal page of the last chapter of Capital, 
Volume I, which closes with Marx clarifying his interest in the colonies, in 
this particular instance, as being exclusively ‘the secret discovered in the 
New World by the political economy of the Old World’, namely that the 
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fundamental condition of capital accumulation is the expropriation of 
the worker, or ‘the annihilation of that private property which rests on the 
labour of the individual himself’ (Marx, 1992a, p. 940). In order to reveal this 
secret more clearly, Marx specifies at the beginning of this chapter that he is 
dealing with ‘true colonies’, which he defines as ‘virgin soil colonized by free 
immigrants’ (Marx, 1992a, p. 931). It is the United States that is given pride 
of place here. Native Americans are not mentioned. The problem for capital 
in such an imaginary space is that there is no incentive for individuals to 
become wage labourers when they can simply work the ‘virgin soil’ into 
a productive little plot of land for themselves. These plots of land must 
be removed from the public sphere and put under the control of capital 
so that the potential labour market does not dissipate into a multitude of 
independent producers who would rather determine their own working 
conditions than submit to those of an employer. In that f inal chapter, as in 
so many other instances, it is the state which comes to the rescue of capital, 
by setting an artif icially high price on the land so that individual workers 
are unable to purchase it and are thus forced into a situation of wage labour 
in a place where, outside of this action of the state, there is an abundance 
of resources ripe for the taking. Granted, Marx is looking specif ically at 
E.G. Wakefield’s theory of ‘systematic colonization’ in this chapter, so the 
state action he describes is the one Wakefield prescribes. And what this 
prescription reveals is the apparently non-capitalist moment that capital 
requires the state to secure in order for capital to accumulate through the 
exploitation of labour power. In the colonies, the dependence of the worker 
Figure 10.6. Video still from zachary Formwalt, A Projective Geometry, 2012.
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on the capitalist must be produced and it is the state that plays a key role 
here. So why not include in this description, that other condition, which 
had to be secured in order for this theory of systematic colonization to be 
formed? Namely, the systematic destruction of the native population. For 
this, too, is clearly a moment of accumulation by dispossession. A dispos-
session of the most violent sort. But in that f inal chapter of Capital it is as 
if the dispossession of the workers has displaced rather than followed upon 
this other dispossession of the native population (Figure 10.6).5
So the page that concludes that chapter stands on the left of the screen. 
The right half is f illed with an image of three train tracks, two of which 
meet towards the top of the frame, where a young girl and what could be 
her mother enter, walking down these tracks as the frame then begins to f ill 
with passers-by from both top and bottom and a voice can be heard asking 
if I, the cameraman, am surveying. The man tells me that he is studying 
surveying at school. I tell him that I am documenting one of the tracks 
below; the one that no longer runs, which used to travel to the coastal city 
of Sekondi, but which is no longer in service. He confirms that the track is 
indeed no longer in use. And he then says he is off to church. It’s a Sunday 
and no trains are running. The tracks are f illed instead with pedestrians. 
After describing Marx’s ‘true colonies’ as a place where he could sketch out 
an image of the most basic condition of capitalist production, I then begin to 
describe the conditions of my own image production there in Ghana, where 
I was on several occasions mistaken for a surveyor in my f ilming of the 
railway track. The whole history of colonial exploitation was so much more 
on the surface than I had imagined. With my camera and tripod, I effectively 
became a railway surveyor, though rather than leaving with a map, I left 
with these images and a story from the 1930s about a community which 
this railway had served. I had come there with a story about a man who 
helped determine its path. Both of these stories involve the reproduction 
of an image of an eminently colonizable space, as you put it.
These stories appear in reverse chronology in the f ilm, with the f irst 
describing an episode from the 1930s when the colonial authority decided 
to relocate the railway headquarters from the city of Sekondi to Takoradi, 
where in 2007 oil was discovered offshore and which, in light of this, has 
again become a magnet for capital. In the 1930s the railway station was 
being moved in order to facilitate access to the larger, industrial port then 
being built in Takoradi. This move would cause all kinds of problems for the 
local community in Sekondi and a petition was drafted and submitted with 
hundreds of signatures from Sekondi residents, addressed to the governor 
of the colony, which detailed the negative impact that the transfer would 
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have on the community there. Within the colonial administration, notes 
were made on the petition indicating that the local population was ‘not 
competent to form an opinion’ (Provincial Commissioner’s Off ice, 1934) on 
the matter. And the petitioners were simply ‘informed’ that the move of the 
headquarters would realise a large savings for the railway company. The 
main problem brought up about the negative impact on the local community 
was left completely unanswered. The change was made with the interests of 
the empire in mind and the fallout on the ground in the local ‘incompetent’ 
community was of no perceived consequence from this perspective (Figure 
10.7). This image of an incompetent native population who needed to be 
told how to organize their existence is one that is familiar from the colonial 
perspective. In the documents surrounding the transfer of the railway and 
the petition from the residents of Sekondi, it is clear that ‘incompetence’ here 
simply meant an interest in the local situation—a view from this specif ic 
place rather than a view of it as a simple node in the empire.
The second story is about a railway surveyor who gave a talk in 1901, back 
in London, about the progress being made on the railway being constructed 
in the Gold Coast at the time to connect a series of mines to the coastal 
city of Sekondi, where the raw materials from these mines could be loaded 
onto boats and transported elsewhere in the empire. During the talk the 
surveyor regrets not having slides to show to his audience of the progress 
that was being made in the development of a disciplined labour force in 
the West African Colonies. He then goes on to describe the ‘before’ of this 
Figure 10.7. notes by the colonial administration regarding a petition from the residents of 
Sekondi. These notes can be found in the national archives of Ghana, in accra. Video still from 
zachary Formwalt, A Projective Geometry, 2012.
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progress in the form of locals in Sekondi doing nothing but watching the 
imported labourers construct the railway there (Shelford, 1901). For the 
surveyor and his London audience, these undisciplined observers were the 
unformed nature awaiting colonial development. And yet, they were, in 
the surveyor’s description, doing exactly what he had wanted his London 
audience to do! Watching the progress being made on the railway. But of 
course, they would be watching from the place where this was happening, 
with the interests of that place, the place of their community, their homes, 
their livelihoods in mind. The audience in London would be watching with 
a different set of interests, where these communities were important only 
to the extent that they could produce and maintain labour power and 
eventually also consumption. A path to a factory and a market is what, 
ultimately, the surveyor’s imaginary slides showing the construction of 
these colonial railways represented. These were not the true colonies 
Marx spoke of. They were real colonies, where various forms of primitive 
accumulation were taking place, not simply that of the expropriation of 
the worker, though for sure that too. But to return to your question of the 
function of visual representation in relation to primitive accumulation, 
I’m not so sure that it is all that obvious that a specif ic mode of visual 
representation goes hand-in-hand with the expanded reproduction of 
capital. Certain strategies are used to make the capitalist mode of produc-
tion appear infinite in its reach. And perhaps at certain historical moments 
the appearance of this inf inite has a def inite character. But what I think 
is more decisive are the ways in which possibilities of something other 
than capitalist reproduction/accumulation are either made to disappear 
or appear ridiculous.
SG/JH: Marx presents the capital relation as a relation between living 
and dead labour and, of course, the book, Capital, is filled with ghosts, 
vampires, werewolves, etc. The traditions of Lukács and Debord, the con-
ceptualizations of reification and spectacle, but also your own work seems 
to be dealing with this rhetoric of life and death. And this is not entirely 
surprising given the connections Roland Barthes draws in Camera Lucida 
between the ‘punctum’ or that detail within the photograph that enables it 
to transcend its banal context (‘studium’) and death. The ‘presence’ within 
a photograph is precisely its absence—‘that moment which is no longer’. 
The concrete forms of visual representation (including architecture, more 
often than not in its most geometrical monumentality) are presented as 
mortifying. They make processes invisible and freeze movements. And 
then your films show the presence of the absent in an indeed ghost-like 
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manner, the passers-by in Central Park, the workers constructing the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, etc. How are video and photography on the one 
hand and the commodity on the other indeed a question of life and death?
This presence of the absent that you mention as being rendered in a ghost-
like manner in the f ilms: It’s true that this is the case in both Unsupported 
Transit and Through a Fine Screen. And the former is perhaps the easiest f ilm 
to talk about in this respect because there this relation of the living labour 
of the present to accumulated past labour is articulated explicitly in the 
voice-over and in the way the images present a picture of subtraction—the 
subtraction of the present in which they were taken. The ‘punctum’ here 
is more this process of subtraction of certain details, their ongoing disap-
pearance in these images. These details, in Unsupported Transit, are the 
workers who can only be found with a certain effort from the viewer. Even 
then, they are only half-there, translucent, blurred before the worksite that 
can be seen through them (Figure 10.8). In time-lapse f ilms this kind of 
blurring is achieved through the intentional use of longer exposure times 
in order to prevent the appearance of faster movements from interfering 
with the slower ones that the f ilm is to depict. In the case of time-lapse 
f ilms documenting the progress on construction sites, it is the slow ascent 
of the building that is to be represented and this is done at the expense of 
all the real labour that actually makes such an ascent possible. Today such 
f ilms are made as a matter of course in any given construction project, 
especially with larger, monumental structures. The time-lapse f ilm is a 
favoured form of representation of such projects and in general it can be 
seen as a popular medium for the depiction of capital accumulation at the 
scale of the built environment.
It is in the second half of Unsupported Transit, made up of a series of three 
fairly long static shots of the stock exchange construction site, where it is 
most diff icult to locate the vanishing workers because of the sheer scale 
of the scene, which is still only a partial view of the entire site. These wide 
shots reveal a space the scale of which is diff icult to fathom. The relation of 
the human body to the massive structure being built is, on the side of the 
‘studium’, one of construction. Anyone appearing in the shot is involved with 
the very real work of building this massive structure. But the scale of the 
structure makes such activity impossible to grasp. One can either see the 
work or the structure, but not both simultaneously. The specif icity of both 
the work and the workers has been transformed into a general picture of 
the ongoing results of this labour (Figure 10.9). At the scale of the building 
as a whole, there is only labour power in use and not any specif ic labour to 
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be seen, except perhaps in the few places where a large machine is being 
operated by an individual worker. But even there, it is the machine that 
you see and not the operator. Of course, one could look at that machine as 
accumulated labour, just like the building itself. And that’s the point—that 
what appears here is the result of past labour. At the exchange, this is what 
labour looks like. A commodity, like anything else.
The thing is that at the scale of abstraction at the Stock Exchange, with 
the exception of the traders and other exchange staff, labour is impossible to 
see optically, but it’s in every single thing that is exchanged there. You need 
an adequate theory of capital, not a state-of-the-art imaging technology, to 
be able to see labour there. When an exchange is being built on the other 
hand—when it’s a construction site like any other—labour is precisely what 
there is to see. But at a certain point in the process, the scale of things takes 
over. The sheer accumulation of capital overwhelms the actual work being 
done. When I shot Unsupported Transit, the site had definitely reached that 
point. I felt like it would be a good moment to slow down the time-lapse of 
this construction project and see some of the mechanisms through which 
labour disappears in that kind of image of capital accumulation.
SG/JH: The ghostly presence of the political—the figure of the worker 
as you mention—suggests a melancholic figure of shifting moments of 
absence and presence in the dominant regime of visual/spatial repre-
sentation. This relates to the work of Debord again. For when speaking 
about life, death, reification, spectacle, and, of course, the tradition of 
Figure 10.8. worksite at Shenzhen Stock exchange. Video still from zachary Formwalt, Unsup-
ported Transit, 2011.
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Debord one of course stumbles over the most obvious parallel between 
your films and some of Debord’s films (first and foremost of course the 
film version of The Society of the Spectacle): the monotonous (and maybe 
melancholic) voice-over. Would you want to situate this obvious formal 
decision in this tradition?
Yes, though I wouldn’t overemphasize the melancholic aspect of this. It’s 
diff icult for me to read a text without dramatizing it and not sounding a 
little bit melancholic. The monotony is related to this lack of staging. The 
f irst time I used my own voice in a work was for a television program that 
I made in 2005 called A Story Called ‘Eurabia’. It was for a small artist-run 
television station in Copenhagen called tv-tv that had a slot just before the 
porn started late at night. I was living in Malmö, just across the Öresund 
from Copenhagen, at the time. FOX News was run on normal television 
in Malmö and they had just aired a program called Eurabia that looked 
at several European cities, one of which was Malmö, where they made 
a series of superf icial links between immigration and terrorism. A Story 
Called ‘Eurabia’ carried out an analysis of the program, the way in which 
they used images and texts to make their connections. Working on that 
piece was really exciting for me, because there was a kind of urgency to it. I 
had a short deadline to meet and access to a rudimentary recording studio 
(Figure 10.10). I was able to get most of the footage I needed online and then 
re-stage the ‘broadcast’ on a television screen that I then recorded. I had 
Figure 10.9. exterior of Shenzhen Stock exchange. Video still from zachary Formwalt, Unsupported 
Transit, 2011.
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just seen for the f irst time Godard and Miéville’s Ici et ailleurs, Comment ça 
va? and Numéro deux and was completely taken by those works. The f irst 
was probably the most influential on the works I would make in the next 
couple of years, but they all made an impact. Shortly after that I started 
watching Alexander Kluge’s stuff from the 1970s and 1980s and in combina-
tion with Harun Farocki, a whole world of possibilities for f ilm and video 
had opened up for me. All of these f ilmmakers were using, at one point or 
another, their own voices. There was something about the immediacy of 
that that I found attractive and, ultimately, it was a way in which I could 
work without having to raise any money for the projects. I had seen Debord’s 
The Society of the Spectacle years earlier, but it had not made an impact on 
me in the way that these other works did. I think this was in part about 
timing and my own ideas about f ilmmaking. Perhaps I wasn’t ready for 
that f ilm when I f irst saw it. After Farocki, Kluge, Godard, and Miéville, 
however, I took another look at Debord’s f ilms and what really struck me 
about them was this purity that they seemed to have. A kind of ultimate 
impenetrability. I think this is because they seem to refuse to touch down 
on the detail, always remaining on the level of the totality, of the spectacle 
Figure 10.10. Voice-over microphone in malmö recording studio. Video still from zachary 
Formwalt’s 2005 television program, A Story Called ‘Eurabia’.
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as such, rather than any particular manifestation of it even though the f ilms 
are loaded with particular images. What I had really liked about the work 
of Godard/Miéville, Kluge, and Farocki was the way in which a particular 
instance or detail would suddenly open onto a whole. But I think in all 
these cases, Debord included, the relation of the voice to the image is never 
fully resolved. I think that formal decision is as important as the decision 
to use one’s own voice.
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1. Sections of this Introduction were presented by Samir Gandesha in a paper 
entitled ‘Jacques Derrida: A “Good European”?’ at a Conference on ‘Philoso-
phy, Language and the Politics: Re-Evaluating Post-Structuralism’ at Jawaha-
rlal Nehru University in December 2014. We would like to thank Ian Angus, 
Andrew Feenberg, Am Johal, Daniel Musekamp, Joseph Nicolai, and Wayne 
Knights for their helpful comments on previous drafts. Special thanks to 
Jason O’Neal King for various kinds of support.
2. Personal communication from art historian and critic Professor Lu Xinghua.
3. This has a particular valence in Putin’s aggressive policies vis-à-vis the 
Ukraine. 
4. Pouring cold water on 15 February as representing anything other than a 
certain mobilization of global citizenry under the aegis of fear was Perry 
Anderson’s typically trenchant commentary. The idea of pan-European soli-
darity was of course also terribly contradicted by the fiscal contradictions 
that began to sharpen only a few years later with the global economic crisis 
of 2007–2008 wherein it was revealed how irreconcilable northern and 
southern regions of the EU actually are as reflected in the Greece referen-
dum whose anti-austerity results were simply ignored and more recently by 
the election of SYRIZA and its opposition to German-led austerity. 
5. One of the worst being a beheading of some 21 Coptic Christians on a 
Libyan beach. 
6. So much so that in Europe, many prepare themselves for an imminent inva-
sion of ISIS fighters. 
7. One must not forget that the ground of the Arab Spring was, to some extent, 
prepared in Persia, i.e. the 2009 Green Revolution in which the ‘micro-
spectacle’ was turned in the direction not of rendering the population more 
passive but for creating conditions under which the Ahmadinejad regime 
could be challenged (unsuccessfully, as it turned out).
8. Demands that have and are being made and with success in, for example, 
Seattle by Socialist Alternative, as well as in struggles that are brewing 
elsewhere.
9. This is Moishe Postone’s distinction between the critique of capitalism from 
the ‘standpoint of labour’, on the one hand, and the critique of ‘abstract 
labour as the dominant form of social mediation’, on the other. See Postone, 
1996, Chapter 2. 
10. In fact, this can explain to some extent the positive reception in the mid-
1980s of the conservative critique of ‘depoliticization’ in the pages of the 
erstwhile leftist journal Telos, which did so much to introduce Critical 
Theory to North America. 
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11. See also Chris Hedges (2010), which, despite evoking the concept of ‘spec-
tacle’, demonstrates no real grasp of how to account for what Marx called 
‘socially necessary illusion’ nor any really convincing, structural account of 
the ‘spectacle’. As such, the author’s only real stance isn’t a properly ‘politi-
cal’ one but rather shrill, impotent sermonizing. 
12. One of the most promising accounts of the problem of extremist or Jihadi 
responses to the neo-liberal ‘fundamentalism of the market’ is the account 
offered by Moishe Postone. To wit: The critique of the governing form of 
social mediation under capitalism, namely, the law of value or ‘abstract la-
bour’, is concretized in the form of ‘spectacular’ images of the enemy: quin-
tessentially the rootless ‘Jew’, but which could just as easily apply, today, to 
the refugee, migrant, or asylum-seeker, etc. This is a ‘false concretization’ of 
the abstract insofar as the structural conditions are not only hidden from 
view, but actually become reinforced particularly through a re-doubled 
dynamics of colonization driven by a politics of fear of the other. 
1. Reification as Structural Depoliticization : The Political 
Ontology of Lukács and Debord
1. See Jaeggi and Stahl (2011), Bewes and Hall (2011), Thompson (2011), Bitterolf 
and Maier (2012), Plass (2015).
2. Timo Jütten (2011) goes into a similar direction. He emphasizes that every 
critique of reification is fundamentally a form of re-politicization (pp. 725–
729).
3. In Axel Honneth’s book Reification (2008), the key text for such ethical read-
ings, the political implications of the term get obscured. Although Honneth 
is eager to reconstruct the reification of self-relations, of relations to others, 
of thought and of objects within the framework of his ontological theory of 
the social, one politically crucial aspect of reification remains in the dark: 
the reification of society. 
4. This seems to be the central claim of the slightly obscure chapter on depo-
liticization in Gilman-Opalsky (2011, pp. 64–77), which I hope to be able to 
elucidate to some extent.
5. For the concept of political ontology and the indirectly political dimensions 
of ontology, see also Bourdieu (1991).
6. It is important to note here that Gegenstandsform really describes the forms 
of objects rather than the form of objectivity as such. To avoid reiterating 
the failed belief in an all-embracing idealist horizon of subject-object iden-
tity, one should be aware of this distinction. 
7. As I refer to the concrete factuality of commodities (and later) images, I 
use this term quite differently from Durkheim’s famous use of the term. 
According to Durkheim (2012), social facts are basically all kinds of social 
behaviour that exist independently of individual action. In my use of the 
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term, ‘social facts’ are empirical facts into which social relations and general 
behavioural patterns, characteristic for a specific society, are inscribed. 
8. And as Searle specifies in his Making the Social World, this act is possible 
only because subjects (S) performatively relate (R) to the status of these 
objects (Y) because they have the power to do so (Searle, 2010, pp. 102–104). 
This might, however, suggest that we are dealing with practices that can still 
be attributed to individuals which is not the case in Marx’s example: Com-
modification is a widely anonymous and structural (thus: not individual) 
practice.
9. One could say more here about the nature of Lukácsian dialectics (and its 
critique of the natural sciences—see, for instance, Lukács, 1971, p. 6) and 
its effects on the further development of critical theory. I would just like to 
refer to the following three (or so) publications here.
10. If not the terminology of institutional facts, reference to ‘instituting’ and 
‘instituted’ social reality plays a major role in the political ontology of Cor-
nelius Castoriadis. Society’s ‘alienation with respect to itself ’ is ‘a manner 
of instituting itself which contains the refusal to see that it institutes itself ’ 
(Castoriadis, 1987, p. 214). Castoriadis (in particular and the group Social-
isme ou Barbarie in general) has been one of the intermediaries between 
Lukács and Debord.
11. The most obvious form of such an ontology in contemporary social and 
political philosophy is the political ontology of Hardt and Negri, which they 
themselves describe as ‘radical ontology of the production of the social’ 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 28). Their critique of ‘Empire’ (just as much as 
Castoriadis’s theory of political alienation, see above) can be read as a con-
tinuation of the critique of political reification in the tradition of Lukács.
12. Which really suggests that men have lost their practical understanding of 
the social world as well.
13. Samir Gandesha (2016) also interprets this key passage as a Rancièreian 
‘redistribution of the sensible’.
14. It is thus no coincidence that Debord called his 1961 film Critique de la 
séparation.
15. See the introduction of this book and the chapters by Joost de Bloois, 
Sudeep Dasgupta, and Noortje de Leij for further aspects of contemporary 
analyses of spectacle. 
16. As is well known, Debord even invented his own strategic board game: A 
Game of War.
17. See particularly Lukács, 1971, p. 80, where Lukács explicitly praises the work-
ers’ councils. Debord interprets Lukács’s critique of reification (and his plea 
for radical workers’ democracy) as radically contrary to Leninism and his 
Leninist leanings as massive self-misunderstanding: ‘When Lukács, in 1923, 
pointed to this same organizational form [of the workers’ council] as the 
long-sought mediation between theory and practice thanks to which prole-
tarians, instead of being mere ‘spectators’ of events that occur in their own 
organization, consciously choose and experience those events, what he was 
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describing as actual virtues of the Bolshevik party were in fact everything 
that the Party was not’ (Debord, 1995, p. 81).
18. The problem of a strictly Hegelian reading of Lukács (a misinterpretation 
for which Lukács himself is not quite innocent) mainly goes back to the 
idea that the proletariat has to be understood as the self-identical subject-
object of history (Lukács, 1971, p. 206). Jameson (1982, pp. 35–39) suggests 
a different, materialist reading of Lukács, which I also happen to find more 
convincing. For a discussion of transparency in Debord, also see Clark, 1999, 
p. 9.
19. Lukács somewhat admits this in his self-criticism in the introduction of 
1967 (the year of the publication of The Society of Spectacle), when he calls 
his History and Class Consciousness a work of romantic anti-capitalism 
(Lukács, 1971, p. x).
20. Surprising because of Rancière’s general sharp anti-Leninism and his harsh 
critique of Debord in his The Emancipated Spectator (2009). 
21. We consider this aesthetic-political dimension as fundamental for any kind 
of Marxism. See Samir Gandesha and Johan F. Hartle, eds. Aesthetic Marx 
(2017).
22. This also suggests why and how it remains so incommensurable with Hon-
neth’s (2008) attempt of its reconstruction, mentioned in the beginning.
23. A major part of Fredric Jameson’s theoretical efforts are about this problem. 
See Jameson (1990).
24. See the famous texts of Brecht, Bloch, and Adorno, in Adorno et al. (1977).
25. See also Debray (1995).
26. See also the chapters by Tyrus Miller and Noortje de Leij in this volume.
27. Jameson (1982, pp. 35–39, and 2009, p. 230) rejects this interpretation of 
Lukács and the subsequential identification of Lukács’s perspective with 
a Hegelian identity philosophy. Žižek (2000, p. 120) follows him in this, 
emphasizing the unforeseeable implications of the revolutionary act, 
which informs the conception of totality: ‘[W]e never reach the zero-level 
of a purely “objective” state of things. The ultimate point is not objectivity, 
but social “totality” as the process of the global “mediation” between the 
subjective and the objective aspect. In other words, the Act cannot ever be 
reduced to an outcome of objective conditions.’ I will follow their lead in 
my interpretation and in my plea for an experimental aesthetics.
28. This becomes especially interesting from the standpoint of indigenous 
resistance to the process of primitive accumulation, that is, dispossession 
and displacement. See Glen Coulthard (2014), in particular how his idea of 
‘grounded normativity’ entails, we might say, ‘relations’ to the land, people, 
and animals over the ‘fact’ of property and exchange relations.
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2. ‘Reification’ between Autonomy and Authenticity : Adorno on 
Musical Experience
1. This chapter was originally presented at the Canadian Society for Continen-
tal Philosophy in fall 2014 at Simon Fraser University. I would like to thank 
Ian Angus, Bruce Baugh, Andrew Feenberg, Johan F. Hartle, and Willow 
Verkerk for their helpful comments on a previous draft. Any errors of fact or 
interpretation are mine alone.
2. Adorno first uses this formulation in a letter to Walter Benjamin dated 
29 February 1940. See also Thijs Lijster’s chapter in this volume. 
3. In Goldmann’s (2009) view, Lukács’s conception of totality and Heidegger’s 
concept of Sorge (care) in which past, present, and future are unified, are 
homologous. 
4. See Taminiaux (1985).
5. See Biro (2011); Cook (2011); and also Debord (2008).
6. By this Adorno means the attempt to circumvent a rigorous analysis of capi-
talism by invoking an illusory past era of supposed unity or reconciliation 
of subject and object. It is, in a word, what Lukács would use to describe his 
own position in Theory of the Novel: ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ (Lukács, 1974, 
p. 18). See for example, Adorno’s analysis (1973a, p. 26) of the problem of 
‘shelteredness’ (Geborgenheit).
7. The first model shapes the history of Western Marxism in key ways, par-
ticularly via the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School both in the first 
generation as well as in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, and in 
Andrew Feenberg’s philosophy of technology. It also has a profound impact 
on the thinking of the Situationist International, most notably Debord’s 
The Society of the Spectacle, although, as Howard Caygill (2013, pp. 176–177) 
has recently suggested, not necessarily Vaneigem’s Revolution of Everyday 
Life. The second model shapes various developments in French and Anglo-
American thought. In particular, Heidegger’s ‘ontological difference’ is 
taken up and radicalized in Jacques Derrida’s (1982) decentring of structur-
alism through the operations of differance—the differing, deferring logic of 
the trace that manifests the inherent ‘undecidability’ of signification and 
therefore the very possibility of an opening to a ‘democracy to come’. It also 
forms the basis for Hannah Arendt’s (1958) differentiation of the vita activa 
and her attempt to distinguish action, as the temporally-bounded inaugu-
ration of a new beginning, with the endless and mechanical repetition of 
behaviour constitutive of what she calls ‘the social’. The difference model 
forms a basis, as well, for Charles Taylor’s (1985) elaboration of a philosophi-
cal anthropology directed against objectivism and positivism within the 
human sciences that provides an account of human beings as ‘self-inter-
preting animals’. It can also be discerned in Hubert Dreyfus’s (2014) critique 
of artificial intelligence based on the anthropological specificity of ‘skilful 
coping’ based on Heidegger’s ‘existential analysis of Dasein’.
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8. Taking as their starting point sense certainty and the commodity form He-
gel and Marx seek in the Phenomenology and Capital to unfold the media-
tions that lead from these starting points to Absolute Knowledge and the 
mode of production as a whole, respectively. 
9. This can also be discerned in Marx’s discussion of the way in which surplus 
value is erased in the transition from the first to subsequent circuits of 
capital’s expanded reproduction. (See the interview with Zachary Formwalt 
at the end of this volume.)
10. This is what Althusser and Balibar (1986, p. 17) criticize as ‘expressive total-
ity’ or the idea that the social formation as a whole could be said to express 
or be constituted by a single contradiction. 
11. This means the attempt to determine the nature of ‘Being’ by determining 
the nature of God. 
12. Recall also Heidegger’s reference to the Choral Ode on the ‘Strangeness of 
Man’ from the Antigone in his notorious Introduction to Metaphysics (1959) 
from 1935.
13. This means that Honneth replaces metaphysical commitments of the post-
Idealist sort, i.e. transcendental subjectivity, with social-psychological ones 
capable of being empirically tested. 
14. This itself stems from the Wittgensteinan attempt to address the sceptical 
problem of the possibility of ‘knowing’ other minds by virtue of an ‘ac-
knowledgment’ of the pain expressed by the other which cannot itself be 
known with certainty. See Wittgenstein, 2003, §302–§303.
15. See chapter by Hartle in this volume. 
16. This is the gist of the critical rejoinders by Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, 
and Jonathan Lear included in the volume. See also Andrew Feenberg (2011).
17. In fact these are its Rousseauian roots. See Rousseau’s notion of the ‘Gen-
eral Will’, in Rousseau (1984), which was such an inspiration for Kant. 
18. This is precisely the term Fichte uses to describe a set of worries generated 
by the Napoleonic campaigns in the German-speaking lands in his addresses 
to the German nation and this has a profound impact on Lukács. See Lukács, 
1971b, p. 18. See Bibliography>, in which modern individualism (Fichte’s ‘sen-
suous selfishness’) is a symptom of the age of ‘absolute sinfulness’.
19. As Howard Caygill (2014) recently suggested, a critical move in this respect 
is made by Schiller in taking the step from the actual to the possible as the 
move from the realm of necessity to that of freedom. In his Theory of the 
Novel, Lukács presents the idea of ‘second nature’ which anticipates the 
concept of reification in History and Class Consciousness which he describes 
as ‘the charnel house of long-dead interiorities’ (Lukács, 1971b, p. 64).
20. Literally ‘mineness’ and is cognate with Eigentum or ‘property’. See Adorno, 
1973a, pp. 127–28.
21. As Debord puts it in a remarkably similar formulation: ‘The spectacle in 
general, as the concrete inversion of life, is the autonomous movement of 
the non-living’ (Debord, 1995, §2, emphasis added).
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22. The controversy initially caused by the publication of Victor Farias’s book 
Heidegger and Nazism through to the recent publication of the Schwarze 
Hefte, which reveal the extent of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, can be usefully 
understood in light of Moishe Postone’s (1980) account of anti-Semitism as 
the false concretion of the abstract logic of finance capital in the figure of 
the Jew. 
23. For an elaboration of this, see the ‘Introduction’ to Gandesha and Hartle 
(2016).
24. See the chapter in this volume by Thijs Lijster.
25. Adorno’s concept of ‘structural listening’ has been the focus of a critical de-
bate within the philosophy of music. For example, Rose Subotnick, in line 
with the postmodern suspicion of ‘totality’, has sought to deconstruct the 
concept. Richard Leppert, on the other hand, has sought to defend it. What 
both sides of this issue miss, however, is the manner in which the concept 
is tied to Adorno’s reading of the Hegelian concept of Erfahrung, denoting 
a dynamic, unifying form of experience of an object mediated by subjec-
tivity. This is brought out in Lydia Goehr’s positing of the ‘elective affinity’ 
between music and philosophy that lies at the heart of Adorno’s work. See 
Goehr, 2008, pp. 1–44. 
3. ‘All Reification Is a Forgetting’ : Benjamin, Adorno, and the 
Dialectic of Reification
1. On the other hand, Žižek has been defending Lukács’s Leninism against the 
Frankfurt School. See Žižek (2000).
2. For some classic discussions, see, for instance, Rose (1978) and Jameson 
(1990). For a more recent and thorough discussion of Adorno’s critique of 
Lukács, however, see Hall (2011). As Hall shows, Adorno criticizes Lukács 
both for not getting beyond idealism and for regressing behind it, to a form 
of what Lukács himself calls ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ (Hall, 2011, p. 62). For 
my argument here I will focus only on the first accusation.
3. Lukács himself also makes this point in his self-critical 1967 preface to His-
tory and Class Consciousness.
4. See Benjamin’s letter of 20 May 1935 to his friend Gershom Scholem (Benja-
min and Scholem, 1980, p. 195).
5. Marx quoted in Benjamin, 1999a, p. 657. For Marx, however, the social 
meaning projected on the commodity as fetish is never a mere projection. 
Differences in exchange value of commodities also refer to real differences 
in hours of socially necessary labour, which in turn point to class relations. 
This connection tends to be blurred by Benjamin’s consumption-oriented 
approach.
6. Nevertheless, Luc Boltanski and Arnaud Esquerre (2011) argue that the 
nineteenth-century collection is the model for a form of capitalism that 
comes after industrial capitalism, in which commodities that have an aura 
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of singularity and individuality (such as haute couture fashion and designer 
objects, gadgets, and other luxury goods) are increasingly preferred over 
standardized goods.
7. See Benjamin’s essay on Surrealism, where he writes the following about 
André Breton: ‘He can boast an extraordinary discovery: he was the first 
to perceive the revolutionary energies that appear in the “outmoded”—in 
the first iron constructions, the first factory buildings, the earliest photos, 
objects that have begun to be extinct, grand pianos, the dresses of five years 
ago, fashionable restaurants when the vogue has begun to ebb from them’ 
(Benjamin, 1999b, p. 210).
8. See for instance: ‘Aura is not only—as Benjamin claimed—the here and 
now of the artwork, it is whatever goes beyond its factual givenness, its 
content; one cannot abolish it and still want art. Even demystified artworks 
are more than what is literally the case’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 56).
9. This ontological interpretation of the commodity form as being destructive 
with regard to the use value has been characteristic for the early Frankfurt 
School. It can, however, be questioned whether it adequately represents the 
argument of Capital, which very much seems to be about the dialectics of 
the equivalent form allowing for exploitation: surplus value.
10. Furthermore, the subject also loses that aspect of him/herself that is alien 
or non-identical, the sensuous or bodily aspect of what it is to be human. 
Hence Adorno’s preoccupation with suffering, which he considers as the 
somatic remainder of nature in the subject.
11. See Benjamin, 2003, p. 338. This characterization of the experience of ‘natu-
ral’ aura is likely to be inspired by Baudelaire’s poem ‘Correspondences’: 
‘Man walks within these groves of symbols, each / of which regards him as a 
kindred thing’ (Baudelaire, 1993, p. 19).
12. Like the translators of Dialectic of Enlightenment, I prefer to translate 
Eingedenken as ‘remembrance’, rather than ‘mindfulness’, which is also often 
used in the literature. The reasons are, first, that ‘mindfulness’ is more or 
less synonymous with ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness’ and lacks the historical 
dimension that the concept ‘remembrance’ has, and second, the concept of 
‘mindfulness’ brings along associations of contemporary practices of medi-
tation and (Eastern) spirituality, which I here want to avoid.
13. For instance: what is obscured in this ideology is that the fluidity and flex-
ibility our ‘network society’ boasts about is reserved for money, commodi-
ties, and tourists, not for refugees or jobseekers.
14. This process of the displacement of critique and the resulting disorientation 
of critique is most elaborately discussed in Boltanski and Chiapello (2005).
15. See especially Latour (1993 and 2010). For an interesting critique of Latour 
as well as a positive re-appropriation of the concept of reification, see Silva 
(2013).
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5. ‘The Brilliance of Invisibility’ : Tracking the Body in the Society 
of the Spectacle
1. The above description of modernity, and Clark’s extension of it to the 
society of the spectacle emphasizes the capitalist character of modernity, 
instead of a generalized description of a specific period. See Peter Osborne 
(2000, pp. 63–77) for a critique of theorizations of modernity which em-
phasize the experience of flux and dissolution while ignoring the capitalist 
and class-fracturing dynamic of modernity, such as in Marshall Berman’s All 
That Is Solid Melts into the Air: The Experience of Modernity (1988). Zygmunt 
Bauman’s (2000) notion of ‘liquid modernity’ is similarly critiqued by Ran-
cière (2009, p. 37). The emphasis in my argument of the importance of the 
category of class, and of socioscopy (Bolla, 1996) as the visualization of a 
class-riven social totality is predicated precisely on this crucial link between 
capitalism as an economic system and transformations in visual experience.
2. Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1984) is the exem-
plary text in which class is figured through the dialectic of coherence and 
dispersal due to the multiplications of contradictions and economic and 
political interests. See Marx, 1984, pp. 123–135 in particular.
6. Art Criticism in the Society of the Spectacle: The Case of 
October
1. Letter from the editors to Artforum as quoted in Bracker (1995, p. 107). The 
other editors who signed the letter were Lawrence Alloway, Max Kozloff, 
and Joseph Masheck.
2. The journal was allusively named after Serge Eisenstein’s silent film October: 
a phantasmagoric montage about the 1917 October Revolution and method-
ologically based on Eisenstein’s interpretation of Marxism. Jeremy Gilbert-
Rolfe was initially also involved with October, but he left after a few issues. 
Soon after, Douglas Crimp joined the editorial team. However, in 1990 
Crimp left October after a disagreement over a special issue he put together 
on the AIDS crisis. In organizing the issue, Crimp had moved towards the 
domain of political activism, away from the much more theoretical, critical 
analysis that was typical for October. The other October editors, however, 
did not answer Crimp’s call for political activism and after their refusal to 
publish a second issue on the subject that he had organized (entitled ‘How 
Do I Look?’), Crimp left the journal. Benjamin Buchloh, Yve-Alain Bois, and 
Hal Foster joined October after Crimp’s departure. It should be noted that 
Annette Michelson, although a founding editor, is quite seldom brought up 
in discussion about October and often seems not to be regarded as a core 
‘member’ of what is sometimes referred to as the ‘October group’. 
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3. See Debord, 1995, p. 136: ‘Dadaism sought to abolish art without realizing it, 
and surrealism sought to realize art without abolishing it. The critical posi-
tion since worked out by the Situationists demonstrates that the abolition 
and the realization of art are inseparable aspects of a single transcendence 
of art.’ 
4. Krauss, Bois, Foster, and Buchloh all participated in the roundtable discus-
sion. The term ‘integrated spectacle’ stems from Debord’s 1988 Comments 
on the Society of the Spectacle: a forlorn update of his original analysis, 
enucleated of his (pre-1968) ‘naive’ revolutionary optimism. The integrated 
spectacle ‘has spread itself to the point where it now permeates all reality’, 
Debord decrees, and leaves no escape (Debord, 2011, p. 9).
5. No account of October would be complete without an analysis of the 
journal’s introduction of French theory into art criticism. Rosalind Krauss 
and Annette Michelson in particular extensively incorporated thinkers like 
Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, 
and Gilles Deleuze. It would, in fact, be of great interest to analyse how 
Foucault’s conception of ‘bio-power’ and Deleuze’s ‘societies of control’ 
converge and conflict with the notion of ‘spectacle’ in the October writings. 
However, within the scope of this chapter, I will confine my analysis of 
October to their use of Debord’s ‘spectacle’. 
6. Krauss’s title explicitly refers to the 1984 essay ‘Postmodernism, or the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’ by the Marxist theorist and literary critic 
Fredric Jameson. 
7. Krauss mentions the trance-like installations or colour projections of James 
Turrell as exemplary for this ‘sensory reprogramming’ of ‘hyperreality’. 
It is noteworthy that Turrell, described by Krauss as ‘an extremely minor 
figure for Minimalism’, appears in practically all the October writers’ texts 
as emblematic for the sublimatory, ahistorical, and spectacular experience 
(Krauss, 1990, p. 12); see also, for example, Foster (2004). 
8. See also the chapter by Sudeep Dasgupta in this volume.
9. One common denominator between Baudrillard and Debord and the Situa-
tionists is the Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre. Both Baudrillard and the 
Situationists were heavily influenced by Lefebvre, especially by his Critique 
of Everyday Life, in which he analysed capitalism’s permeation of everyday 
life. Departing from a Hegelian-Marxist conception of alienation, Lefebvre 
argued that the commodity form had extended to the everyday life, leading 
to social alienation and atomization. Surprisingly enough, Lefebvre had not 
read George Lukács’s History of Class Consciousness when he first devel-
oped this analysis of the commodification of everyday life in La Conscience 
Mystifiée. ‘Is it true what a chap who has looked through A Conscience 
Mysitfiée tells me: that the book just repeats what has already been said in 
Germany by Lukács?’ wrote Lefebvre in a letter to his collaborator Norbert 
Guterman (Lefebvre as quoted in Trebitsch, 1991, p. xvii). Although Lefeb-
vre and the Situationists ended on rather bad terms, they worked together 
quite closely and mutually inspired each other from 1957 until their break 
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in 1963. The Situationists were most fundamentally influenced by Lefebvre’s 
plea for a revolution of the everyday life (literally referenced in Vaneigem’s 
The Revolution of Everyday Life) as well as by his analysis of a shift from the 
consumption of goods to the consumption of signs and images (‘consumer-
goods are not only glorified by signs and “good” insofar as they are signified; 
consumption is primarily related to these signs and not to the goods them-
selves’ (Lefebvre as quoted in Gotham and Krier, 2008, p. 166.). Baudrillard 
started his academic career as Lefebvre’s assistant and his further theoreti-
cal development was also heavily influenced by Lefebvre’s work. From the 
1970s onwards, however, Baudrillard distanced himself from his earlier 
Marxist framework and by the time he introduced his ideas on ‘simula-
tions’ and ‘the hyperreal’, he argued that there was no truth underneath the 
‘untrue’ anymore, since simulations had become more real than the real. In 
this hyperreality, ‘social theory loses its very object as meanings, classes, and 
difference implode into a “black hole” of non-differentiation’ (Kellner, 1994, 
p. 10). It is within this context that Baudrillard argued that ‘we are no longer 
in the society of the spectacle which the Situationists talked about, nor in 
the specific types of alienation and repressions which it implied’ (Baudril-
lard, 1991, p. 273). 
10. Not surprisingly, in this respect, Buchloh was the one responsible for writ-
ing the entry for ‘The Social History of Art’ in the introduction to Art Since 
1900—the comprehensive art history book that Foster, Krauss, Bois, and 
Buchloh wrote as a joint undertaking. Krauss wrote the entry for ‘Poststruc-
turalism and Deconstruction’, Foster was in charge of ‘Psychoanalysis’, and 
Bois took care of ‘Formalism and Structuralism’. ‘None of us is married to a 
particular method’, Bois noted in one of their roundtables, yet this division 
is nonetheless characteristic for their respective art critical approaches 
(Bois in Bois et al., 2004b, p. 671). 
11. Motivated by his discontent with a suffocating ‘overdetermined cultural 
identity’ in post-war Germany, Buchloh emigrated in 1977 to the United 
States with hopeful expectations of arriving in a country that had devel-
oped, at least in an early stage, a ‘postnational cultural identity’ (Buchloh, 
2003a, p. xviii). His intellectual formation was, however, highly indebted to 
Germany’s post-war political climate during the 1960s student protests and 
intellectual debates, fuelled by the Frankfurt School, about the political po-
tential of artistic expressions, the rise of the culture industry, and an overall 
concern with finding ways to deal with the country’s fascist past. Of all the 
October writers, Buchloh is most strongly indebted to the Frankfurt School, 
especially to Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin’s cultural theories (he 
even adopted the latter’s name).
12. See Buchloh, 2003a, p. xxii: ‘when culture industry and spectacle massively 
invade the once relatively autonomous spaces, institutions, and practices of 
avant-garde culture and begins to control them’. 
13. At the beginning of an essay on Hans Haacke, Buchloh quotes Adorno stat-
ing that ‘[t]he organizing, unifying principle of each and every work of art is 
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borrowed from that very rationality whose claim to totality it seeks to defy’ 
(Adorno as quoted in Buchloh, 2003b, p. 203). The totalizing rationality that 
art, in Buchloh’s art criticism, has to defy, however, is that of spectacle.
14. See Gotham and Krier (2008) for a lucid explication of the difference 
between these two forms of ‘immanent critique’. Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
project of immanent critique was mainly ‘to discern what aspects of exist-
ing society should be negated or transcended, in order to create a better so-
ciety. The Situationists informed their critique of the spectacle with a vision 
of liberation using the strategy of détournement. […] For the Situationists, 
détournement is revolutionary praxis that attempts to reveal that the ideas, 
values, and cultural and technological means of launching progressive 
social change are already available to everyone. […] The goal of Situation-
ist practice is to appropriate the texts, images, and advertisements that are 
produced by the spectacular society in an effort to bring critical awareness 
to people’s struggles and conflicts, and to incite collective revolt against the 
stultification induced by entertainment and spectacle’ (Gotham and Krier, 
2008, pp. 180, 181). 
15. The minimalist three-dimensional object challenged Clement Greenberg’s 
‘disembodied’ contemplative observer and situated the subject in a spatial 
and temporal relation to the work by encouraging him/her to physically 
engage with the three-dimensional cubes and beams. For formalists such 
as Fried, these works herewith contaminated the specifics of the medium 
sculpture with the timely experience of theatre. See also the chapter by Kati 
Röttger in this volume.
16. See also Day, 2010, pp. 187–193.
17. Buchloh acknowledges in his ‘Epilogue on the Idea of Use Value’, the 
concluding subchapter of the essay, that ‘use value is at the same time art’s 
most heteronomous counterpart’ and warns in the section that follows for 
the imminent recuperation of art’s critical transgression (in Marxist-Ador-
nian fashion he emphasizes that art’s possibility of critique is intertwined 
with the specific conditions of its historical context) in which it is trans-
formed into a ‘merely aesthetic object’. Herewith art is not only neutralized 
but becomes, as both Debord and Marcuse theorized, a sublimating distrac-
tion that strengthens the dominant social structure: ‘Restorations on the 
formal surfaces of social reality’, Buchloh writes, ‘effect the opposite of their 
original intentions’ (Buchloh, 2003c, pp. 198–199).
18. See also Day, 2010, p. 187.
19. Buchloh’s focus on the distinction between a false, surface reality and ‘real’ 
social structures underneath clearly reveals a break with the Baudrillardian 
conception of simulacrum as referenced by Krauss and Foster. Nevertheless, 
they all share a concern for uncovering or unveiling a certain truth, or, so to 
speak, for waking up the sedated subject—which might lead us, again, to 
question October’s integration of Baudrillard’s theory of simulacrum into 
their art critical project. 
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7. Spectacle and Politics : Is There a Political Reality in the 
Spectacle of Society?
1. Referring to the congruence between the notions of spectacle and theatre 
in Debord’s approach, see Debord, 1995, p. 41.
2. Rancière 2004, p. 272: ‘Plato drew an opposition between the poetic demo-
cratic community of the theatre and a “true” community: a choreographic 
community in which no one remains spectator, in which everyone moves 
according to a commutarian rhythm determined by mathematical propor-
tion.’ See Starobinski, 1988, p. 81.
3. This is precisely the advantage of the term. It is inclusive and, at the same 
time, differentiates. This also applies, for example, to an analysis of Modernist 
spectacle in terms of theatre or media studies. The concept of the spectacle is 
suitable in this context for analysing and describing different mass media such 
as film, radio, theatre, and TV, while these media themselves include spectacu-
lar practices. In many cases, the popularity of these media is linked to pre-
cisely these practices and the genres associated with them and emerging from 
them, such as grand opera, comedy, musicals, and Westerns (Röttger, 2015).
4. See Davis and Postlewait, 2003, pp. 4–5.
5. This rethinking has already gained some ground in theatre practice and in 
theatre studies, without this having been reflected in treatises on literary 
or political theory. In a nutshell: The focus is on confronting the theatre of 
representation with the theatre as event, the theatre of identity with the 
theatre of appearance, the theatre of imagination with the theatre of pro-
duction, and finally to relinquish the paradigm of an architecturally defined 
illusionist stage in order to construe the theatre as materialization of a stage 
that can be constituted wherever actors and spectators meet (see, among 
others, Lehmann, 2006).
6. Nancy distinguishes in this context between good and bad mimesis and 
between good and bad spectacles (2000, pp. 68 and 72).
7. For more on this (including examples), see Hartmann et al. (2012).
8. See on this Arendt, 1998, p. 237
9. For the English version, see Debord, Guy. “Theory of the Dérive” (1958). 
Trans. Ken Knapp. Bureau of Public Secrets, http://www.bopsecrets.org/
SI/2.derive.htm. (last accessed 13.2.2018).
10. International Situationniste, 1960, p. 152.
11. It is important to stress that urban interventions are not the only theatri-
cal art form that produce a shift to the so-called dramatic theatre. See e.g. 
Hans-Thies Lehmann’s considerations about ‘new forms of theatre’, or more 
specifically, post-dramatic theatre: ‘Aristotle’s poetics couples imitation and 
action in the famous formula that tragedy is an imitation of human action, 
mimesis praxeos. […] While for good reasons the poetics of drama have 
never abandoned the concept of action as the object of mimesis, the reality 
of the new theatre begins precisely with the fading away of this trinity of 
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drama, imitation and action’ (2006, pp. 36–37). Instead, it realizes that the 
real of our experiential worlds, of our ways of seeing and thinking is shaped 
and structured by art or even created by art in the first place. This shift from 
the representational mode of theatre to the aisthetic experience through 
theatre bears in terms of post-dramatic theatre various consequences: ‘A 
characteristic factor of the theatre now comes into its own, to which the 
following formula applies: sensuality undermines sense’ (Lehmann, 2006, 
p. 162). It includes a detachment of the word through the body, and a phe-
nomenology of perception. The bodily presence, the experience of theatre 
as event, the performance of its materiality, all generate a change in the re-
lation between mimesis, poesis, and aisthesis. Aisthesis gains from mimesis, 
and poesis separates itself from the word.
12. According to Arendt, production is crucially different to action as it pro-
duces an artificial world of things. Cf. Arendt, 1958, p. 14. 
8. Reification, Sexual Objectification, and Feminist Activism
1. Two recent examples are Hull (2013) and Jütten (2010). 
2. I agree with Honneth’s (2008, p. 20) claim that Lukács views reification to be 
a process in which social behaviours do not correspond to ontological facts.
3. Lukács quotes Marx: ‘The property-owning class and the class of the proletar-
iat represent the same human self-alienation. But, the former feels at home 
in this self-alienation and feels itself confirmed by it; it recognizes alienation 
as its own instrument and in it possesses the semblance of a human exist-
ence. The latter feels itself destroyed by this alienation and sees in it its own 
impotence and the reality of an inhuman existence’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 149).
4. ‘The individual can use his knowledge of these laws to his own advantage, 
but he is not able to modify the process by his own activity’ (Lukács, 1971, 
p. 87).
5. ‘The divorce of the phenomena of reification from their economic bases 
and from the vantage point from which alone they can be understood, is 
facilitated by the fact that the [capitalist] process of transformation must 
embrace every manifestation of the life of society if the preconditions for 
the complete self-realisation of capitalist production are to be fulfilled’ 
(Lukács, 1971, p. 95).
6. Honneth critiques Lukács for considering reification to be solely a result of 
economic circumstances: he accuses Lukács for having ‘a systematic blind-
ness associated with his prejudice that only economic forces can lead to a 
denial of humans’ human characteristics. Lukács in no way sought to gain 
knowledge of the ideological convictions that could cause entire groups 
of people to appear depersonalized and thus as mere things. He was so 
singularly focused on the effects of capitalist commodity exchange on the 
behaviour of social actors that he was incapable of taking note of any other 
social source of reification’ (Honneth, 2008, p. 78).
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7. MacKinnon explains how female desirability becomes commodified: ‘Like 
the value of a commodity, women’s sexual desirability is fetishized: it is 
made to appear a quality of the object itself, spontaneous and inherent, 
independent of the social relation which creates it, uncontrolled by the 
force that requires it’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 540). For women, MacKinnon 
argues that the predicament of reification is all-pervasive; it is their reality 
(MacKinnon, 1982, p. 542).
8. Anderson further argues that the commodification of female labour, such 
as surrogate pregnancy and ‘prostitution’, is disrespectful of women and 
encroaches upon their autonomy. She states that one is autonomous if ‘she 
confidently governs herself by principles and valuations she reflectively 
endorses’ (Anderson, 1993, p. 142). However, autonomy can be affected and 
potentially threatened through ‘addictions, compulsions, phobias, and 
other neuroses, which motivate a person in ways she cannot reflectively 
endorse’ (ibid.). In addition, Anderson states that, coming from external 
sources, autonomy can be undercut by social systems of domination and 
stigmatization (ibid.). She claims that the sale of reproductive labour or 
one’s sexuality adversely affects female autonomy especially because it is 
often if not always performed under coercion.
9. Queen describes the role of an activist sex worker: ‘to support our clients’ 
forays away from traditional masculine sexuality, to transgress masculine 
boundaries and rebel against the rigid limitations created by our own fear 
of sex’. She states that sex workers act as educators for their clients and for 
each other to challenge normative understandings of sexual identity and 
sexual pleasure (Queen, 1997, pp. 134–135).
10. See Nina Hartley’s (1997) account of objectification from the perspective of 
a sex worker. See also the stories of other feminist sex-workers in the same 
volume (Nagle, 1997). 
11. Braidotti makes a similar point: ‘Data banks of biogenetic, neural and medi-
atic information about individuals are the true capital today, as the success 
of Facebook demonstrates at a more banal level’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 61).
12. Haraway states that her problem with the Marxist and socialist standpoint 
is that it unifies the ‘polyvocal’ contributions that have become ‘visible in 
anti-colonial discourse and practice’ and presents itself as a totality, instead 
of admitting that its accounts are only partial (Haraway, 1991, pp. 159–160).
9. Reified Life : Vitalism, Environmentalism, and Reification in 
Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle and A Sick Planet
1. As Lukács argues: ‘There arises a rational systematization of all statutes 
regulating life, which represents, or at least tends towards, a closed system 
applicable to all possible and imaginary cases’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 96).
2. From the onset, in his Situationist and even lettrist works, Debord’s think-
ing is entirely environmental. Psychogeography and dérive take the milieu 
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of the modern subject as the battleground precisely because spectacle—as 
ideology embodied—entails the production of the lifeworld or environ-
ment.
3. In his biography of Guy Debord, Anselm Jappe writes: ‘It would certainly 
be a mistake to tax the Situationists with ‘vitalism’ in any traditional sense, 
in the sense that Bergson or Simmel was a vitalist. They in no way meant 
to criticize social institutions or art as extraneous to life as it actually exists 
today. […] Undoubtedly they wished to contrast life and its reifications, 
but they wished to do so in the name of another life’ (Jappe, 1999, p. 136; 
emphasis in the original). What I attempt to show in this chapter is that the 
distinction between vitalism and historicism that Jappe makes is not that 
clear-cut in the work of Debord. Debord’s historical materialism is in fact 
underpinned by vitalist assumptions—an idiosyncratic vitalism perhaps, in 
the sense that is not explicitly grounded in any recognizable philosophical 
tradition, but a distinct vitalism nonetheless.
4. For an elaborate discussion of the distinction between anthropos and hu-
manitas, see Mignolo (2003 and 2011). See also Bloois ‘2015).
5. Once more, a parenthetical reference to Adorno is illuminating concerning 
the stakes of Debord’s argument: in Minima Moralia, Adorno argues that 
‘every undistorted relationship, perhaps indeed the conciliation that is part 
of organic life itself, is a gift. He who through consequential logic becomes 
incapable of it, makes himself a thing and freezes’ (2005, p. 42). For Adorno, 
life is opposed to exchange: once entered into the sphere of commodity 
production, life becomes ossified, reified for having been made exchange-
able. As gift, life is transient: it defies objectivation.
10. Images of Capital: An Interview with Zachary Formwalt
1. This is most famously articulated in Marx and Engels’s Communist Mani-
festo (1998) in which the bourgeoisie is understood in Faustian terms as the 
sorcerer that calls into being the very force, namely the proletariat, that will 
bring about its own demise.
2. See, for example, Althusser’s Lacanian account of ideology as ‘an imagi-
nary relation of […] individuals to the real conditions in which they live’ 
(Althusser, 1971, p. 165). 
3. In describing the ‘expanded reproduction’ of capital in Capital, Vol. II, Marx 
shows the way in which the origin of capital in surplus value is obliterated 
in the passage from the first to subsequent circuits of capital. 
4. As a kind of side-note to this, the last residents of the area that became 
Central Park were evicted during a financial crisis in 1857. Descriptions of 
this crisis could be found throughout the newspapers of the time, while the 
final removal of residents went unreported. The description of the residents 
as ‘insects’ who had been violently/bravely removed by the police came al-
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most a decade later in a New York Times article on Central Park (‘CENTRAL 
PARK’, 1866). 
5. It was a decade later, but at that time, as Rebecca Solnit vividly describes in 
her account of Eadweard Muybridge’s panoramic photographs of San Fran-
cisco made in the summer of 1877, at the height of the Great Railway Strike 
in the US, urban workers and Native Americans, though now ‘separate 
subjects on bookshelves and in universities, seemed that summer as though 
they were engaged in the same war, a war against the central institutions 
that were taking away their power, their freedom, even their ability to feed 
themselves, to survive. It was as though every kind of population were be-
ing subjugated to the might of the industrial age, to its control of resources, 
to the brutality of regimented jobs and locked-down lives that still didn’t 
provide enough to eat, whether it was railroad workers on twelve-hour 
shifts or Indians forced to till the inferior land of the reservations. Remov-
ing the Indians opened up their land as an exploitable resource; keeping 
the labourers subjugated supplied the already-industrialised zones with the 
cheap labour that made such heinous profits possible. Five years earlier Sit-
ting Bull had sat down to smoke a pipe in the middle of a battle. In the sum-
mer of 1877 hundreds of thousands were doing something similar, and from 
Buffalo to the wilder parts of Montana they succeeded in shutting down the 




Adorno, Theodor 17-19, 37-39, 46-52, 55-57, 
62-65, 70, 106, 109, 112, 116-18, 124, 128-29, 
165-66, 168, 172, 207 n.2 n.6, 209 n.25 n.2, 210 
n.8 n.10, 214 n.14, 218 n.5
Aesthetic Theory 62-63
Dialectic of Enlightenment 46-48, 56, 64-65, 
116, 168, 210 n.12
Minima Moralia 172, 218 n.5
Negative Dialectics 47, 63-65
Aesthetics 17-18, 23, 31-34, 38, 50, 52, 60, 62-65, 
101, 105, 118, 122-24, 133-35, 138-39, 141-42, 
175-76, 182, 184-87, 190, 206 n.27
Aestheticization 133, 139
Ajalbert, Jean 104
Alienation 28, 31, 34, 39-40, 43, 45, 49, 55-56, 
63-65, 91-92, 94, 96-98, 107, 112-13, 115-17, 129, 
151-53, 159, 161, 205 n.10, 210 n.10, 212-13 n.9, 
216 n.3
Allegory 47, 56-60
Althusser, Louis 70, 208 n.10, 218 n.10.2
Anders, Günther 46
Anderson, Elisabeth 155-57, 217 n.8
Anderson, Perry 203 n.4
Anthropology 79, 83-84, 163-70, 207 n.7
Anthropos 165, 167-73, 218 n.9.4
Apathy 21, 28, 138
Arab Revolutions 14, 203 n.7
Aragon, Louis 71-72
Arendt, Hannah 42, 52, 145-46, 207 n.7, 216 n.12
Aristotle 143, 144, 215 n.11
Atomization 30, 117, 212 n.9
Autonomy 18, 38-39, 45-47, 50, 52, 55, 62, 112, 
149-51, 156, 217 n.8
Badiou, Alain 181
Bakhtin, Mikhail 87
Baudrillard, Jean 114-15, 212-13 n.9, 214 n.19
Baumeister, Ruth 75-76
Bell, Michael 188-89
Benjamin, Walter 18, 47-49, 55-65, 68, 70-72, 76, 
87, 108, 165-66, 209 n.5, 210 n.7 n.8 n.11
Arcades Project 56, 58-62, 68, 72-73, 108
Bergson, Henri 70, 106, 163, 218 n.9.3
Bernstein, Jay 64
Bios 165, 170-73, 176, 178
Bio-politics 165, 167, 170, 172, 174, 177
Bouazizi, Mohammed 14
Bourgeoisie 12, 32, 41, 48, 104, 152-54, 160, 
170-71, 218 n.1
Braidotti, Rosi 149, 154, 158-59, 217 n.11
Breton, André 69
Broodthaers, Marcel 61, 119
Buchloh, Benjamin 111-13, 116-29, 211 n.6.2, 212 
n.4, 213 n.10 n.11 n.12, 213-14 n.13, 214 n.17 n.19
Bush, George W. 14
Butler, Judith 19, 153-54, 157-59
Cacciari, Massimo 81-82, 85
Capitalism passim
bio-genetic 149, 159, 217 n.11




China Commodity City see Yiwu
Choreography 133, 215 n.2
Clark, T.J. 92-94, 97-100, 102-09, 206 n.18, 211 n.5.1
COBRA 69, 75-77, 87
Collecting 18, 56, 59-62, 209-10 n.6
Collectivity 30-32, 45-51, 83-84, 133-34, 140, 153
Commodity Fetishism 16, 18, 23-29, 32-33, 
39, 41-43, 48-49, 59, 62, 70, 121, 127, 149-150, 
152-53, 159, 171-72, 181-84, 209 n.5, 217 n.7
Constant (Constant Nieuwenhuys) 18, 67, 69, 
71-73, 75-88
New Babylon 71, 73, 77-88
Constellation 60, 62, 68
Consumer/Consumerism 16, 21, 28, 30, 48, 55, 59, 
70, 91, 95-96, 103, 112-13, 115, 120, 128-29, 135, 
137, 145, 149, 159, 171-72, 196, 209 n.5, 212-13 n.9
Contemplation, contemplative stance 21, 28-30, 
41, 44-45, 93, 119, 121, 124, 166, 169, 214 n.15
Le Corbusier 76, 79




Dasein 38, 42-46, 50, 207 n.7
Debord, Guy passim
Comments on the Society of the Spectacle  
128, 178
Guy Debord, son art, son temps 178
A Sick Planet 19, 39, 163-64, 166-67, 173-78
Society of the Spectacle 37
with Gianfranco Sanguinetti: The Real Split 
in the International 68, 91-97, 116-17, 164, 
166-78, 182-83, 198-200, 207 n.7
De Certeau, Michel 143-44
Deleuze, Gilles 163, 181, 212 n.5
Demos 134-35, 138
Depoliticization 16-19, 21-22, 29, 30, 32, 134, 139, 
203 n.10
Descartes, René 63
Détournement 11, 14-15, 31, 33-34, 73-74, 78, 118, 
124, 134, 141, 168-69, 184-87, 214 n.14
Dérive 15, 71-73, 75, 78, 81, 134, 144, 185
222 THe SPell oF CaPiTal 
Derrida, Jacques 12, 46, 207 n.7, 212 n.5
Dialectic 18, 25, 37, 39, 41-43, 45-46, 57, 61-62, 
65, 85, 87, 91, 112, 119-21, 127, 153, 165-71, 
173-74, 176, 178, 181, 205 n.9
Difference 37-39, 41-42, 45-46, 49-50, 98, 104, 
115, 128, 145, 158-159, 161, 165, 181, 207 n.7, 209 
n.5, 212-13 n.9, 215 n.3
Ontological difference 38, 42, 46, 49, 207 n.7
Disney World 14
Dissensus 141
Distribution of the sensible 29, 141-42, 146, 
205 n.13
Economist, The 190-91
Eisenstein, Sergej 87-88, 211 n.6.2
Enigma 62-64, 124
Engels, Friedrich 12, 218 n.1
Environmentalism 163-65, 173-77, 217-18 n.2
Exploitation 27, 92, 117, 150, 154-55, 159, 176, 181, 
193-94, 210 n.9, 219 n.5
Expropriation 73, 94-95, 192-93, 196
Exterior Space 68-70, 76-77, 82, 141, 175
Farocki, Harun 200-01






Foucault, Michel 92, 107-09, 113, 137
Fordism 10, 16-17, 28
Post-Fordism 10, 17, 136
Forgetting 37-44, 49-51, 56-57, 64, 115-16, 124-25, 
152
Foster, Hal 18, 76, 111, 115-16, 119, 124, 129, 211 




Goldmann, Lucien 38, 207 n.3
Habermas, Jürgen 12, 38, 207 n.7
Haraway, Donna 149-50, 153-54, 157-61, 217 n.12
Hardt, Michael 137, 205 n.11
Hartley, Nina 217 n.10
Harvey, David 15, 189
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 39-42, 43, 46, 
49, 57, 94, 96, 106-07, 206 n.18 n.27, 209 n.25
Heidegger, Martin 37-39, 41-47, 50-51, 63, 
140-41, 207 n.3 n.7, 208 n.12, 209 n.22
Heynen, Hilde 81
Historical materialism 163-65, 178, 218 n.9.3
Hobbes, Thomas 168-69
Hobsbawm, Eric 98
Honneth, Axel 43-44, 150-56, 204 n.3, 208 n.13, 
216 n.2 n.6
Horkheimer, Max 37, 39, 48, 51, 56, 65, 112, 
116-17, 124, 168, 214 n.14
Hullot-Kentor, Robert 56
Humanitas 167-69
Interior Space 67-71, 75-80, 82, 84-85, 87-88, 
120, 188
ISIL see Daesh
Jameson, Fredric 34, 114, 154, 206 n.18 n.23 n.27
Jappe, Anselm 29, 33, 218 n.9.3
Jaschke, Karen 77
Jorn, Asger 18, 67, 69, 74-76, 79, 87
Kant, Immanuel 41, 45, 51, 63, 69, 208 n.17






Krauss, Rosalind 111, 113-15, 118-20, 126, 212 n.4 
n.5 n.6 n.7, 213 n.10, 214 n.19
Kurczynski, Karen 76
Labour 11, 19, 23-24, 26-27, 31, 55, 57, 59, 60, 
64, 67-70, 78-79, 81, 83, 85, 94-95, 143-45, 
149, 151-53, 155, 170, 173, 176, 181-82, 188-89, 
193-98, 203 n.9, 209 n.5, 217 n.8, 219 n.5
Abstract Labour 11, 24, 69, 81
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe 140
Lefebvre, Henri 15, 68-73, 76, 82, 187, 212-13 n.9
Leninism 22, 31, 205 n.17 n.20, 209 n.1




History and Class Consciousness 17, 22, 25, 
28, 30, 31, 33-34, 37-38, 58, 70, 83, 164, 171, 
206 n.19, 208 n.19
Theory of the Novel 165, 207 n.6
Luxemburg, Rosa 10, 192
MacKinnon, Catharine 19, 154-55, 217 n.7
Manet, Edouard 92-93, 98-103, 107-09
Marcuse, Herbert 69, 79, 214 n.17
Marx, Karl 12-14, 21, 23-25, 28-30, 33, 37, 40, 48, 
59, 62, 70, 91, 94, 120-21, 124, 129, 135, 167, 181-
83, 188-94, 196, 204 n.11, 205 n.8, 208 n.8 n.9, 
209 n.5, 211 n.5.2, 216 n.3, 218 n.1, 218 n.10.3
Marxism 15-17, 21-22, 25-27, 48, 58, 70, 134, 
136, 154-55, 158-59, 206 n.21, 211 n.6.2, 
212-13 n.9, 214 n.17, 217 n.12
Western Marxism 15-17, 22, 165, 207 n.7
primitive accumulation 189, 192, 196, 206 
n.28
Capital 16, 29-30, 37, 48, 181, 192, 194, 196, 







Modernism 18, 82, 85, 87, 97, 108-09, 117, 119, 
125, 136
Modernity 13, 58, 72-73, 82, 85, 92, 94, 97-104, 
106, 164, 167, 169-70, 211 n.5.1
Mubarak, Hosni 14
Music 39, 47, 49-51, 209 n.25
Myth 47, 59, 128, 160
Nancy, Jean-Luc 134, 140-41, 146, 216 n.6
Narrativity, narrative 31-32, 34, 44, 76, 125, 129, 
167-70, 184-85
Natural history 19, 51, 59, 165-16, 170, 173
Negri, Antonio 137, 205 n.11
Nietzsche, Friedrich 13, 85
Nussbaum, Martha 150-51, 157
Objectif ication 19, 21, 23, 28-31, 39, 41, 45, 49, 







Plato 41-42, 47, 133-35, 140, 215 n.2
Polis 145
Political Ontology 15-17, 21-23, 26-27, 31, 34, 204 
n.5, 205 n.10 n.11
Postone, Moishe 203 n.9, 204 n.12, 209 n.22
Praxis 15, 38, 40, 44, 112, 140-41, 150-51, 154-55, 161
Psychogeography 15, 71-73, 78, 80-81, 144, 217-18 
n.2
Rancière, Jacques 31-32, 92, 105, 134, 140-42, 
146, 205 n.13
Rationalization 41, 44, 94-95, 102, 151, 171
Rauschenberg, Robert 61-62
Rebentisch, Juliane 133-35, 138-39, 141-42
Remembrance 39, 42, 50, 64-65, 128, 151, 210 n.12
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 133, 135, 138, 140, 208 n.17
Schönberg, Arnold 50-51
Searle, John 25-27, 205 n.8




Separation 11, 15, 29-30, 39, 70-71, 91, 93-104, 
134-36, 144, 145-46, 151, 164, 167, 169, 172-73
Seurat, Georges 102-06
Shapiro, Meyer 98
Simmel, Georg 81-82, 218 n.9.3
Sisi (Abdel Fattah El-Sisi) 14
Situationist International 15, 18, 33, 61-62, 
67-81, 111-14, 118, 124, 141, 144, 165, 167, 184-87, 
207 n.7, 212 n.3, 213 n.9, 214 n.14, 218 n.9.3
Solnit, Rebecca 219 n.5
Spectacle passim
Integrated 28, 94, 96, 112, 115-16, 119, 128, 
135, 137, 178, 212 n.4
Spectaculum 133
Spectator 18, 29, 33, 48, 92, 97, 99, 101-03, 
105-06, 112, 114, 119-127, 129, 133-34, 135-36, 
143-45, 205 n.17, 215 n.2 n.5
Spirit 39-43, 46
Standpoint 13, 22, 33, 153, 203 n.9
Stiegler, Bernard 138
Surplus value 55, 65, 189-90, 208 n.9, 210 n.9, 
218 n.10.3
Surrealism 61, 68-69, 71, 75-76, 210 n.7, 212 n.3
Taylorization 28, 183
Theatre 49, 118-19, 127, 133-35, 138-46, 214 n.15, 
215-16 n.1 n.2 n.3 n.5 n.11
Totality 14-15, 25, 31, 33-34, 40-43, 64, 81-82, 85, 
92, 95, 116, 135-36, 141, 160, 164, 174-77, 200, 
206 n.27, 207 n.3, 208 n.10, 209 n.25, 211 n.5.1, 
213-14 n.13, 217 n.12
Unconscious 41, 48, 69, 108, 126-27
Urbanization 82, 94
Utopia 59, 65, 67, 73, 80-83, 85, 87-88, 114, 116, 128
Value, Value Form 23-26, 49, 58-62, 94-97, 
119-20, 122-23, 125-26, 137-38, 149-50, 152, 
155-57, 190-91, 204 n.12, 208 n.9, 209 n.5, 210 
n.9, 214 n.17, 217 n.7, 218 n.10.3
Van Eyck, Aldo 76-78
Vanguard 22, 119
Vitalism 19, 163-78, 218 n.9.3
Webern, Anton 50-51
Wigley, Mark 81
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 44, 208 n.14
Workers’ Councils 31, 205 n.17
Xiaoping, Deng 9-10
Yiwu 9-10, 16
Žižek, Slavoj 55, 65, 206 n.27, 209 n.1

